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STATE OF IDAHO 
***************************************************************** 
Supreme Court No. 38196 
KATHLEEN McCALLISTER, Chapter 13 Bankruptcy Trustee, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
vs. 
GORDON DIXON, M.D., BLACKFOOT, MEDICAL CLINIC, INC. 
Defendant! Appellant 
***************************************************************** 
Appeal from the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District 
ofthe State ofIdaho, in and for the County of Bingham. 
Honorable Darren B. Simpson, District Judge, presiding. 
****************************************************************** 
Counsel for Appellant: REED W. LARSEN, ESQ., PO BOX 4229, POCATELLO, ID 83205-4229 
Counsel for Respondent: GARY T. DANCE, ESQ. PO BOX 817, POCATELLO, ID 83204 
***************************************************************** 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF STATE OF IDAHO 




GORDON DIXON, M.D., BLACKFOOT, 
MEDICAL CLINIC, INC. 
Defendant/Respondent, 
















Docket No. 38196 




Appeal from the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District 
of the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Bingham. 
Honorable Darren B. Simpson, District Judge, presiding. 
****************************************************************** 
Counsel for Appellant: 
Counsel for Respondent: 
Reed W. Larsen, ESQ., PO Box 4229, 
Pocatello, ID 83205-4229 
Gary T. Dance, Esq. PO Box 817, 
Pocatello, ID 83204 
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icial District Court - Bingham Co 
ROA Report 
Case: CV-2006-0002145 Current Judge: Darren B. Simpson 
Jerry Doherty, eta/. vs. Gordon E. Dixon Jr., eta/. 
User: MPRATT 
Jerry Doherty, Kathleen McCallister vs. Gordon E. Dixon Jr., Blackfoot Medical Center, Blackfoot Medical Center 
Date Code User Judge 
9/6/2006 SMIS MPRATT Summons Issued I GORDON E. DIXON James C. Herndon 
APPR MPRATT Plaintiff: Doherty, Jerry Appearance Through James C. Herndon 
Attorney Reed W Larsen 
MPRATT Filing: Ai - Civil Complaint, More Than $1000 No James C. Herndon 
Prior Appearance Paid by: Larsen, Reed W 
(attorney for Doherty, Jerry) Receipt number: 
0013294 Dated: 9/6/2006 Amount: $88.00 
(Check) 
NEWC MPRATT New Case Filed James C. Herndon 
11/15/2006 AMCO MPRATT Amended Complaint Filed James C. Herndon 
DFJT MPRATT and Demand For Jury Trial James C. Herndon 
SMIS MPRATT Another Summons Issued I Blackfoot Medical James C. Herndon 
Center clo Louis Kraml 
12/28/2006 MPRATT Notice of Transfer and Assignment James C. Herndon 
1/3/2007 ADMR VANORDEN Administrative Judge Reassignment (batch 
process) 
U16/2007 PERS MPRATT Personal Return Of Service - BLACKFOOT MED Darren B. Simpson 
CENTER 
!/22/2007 MISC MPRATT Acceptance of Service for Gordon Dixon by julian Darren B. Simpson 
Gabiola 
1/9/2007 APPR MPRATT Defendant: Dixon, Gordon E. Do Appearance Darren B. Simpson 
Through Attorney Gary T Dance 
APPR MPRATT Defendant: Blackfoot Medical Clinic, Appearance Darren B. Simpson 
Through Attorney Gary T Dance 
MPRATT Filing: 11A - Civil Answer Or Appear. More Than Darren B. Simpson 
$1000 No Prior Appearance Paid by: Dance, 
Gary T (attorney for Dixon, Gordon E. Do) 
Receipt number: 0004016 Dated: 3/9/2007 
Amount: $58.00 (Check) 
ANSW MPRATT Answer Darren B. Simpson 
HRSe MPRATT Hearing Scheduled (Telephonic Status Darren B. Simpson 
Conference 04/09/200709:15 AM) 
MPRATT Notice Of Hearing Darren B. Simpson 
123/2007 NOTe MPRATT Notice OF SERVICE - DEFS' FIRST SET OF Darren B. Simpson 
INTERROGATORIES AND REQUEST FOR 
PRODUCTION OF DOCS TO PL 
19/2007 HRHD MPRATT Hearing result for Telephonic Status Conference Darren B. Simpson 
held on 04/09/2007 09: 15 AM: Hearing Held 
HRSe MPRATT Hearing Scheduled (Telephonic Status Darren B. Simpson 
Conference 10/15/2007 09: 15 AM) 
HRSe MPRATT Hearing Scheduled (Pretrial 12/03/200709:00 Darren B. Simpson 
AM) 
HRSC MPRATT Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 01/07/200809:00 Darren B. Simpson 
AM) 5 Days 
MPRATT Notice Of Hearing Darren B. Simpson 
Date: 2/11/2011 
Time: 1 0:03 AM 
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Mediation Ordered - DUE 9/28/07 
Scheduling Order 
Judge 
Darren B. Simpson 
Darren B. Simpson 
Darren B. Simpson 
Stipulation to Dismiss with Prejudice Blackfoot Darren B. Simpson 
Medical Center 
Order of Dismissal of Blackfoot Medical Center Darren B. Simpson 
Civil Disposition entered for: Blackfoot Medical Darren B. Simpson 
Center, LLC, Defendant; Doherty, Jerry, Plaintiff. 
order date: 4/17/2007 
Notice of Service - First Set of Interrogatories Darren B. Simpson 
Notice of Mediator Selection - Marvin Smith Darren B. Simpson 
serv 1 defs ans to pi's 1 interogs Darren B. Simpson 
Notice OF TAKING DEPOSITION OF JERRY Darren B. Simpson 
DOHERTY 
Notice OF SERVICE - PL'S ANSWERS TO D'S Darren B. Simpson 
DISCOVERY REQUESTS 
SERV 1 PL'S SUPP RESP TO DEF 1 ST REQ Darren B. Simpson 
FOR PROD 
Notice of Service - Discovery Darren B. Simpson 
Stipulation to Amend Deadlines for Mediation, Darren B. Simpson 
Expert Witness Disclosure, and Discovery 
Order to Amend Deadlines for Mediation, Expert Darren B. Simpson 
Witnesses Disclosure, and Discovery 
Notice of Service - PI's 4th supp discovery Darren B. Simpson 
responses 
Notice of Service - PI's 2nd supp discovery Darren B. Simpson 
responses 
Stipulation to Continue Trial Darren B. Simpson 
Notice of Service - PI's 3rd supp discovery Darren B. Simpson 
responses 
Notice of Service - PI's 5th Discovery Response Darren B. Simpson 
Hearing result for Telephonic Status Conference Darren B. Simpson 
held on 10/15/2007 09: 15 AM: Hearing Held 
Hearing result for Jury Trial held on 01/07/2008 Darren B. Simpson 
09:00 AM: Hearing Vacated 5 Days 
Hearing result for Pretrial held on 12/03/2007 Darren B. Simpson 
09:00 AM: Hearing Vacated 
Hearing Scheduled (Telephonic Status Darren B. Simpson 
Conference 01/07/200809:00 AM) 
Notice Of Hearing 
Order CONTINUING TRIAL 
Order VACATING PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCE 
Minute Entry 
Darren B. Simpson 
Darren B. Simpson 
Darren B. Simpson 
Darren B. Simpson 
Date: 2/11/2011 
Time: 10:03 AM 
Page 3 of14 
District Court - Bingham Cou 
ROA Report 
Case: CV-2006-0002145 Current Judge: Darren B. Simpson 
Jerry Doherty, eta!. vs. Gordon E. Dixon Jr., eta/. 
User: MPRA TT 










































































Notice of Deposition Duces Tecum of Charles P. Darren B. Simpson 
Lawless, MD 
Notice of Service - PI's 6th Set of Discovery Darren B. Simpson 
Responses 
Notice OF SERVICE - DISCOVERY Darren B. Simpson 
Minute Entry Darren B. Simpson 
Hearing result for Telephonic Status Conference Darren B. Simpson 
held on 01/07/2008 09:00 AM: Hearing Held 
Hearing Scheduled (Telephonic Status 
Conference 02/11/200809:30 AM) 
Darren B. Simpson 
Notice Of Hearing Darren B. Simpson 
Hearing result for Telephonic Status Conference Darren B. Simpson 
held on 02/11/2008 09:30 AM: Interim Hearing 
Held 
Hearing Scheduled (Telephonic Status Darren B. Simpson 
Conference 05/19/2008 09:00 AM) 
Hearing Scheduled (pretrial/Status Conference Darren B. Simpson 
09/15/2008 09:00 AM) 
Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 10/21/200809:00 Darren B. Simpson 
AM) 
Notice Of Hearing 
Notice of deposition duces tecum of Gordon 
Dixon, MD 
Notice of Taking Depo of Robert R. Jones, MD 
(Duces Tecum) 
Notice of Taking Depo of Darryl G. Moffett, Jr., 
MD (Duces Tecum) 
Darren B. Simpson 
Darren B. Simpson 
Darren B. Simpson 
Darren B. Simpson 
Defs Motion to Compel Responses to Discovery Darren B. Simpson 
Affidavit in Support of Mtn to Compel Darren B. Simpson 
Notice of Deposition of Tina Gail 
Notice of Depostion of Jan Wray 
Notice of Depositon of Karrie Moore 
Notice of Deposition of Teresa Coombs 
Notice of Subpoena Duces Tecum - Portneuf 
Medical Center 
Minute Entry 
Darren B. Simpson 
Darren B. Simpson 
Darren B. Simpson 
Darren B. Simpson 
Darren B. Simpson 
Darren B. Simpson 
Hearing result for Telephonic Status Conference Darren B. Simpson 
held on 05/19/2008 09:00 AM: Hearing Held 
Notice of Service 1 PI's 2nd set of Discovery Darren B. Simpson 
Requests to Def 
Notice of Filing Depo Trans 1 TINA GAIL, JAN Darren B. Simpson 
WRAY, KARRIE MOORE, TERESA COOMBS 
Amended Notice of Taking Depo of Darryl G. Darren B. Simpson 
Moffett, Jr. M.D. (Duces Tecum) 
t1 
Date: 2/11/2011 
Time: 10:03 AM 
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Date Code User Judge 
6/23/2008 EXW MPRATT PI's Expert Witness Disclosure Darren B. Simpson 
7/2/2008 NOTC MPRATT Notice OF SERVICE I DEF'S ANSWERS TO PL Darren B. Simpson 
7/10/2008 NOTC MPRATT Notice of Taking Depo of John K. Davis, DO Darren B. Simpson 
(Duces Tecum) 
NOTC MPRATT Notice of Taking Depostiion of David Leach, MD Darren B. Simpson 
(Duces Tecum) 
NOTC MPRATT Notice of Service I Defs Discovery Responses to Darren B. Simpson 
PI 
NOTC MPRATT Notice of Deposition - Jason Joyner Darren B. Simpson 
NOTC MPRATT Notice of Deposition - Ashley Johnson Darren B. Simpson 
7/11/2008 NOTC MPRATT Amended Notice of Taking Deposition of David Darren B. Simpson 
Leach, MD (Duces Tecum) 
7/15/2008 STIP MPRATT Stipulation for Protective Order Darren B. Simpson 
(/17/2008 ORDR MPRATT Order for Protective Order Darren B. Simpson 
NOTC MPRATT Amended Notice of Taking Deposition of Jason Darren B. Simpson 
Joyner 
NOTC MPRATT Amended Notice of Taking Deposition of Ashley Darren B. Simpson 
Johnson 
'/24/2008 NOTC DISNEY SERV I DEF'S EXPERT WITNESS Darren B. Simpson 
DISCLOSURE 
'/30/2008 NOTC MPRATT Notice OF SERVICE I DEFS' EXPERT WITNESS Darren B. Simpson 
DISCLOSURE 
1/1/2008 NOTC MPRATT Notice OF SERVICE 1 DEFS' ANSWERS & Darren B. Simpson 
RESPONSES 
:14/2008 NOTC MPRATT Notice of Filing Depo Transcript 1 Darryl G. Darren B. Simpson 
Moffett, M.D. 
;18/2008 EXW MPRATT Defs Supplemental expert witness Disclosure Darren B. Simpson 
./13/2008 MOTN MPRATT PI's Motion for Mediation Order Darren B. Simpson 
NOTC MPRATT Notice of Hearing Darren B. Simpson 
HRSC MPRATT Hearing Scheduled (Motion 08/21/200809:00 Darren B. Simpson 
AM) 
MOTN MPRATT Motion to Shorten Time Darren B. Simpson 
115/2008 STIP MPRATT Confidentiality Stipulation Darren B. Simpson 
120/2008 NOTC MPRATT Notice OF TAKING DEPO I JEFFREY B. OPP- Darren B. Simpson 
DUCES TECUM 
NOTC MPRATT Notice OF TAKING DE PO I CINDY HURST - Darren B. Simpson 
DUCES TECUM 
NOTC MPRATT Notice to Vacate Hearing Darren B. Simpson 
HRVC MPRATT Hearing result for Motion held on 08/21/2008 Darren B. Simpson 
09:00 AM: Hearing Vacated Motion for 
Mediation Order 




Time: 1 0:03 AM 
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8/29/2008 HRSC MPRATT 
9/1012008 BRFD DISNEY 
AFFD DISNEY 
3/15/2008 BRFD MPRATT 
AFFD MPRATT 
NOTC MPRATT 
3116/2008 ADVS MPRATT 
~/18/2008 DCHH MPRATT 
DCHH MPRATT 
NOTC MPRATT 




12612008 NOTC MPRATT 
NOTC MPRATT 
MISC MPRATT 




SERV 1 DEF' 3RD SUPP ANS & RSPN TO PL'S Darren B. Simpson 
2ND INTERG & 1 ST REQ FOR PROD 
PL'S MOTN TO COMPEL Darren B. Simpson 
MEMO IN SUPP OF PL'S MOTN TO COMPEL Darren B. Simpson 
Affidavit OF REED LARSEN IN SUPP OF PL'S Darren B. Simpson 
MOTN TO COMPEL 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion To Compel Darren B. Simpson 
09/16/2008 10:30 AM) 
MEMO IN OPP TO MOTN TO COMPEL Darren B. Simpson 
Affidavit OF JULIAN GABIOLA (UNDER SEAL) Darren B. Simpson 
Reply Memo in support of PI's Motion to Compel Darren B. Simpson 
Affidavit of Javier L. Gabiola in support of Reply Darren B. Simpson 
Memo in Support of PI's Motion to Compel 
Notice of Depo Duces Tecum 1 Craig Bosley, MD Darren B. Simpson 
Hearing result for Motion To Compel held on Darren B. Simpson 
09/16/200810:30 AM: Case Taken Under 
Advisement 
Hearing result for Motion To Compel held on Darren B. Simpson 
09/16/200810:30 AM: District Court Hearing Hel( 
Court Reporter: SANDRA BEEBE 
Number of transcript pages for this hearing 
estimated: LESS THAN 100 PAGES 
Hearing result for Pretrial/Status Conference held Darren B. Simpson 
on 09/15/2008 09:00 AM: District Court Hearing 
Held 
Court Reporter: SANDRA BEEBE 
Number of transcript pages for this hearing 
estimated: LESS THAN 100 PAGES 
Notice OF SERVICE 1 PL'S SUPP ANSWERS Darren B. Simpson 
Certificate Of Mailing Jury Questionnaires 
Notice OF HEARING 1 MOTION FOR 
SANCTIONS 
Motion FOR SANCTIONS 
Affidavit of Reed Larsen 
Notice of Service 1 PI's responses to Def's 
Requests 
Notice of Deposition Duces Tecum 1 Craig G. 
Wells, MD 
Mediation Status Report 
Affidavit of Gary Dance in oppositiion to PI's 
Motion for Sanctions 
Memorandum in Oppositionto PI's Motion for 
Sanctions 
Affidavit of Reed Larsen 
r::: 
Darren B. Simpson 
Darren B. Simpson 
Darren B. Simpson 
Darren B. Simpson 
Darren B. Simpson 
Darren B. Simpson 
Darren B. Simpson 
Darren B. Simpson 
Darren B. Simpson 
Darren B. Simpson 
Date: 2/11/2011 
Time: 1 0:03 AM 
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Hearing Scheduled (Motion 10/20/2008 10:30 Darren B. Simpson 
AM) 
Notice OF HEARING Darren B. Simpson 
Motion TO SHORTEN TIME Darren B. Simpson 
Notice OF INTENT TO APPEAR BY PHONE 
Motion TO CONTINUE TRIAL 
Darren B. Simpson 
Darren B. Simpson 
Affidavit OF JAVIER GABIOlA IN SUPPORT OF Darren B. Simpson 
Pl'S MOTION TO CONTINUE TRIAL 
Amended Notice of Hearing Darren B. Simpson 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion to Continue Darren B. Simpson 
10102/2008 09:30 AM) 
2nd Affidavit of Gary Dance in Opposition to PI's Darren B. Simpson 
Motion for Sanctions 
Objection TO MOTION TO CONTINUE TRIAL Darren B. Simpson 
Minute Entry Darren B. Simpson 
Hearing result for Motion to Continue held on Darren B. Simpson 
10102/2008 09:30 AM: District Court Hearing Hel< 
Court Reporter: SANDRA BEEBE 
Number of transcript pages for this hearing 
estimated: lESS THAN 100 PAGES 
Hearing result for Motion to Continue held on Darren B. Simpson 
10102/200809:30 AM: Motion Granted 
Order GRANTING MOTN TO SHORTEN TIME Darren B. Simpson 
Affidavit OF REED lARSEN Darren B. Simpson 
Notice of Depo I Cindy Hurst, RN Darren B. Simpson 
Notice of Depo I Craig L. Bosley, MD Darren B. Simpson 
Notice of depo I David leach, MD Darren B. Simpson 
PI's Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for Darren B. Simpson 
Sanctions 
Affidavit of Javier L. Gabiola in support of PI's 
Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for 
Sanctions 
Hearing result for Motion held on 10/15/2008 
10:30 AM: District Court Hearing Held 
Court Reporter: SANDRA BEEBE 
Number of transcript pages for this hearing 
estimated: Pl'S MOTION FOR SANCTIONS 
Darren B. Simpson 
Darren B. Simpson 
Hearing result for Motion held on 10/15/2008 Darren B. Simpson 
10:30 AM: Motion Denied Pl'S MOTION FOR 
SANCTIONS 
Hearing result for Jury Trial held on 10/21/2008 Darren B. Simpson 
09:00 AM: Hearing Vacated 
Notice of Service 
Minute Entry for 10/15/08 hearing 
If) 
Darren B. Simpson 
Darren B. Simpson 
Date: 2/11/2011 
Time: 1 0:03 AM 
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10/23/2008 ORDR DISNEY Order granting in part and denying in part PI's Darren B. Simpson 
motn to compel 
10/29/2008 NOTC MPRATT Notice of Service 1 Discovery Responses to Defs Darren B. Simpson 
11/12/2008 NOTC DISNEY SERV 1 PL'S 10TH SUPP RESP TO DEF' 1ST Darren B. Simpson 
REQ FOR PROD 
11/21/2008 HRSC MPRATT Hearing Scheduled (Telephonic Status Darren B. Simpson 
Conference 12/22/200809:45 AM) 
MPRATT Notice Of Hearing Darren B. Simpson 
12/22/2008 HRHD MPRATT Hearing result for Telephonic Status Conference Darren B. Simpson 
held on 12/22/200809:45 AM: Hearing Held 
HRSC MPRATT Hearing Scheduled (Pretrial 05/11/200909:00 Darren B. Simpson 
AM) 
HRSC MPRATT Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 06/29/2009 09:00 Darren B. Simpson 
AM) 4 days 
MPRATT Notice Of Hearing Darren B. Simpson 
12/24/2008 NOTC MPRATT Notice OF SERVICE IDS' 4TH SUPP DISC Darren B. Simpson 
RESPONSES TO P 
1/22/2009 NOTC MPRATT Notice of Depo Duces Tecum 1 Mary Darren B. Simpson 
Barros-Bailey, Ph.D. 
1/23/2009 NOTC MPRATT Notice of Service 1 Discovery Responses to Def Darren B. Simpson 
126/2009 NOTC MPRATT Notice of Service 1 Discovery Requests to Plaintiff Darren B. Simpson 
~/2/2009 CO NT MPRATT Continued (Jury Trial 09/22/2009 09:00 AM) 4 Darren B. Simpson 
days 
CO NT MPRATT Continued (Pretrial 08/10/2009 09:00 AM) Darren B. Simpson 
~/3/2009 MPRATT Notice Of Hearing Darren B. Simpson 
ORDR MPRATT 3rd Amended Scheduling Order Darren B. Simpson 
110/2009 NOTC MPRATT Amended Notice of Depostiion Duces Tecum of Darren B. Simpson 
Mary Barros-Bailey, Ph. D. 
113/2009 NOTC MPRATT Notice of Service 1 PI's Discovery Responses Darren B. Simpson 
110/2009 EXW MPRATT DEFS' 3RD SUPP WITNESS DISCLOSURE Darren B. Simpson 
111/2009 NOTC MPRATT Notice OF FILING DEPO TRANSCRIPT 1 MARY Darren B. Simpson 
BARROS-BAILEY 
120/2009 EXW MPRATT PI's Expert Witness Disclosure Darren B. Simpson 
13/2009 EXW MPRATT Defs' Fact and Expert Witness Disclosure Darren B. Simpson 
18/2009 STIP MPRATT Amended Confidentiality Stipulation and Order Darren B. Simpson 
121/2009 HRSC MPRATT Hearing Scheduled (Telephonic Status Darren B. Simpson 
Conference 06/08/2009 10:00 AM) 
MPRATT Notice Of Hearing Darren B. Simpson 
'8/2009 CO NT MPRATT Continued (Jury Trial 09/29/200909:00 AM) 4 Darren B. Simpson 
days 
HRHD MPRATT Hearing result for Telephonic Status Conference Darren B. Simpson 
held on 06/08/2009 10:00 AM: Hearing Held 
MPRATT Notice Of Hearing 1 AMENDED 
r-f 
Darren B. Simpson 
Date: 2/11/2011 
Time: 10:03 AM 
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Minute Entry Darren B. Simpson 
Notice of Service 1 PI's Discovery Responses to Darren B. Simpson 
Def 
PI's Disclosure of Fact Witnesses 
Subponea Served 
defs motn in limine 
Darren B. Simpson 
Darren B. Simpson 
Darren B. Simpson 
defs memorandum in supp of motn in limine Darren B. Simpson 
Affidavit of Gabiola (under seal) in supp of limine Darren B. Simpson 
Affidavit of Gabiola (under seal) in supp of part SJ Darren B. Simpson 
defs motin for Part Summary Judgment 
Memorandum in supp of def's motin for Part 
Summary Judgment 
Notice of Hearing 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion For Summary 
Judgement 08/24/2009 11 :30 AM) 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion In Limine 
08/24/2009 11 :30 AM) 
Brief Filed: Defs Pretrial Memorandum 
PI's First Supplemental Expert Witness 
Disclosure 
Brief Filed: PI's PreTrial Memorandum 
Brief Filed: PI's Supp Pre-Trial Memorandum 
Minute Entry 
Hearing type: Pretrial 
Hearing date: 8/10/2009 
Time: 8:35 am 
Courtroom: 
Court reporter: 
Minutes Clerk: MARIELLE PRATT 
Tape Number: 
Party: Gordon Dixon, Attorney: Gary Dance 
Party: Jerry Doherty, Attorney: Reed Larsen 
Darren B. Simpson 
Darren B. Simpson 
Darren B. Simpson 
Darren B. Simpson 
Darren B. Simpson 
Darren B. Simpson 
Darren B. Simpson 
Darren B. Simpson 
Darren B. Simpson 
Darren B. Simpson 
Objection to Summary Judgment - Filed Under Darren B. Simpson 
Seal 
Hearing result for Pretrial held on 08/10/2009 Darren B. Simpson 
09:00 AM: District Court Hearing Held 
Court Reporter: SANDRA BEEBE 
Number of transcript pages for this hearing 
estimated: LESS THAN 100 PAGES 
PI's Second Supplemental Pre-Trial 
Memorandum 
PI's Motion in Limine 
Darren B. Simpson 
Darren B. Simpson 
Memorandum in Support of PI's Motions in Limine Darren B. Simpson 
Affidavit of Javier Gabiola in support of PI's Darren B. Simpson 
Motions in Limine fJ 
Date: 2/11/2011 
Time: 1 0:03 AM 
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Date Code User Judge 
8/17/2009 BRFD DISNEY defs reply memo in supp of Motn for Sum Jdmt Darren B. Simpson 
8/18/2009 BRFD DISNEY memo in opp to defs Motn in Limine Darren B. Simpson 
AFFD DISNEY Affidavit of Javier Gabiola in supp of opp to defs Darren B. Simpson 
Motn in Limine 
BRFD DISNEY defs memo in opp to pi's motn's in Limine Darren B. Simpson 
AFFD DISNEY Affidavit of Julian Gabiola in opp to pi's Motin in Darren B. Simpson 
Limine 
8/20/2009 BRFD DISNEY defs reply memo in supp of Motn in Limine Darren B. Simpson 
8/21/2009 MOTN MPRATI Motion for Enlargement of Time to Respond to Darren B. Simpson 
Defs' MSJ RE Judicial Estoppel 
AFFD MPRATT Affidavit of Reed Larsen in support of PI's Motion Darren B. Simpson 
for Enlargement of Time to Respond to Defs' MSJ 
RE: Judicial Estoppel 
AFFD MPRATT Affidavit of Javier Gabiola in support of PI's Darren B. Simpson 
Motion for Enlargement of Time to Respond to 
Defs'MSJ RE: Judicial Estoppel 
BRFD MPRATT Reply memorandum in Support of PI's Motions in Darren B. Simpson 
Limine 
AFFD MPRATT Supplemental Affidavit of Javier L. Gabiola in Darren B. Simpson 
support of PI's Opposition to Defs' Motion in 
Limine 
3/24/2009 DCHH MPRATT Hearing result for Motion For Summary Darren B. Simpson 
Judgement held on 08/24/2009 11 :30 AM: 
District Court Hearing Held 
Court Reporter: SANDRA BEEBE 
Number of transcript pages for this hearing 
estimated: LESS THAN 100 PAGES 
DCHH MPRATT Hearing result for Motion In Limine held on Darren B. Simpson 
08/24/200911 :30 AM: District Court Hearing Hel( 
Court Reporter: SANDRA BEEBE 
Number of transcript pages for this hearing 
estimated: LESS THAN 100 PAGES 
MNUT MPRATT Minute Entry Darren B. Simpson 
Hearing type: Motion For Summ Judgment/Motion 
in Limin 
Hearing date: 8/24/2009 
Time: 11 :39 am 
Courtroom: 
Court reporter: 
Minutes Clerk: MARIELLE PRATT 
Tape Number: 
Party: Gordon Dixon, Attorney: Gary Dance 
Party: Jerry Doherty, Attorney: Reed Larsen 
ADVS MPRATT Case Taken Under Advisement 1 Motions in Darren B. Simpson 
Limine & MSJ 
125/2009 HRSC MPRATT Hearing Scheduled (Oral Argument 09/11/2009 Darren B. Simpson 
10:30 AM) 
MPRATT Notice Of Hearing a Darren B. Simpson 
Date: 2/11/2011 
Time: 1 0:03 AM 
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Hearing Scheduled (Telephonic Status 
Conference 09/03/2009 01:45 PM) 
Notice of Telephonic Hearing 
Minute Entry 
Hearing type: Telephonic Status Conference 
Hearing date: 913/2009 
Time: 2:01 pm 
Courtroom: 
Court reporter: 
Minutes Clerk: MARIELLE PRATT 
Tape Number: 
Party: Gordon Dixon, Attorney: Gary Dance 
Party: Jerry Doherty, Attorney: Reed Larsen 
Judge 
Darren B. Simpson 
Darren B. Simpson 
Darren B. Simpson 
Hearing result for Telephonic Status Conference Darren B. Simpson 
held on 09/03/2009 01:45 PM: Hearing Held 
Notice of Hearing 
Hearing Scheduled (Telephonic Status 
Conference 09/09/200909:00 AM) 
Continued (Oral Argument 09/14/200909:30 
AM) 
Notice of Hearing for MSJ - Amended 
Supplemental Memorandum in Support of PI's 
Opposition to Defs' Motion to Dismiss RE: 
Judicial Estoppel 
Affidavit of Javier L. Gabiola in support of 
Opposition to Defs' Motion for Summary 
Judgment RE: Judicial Estoppel 
Affidavit of Jerry Doherty 
Darren B. Simpson 
Darren B. Simpson 
Darren B. Simpson 
Darren B. Simpson 
Darren B. Simpson 
Darren B. Simpson 
Darren B. Simpson 
Hearing result for Telephonic Status Conference Darren B. Simpson 
held on 09/09/2009 09:00 AM: Hearing Held 
Minute Entry 
Hearing type: Telephonic Status Conference 
Hearing date: 9/9/2009 
Time: 9:00 am 
Courtroom: 
Court reporter: 
Minutes Clerk: MARIELLE PRATT 
Tape Number: 
Party: Gordon Dixon, Attorney: Gary Dance 
Party: Jerry Doherty, Attorney: Reed Larsen 
Darren B. Simpson 
Hearing result for Jury Trial held on 09/29/2009 Darren B. Simpson 
09:00 AM: Hearing Vacated 4 days 
Hearing result for Oral Argument held on Darren B. Simpson 
09/14/200909:30 AM: Hearing Vacated 
Hearing Scheduled (Telephonic Status Darren B. Simpson 
Conference 09/29/2009 09:00 AM) 
Notice Of Hearing Darren B. Simpson 
\0 
Date: 2/11/2011 
Time: 10:03 AM 
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Date Code User Judge 
9/14/2009 BRFD MPRATT Defs Memorandum in support of Judicial Darren B. Simpson 
Estoppel Defense 
AFFD MPRATT Affidavit in support of Judicial Estoppel Defense Darren B. Simpson 
9/28/2009 ORDR MPRATT Order Granting Defs Motion for Partial Summary Darren B. Simpson 
Judgment 
9/29/2009 MNUT MPRATT Minute Entry Darren B. Simpson 
Hearing type: Telephonic Status Conference 
Hearing date: 9/29/2009 
Time: 9:03 am 
Courtroom: 
Court reporter: 




HRHD MPRATT Hearing result for Telephonic Status Conference Darren B. Simpson 
held on 09/29/2009 09:00 AM: Hearing Held 
HRSC MPRATT Hearing Scheduled (Telephonic Status Darren B. Simpson 
Conference 10105/200910:00 AM) 
MPRATT Notice Of Hearing Darren B. Simpson 
CONT MPRATT Continued (Telephonic Status Conference Darren B. Simpson 
10/13/2009 08:45 AM) 
MPRATT Notice Of Hearing Darren B. Simpson 
0/13/2009 MNUT MPRATT Minute Entry Darren B. Simpson 
Hearing type: Telephonic Status Conference 
Hearing date: 10/13/2009 
Time: 8:45 am 
Courtroom: 
Court reporter: 
Minutes Clerk: MARIEllE PRATT 
Tape Number: 
HRHD MPRATT Hearing result for Telephonic Status Conference Darren B. Simpson 
held on 10/13/200908:45 AM: Hearing Held 
HRSC MPRATT Hearing Scheduled (Telephonic Status Darren B. Simpson 
Conference 11/09/200909:45 AM) 
MPRATT Notice Of Hearing Darren B. Simpson 
1/9/2009 MNUT MPRATT Minute Entry Darren B. Simpson 
Hearing type: Telephonic Status Conference 
Hearing date: 11/9/2009 
Time: 9:45 am 
Courtroom: 
Court reporter: NONE 
Minutes Clerk: MARIEllE PRATT 
Tape Number: 
REED lARSEN, ESQ. 
JULIAN GABIOlA, ESQ 
HRHD MPRATT Hearing result for Telephonic Status Conference Darren B. Simpson 
held on 11/09/200909:45 AM: Hearing Held 
I t 
Date: 2/11/2011 
Time: 1 0:03 AM 
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Hearing Scheduled (Telephonic Status 
Conference 03/01/201009:00 AM) 
Notice Of Hearing 
Judge 
Darren B. Simpson 
Darren B. Simpson 
Hearing result for Telephonic Status Conference Darren B. Simpson 
held on 03/01/2010 09:00 AM: Interim Hearing 
Held 
Case Status Changed: inactive Darren B. Simpson 
Minute Entry 1 status conf Darren B. Simpson 
Minute Entry Darren B. Simpson 
Hearing type: Telephonic Status Conference 
Hearing date: 3/1/2010 
Time: 9:00 am 
Courtroom: 
Court reporter: 
Minutes Clerk: DISNEY 
Tape Number: 
Party: Blackfoot Medical Center, llC, Attorney: 
Gary Dance 
Party: Gordon Dixon, Attorney: Gary Dance 
Party: Jerry Doherty, Attorney: Reed larsen 
Hearing Scheduled (Telephonic Status Darren B. Simpson 
Conference 05/10/2010 09: 15 AM) 
Notice Of Hearing 
Order Regarding Notice of Bankruptcy 
Minute Entry 
Hearing type: Telephonic Status Conference 
Hearing date: 5/10/2010 
Time: 9:32 am 
Courtroom: 
Court reporter: 




Darren B. Simpson 
Darren B. Simpson 
Darren B. Simpson 
Hearing result for Telephonic Status Conference Darren B. Simpson 
held on 05/10/2010 09:15 AM: Hearing Held 
Hearing Scheduled (Telephonic Status Darren B. Simpson 
Conference 05/24/201009:00 AM) 
Notice Of Hearing 
Minute Entry 
Hearing type: Telephonic Status Conference 
Hearing date: 5/24/2010 
Time: 9: 15 am 
Courtroom: 
Court reporter: 
Minutes Clerk: MARIEllE PRATT 
Tape Number: 
REED lARSEN 
JAVIER GABIOlA I f\ 
JULIAN GABIOlA hi 
Darren B. Simpson 
Darren B. Simpson 
Date: 2/11/2011 
Time: 1 0:03 AM 
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Date Code User Judge 
5/25/2010 HRHD MPRATT Hearing result for Telephonic Status Conference Darren B. Simpson 
held on 05/24/2010 09:00 AM: Hearing Held 
HRSC MPRATT Hearing Scheduled (Motion For Summary Darren B. Simpson 
Judgement 07/07/201009:00 AM) 
MPRATT Notice Of Hearing Darren B. Simpson 
6/9/2010 MOTN MPRATT Motion for Joinder of Bankruptcy Trustee as a Darren B. Simpson 
Party Plaintiff 
BRFD MPRATT Second Supplemental Memorandumin Support of Darren B. Simpson 
PI's Opposition to Defs' Judicial Estoppel Defense 
and in Support of Motion for Joinder of 
Bankruptcy Trustee 
AFFD MPRATT Affidavit of Javier Gabiola in Support of PI's Darren B. Simpson 
Opposition to Defs' Judicial Estoppel Defense and 
in Support of Motion for Joinder of Bankruptcy 
Trustee 
3/10/2010 NOTC MPRATT Notice of Hearing 1 Motion for Joinder 17/7/10 @ Darren B. Simpson 
9:00 a.m. 
HRSC MPRATT Hearing Scheduled (Motion 07/07/201009:00 Darren B. Simpson 
AM) Motion for Joinder of Bankruptcy Trustee 
3/18/2010 BRFD MPRATT Defs' Supplemental Memorandum in Support of Darren B. Simpson 
Judicidal Estoppel Defendse 
717/2010 MNUT MPRATT Minute Entry Darren B. Simpson 
Hearing type: Motion For Summary Judgement 
Hearing date: 7/7/2010 
Time: 9:01 am 
Courtroom: 
Court reporter: SANDRA BEEBE 





DCHH MPRATT Hearing result for Motion held on 07/07/2010 Darren B. Simpson 
09:00 AM: District Court Hearing Held 
Court Reporter: Sandra Beebe 
Number of transcript pages for this hearing 
estimated: Motion for Joinder of Bankruptcy 
Trustee 
ADVS MPRATT Hearing result for Motion held on 07/07/2010 Darren B. Simpson 
09:00 AM: Case Taken Under Advisement 
Motion for Joinder of Bankruptcy Trustee 
DCHH MPRATT Hearing result for Motion For Summary Darren B. Simpson 
Judgement held on 07/07/2010 09:00 AM: 
District Court Hearing Held 
Court Reporter: Sandra Beebe 
Number of transcript pages for this hearing 
estimated: less than 100 pages 
ADVS MPRATT Hearing result for Motion For Summary Darren B. Simpson 
Judgement held on 07/07/2010 09:00 AM: Case 
Taken Under Advisement /5 
Date: 2/11/2011 
Time: 1 0:03 AM 
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Order Granting Defs' Motion for Summary 
Judgment and Substituting the Bankruptcy 
Trustee as the Party Plaintiff 
Judge 
Darren B. Simpson 
Appealed To The Supreme Court Darren B. Simpson 
Notice of Appeal Darren B. Simpson 
Filing: L4 - Appeal, Civil appeal or cross-appeal to Darren B. Simpson 
Supreme Court Paid by: Larsen, Reed W 
(attorney for Doherty, Jerry) Receipt number: 
0017218 Dated: 10/22/2010 Amount: $101.00 
(Check) For: Doherty, Jerry (plaintiff) 
Hearing Scheduled (Telephonic Status 
Conference 11/22/2010 09:45 AM) 
Notice Of Hearing 
Supreme Court Order Suspending Appeal I to 
allow for entry of judgment by District Court 
Minute Entry 
Hearing type: Telephonic Status Conference 
Hearing date: 11/22/2010 
Time: 9:49 am 
Courtroom: 
Court reporter: 
Minutes Clerk: MARIELLE PRATT 
Tape Number: 
Darren B. Simpson 
Darren B. Simpson 
Darren B. Simpson 
Darren B. Simpson 
Hearing result for Telephonic Status Conference Darren B. Simpson 
held on 11/22/201009:45 AM: Hearing Held 
Order Clarifying Summary Judgment Order 
Judgment as to Jerry Doherty 
Civil Disposition entered for: Doherty, Jerry, 
Plaintiff. Filing date: 11/24/2010 
Supreme Court Order changing title of appeal 
Darren B. Simpson 
Darren B. Simpson 
Darren B. Simpson 
Darren B. Simpson 
Supreme Court Order Requiring Amended Notice Darren B. Simpson 
of Appeal if Transcript is to be included 
Clerk's Record due 2/10/11 Darren B. Simpson 
Amended Notice of Appeal Darren B. Simpson 
)!f 
Reed W. Larsen (3427) 
COOPER & LARSEN, CHARTERED 
151 North 3rd Avenue, 2nd Floor 
P. O. Box 4229 
Pocatello, ID 83205-4229 
Telephone: (208) 235-1145 
Facsimile: (208) 235-1182 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 




GORDON DIXON, M.D., and 













Case No. -,) ) 4_5 
COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR 
JURY TRIAL 
COMES NOW the Plaintiff, and for his cause of action against the Defendant, complains and 
alleges as follows: 
JURISDICTION 
1. At all times material herein, Jerry Doherty was and is a resident and domiciliary of 
Bonneville County, Idaho; 
2. At all times material herein, Defendant Gordon Dixon, M.D., was and is a resident and 
domiciliary of Bingham County, Idaho, and was an employee/owner ofthe Defendant Blackfoot Medical 
Clinic. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
3. That at all times material herein, Jerry Doherty was a resident ofIdaho Falls, Bonneville 
County, Idaho. He was employed by Albertson's bakery and worked in Bingham County. 
4. That on September 12,2004, Mr. Doherty was working at the Albertson's bakery and 
was injured when a bakery cart, which cart had a bad wheel, when a metal portion of the bakery cart came 
into contact with Jerry Doherty hitting him in the left eye. As a result of this accident, Mr. Doherty's left 
eye was severely injured. 
5. That on September 12,2004, Mr. Doherty sought medical care from Gordon Dixon, 
M.D., a general practitioner in Blackfoot, Idaho, at the Blackfoot Medical Center. 
6. A prelitigation screening request was requested by the Plaintiff and was filed on the 28th 
day of August, 2006. That request is evidenced by attached Exhibit 1 which is incorporated by reference. 
This action should be held in abeyance until the completion of the prelitigation process. 
7. At all times Dr. Dixon was an employee acting in the course and scope of his employment 
with the Blackfoot Medical Clinic. 
CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Negligence) 
8. The standard of care for a medical provider of Mr. Dixon's skill and practice in Blackfoot 
for a left eye injury is to do a visual acuity test and to document that visual acuity test, both by record and 
exam. Dr. Dixon conducted no such test and gave Mr. Doherty no referral. Mr. Doherty had a loss of 
vision at the time ofthe accident. This loss of vision was reported to Dr. Dixon. Dr. Dixon failed to 
properly treat Mr. Doherty and as a result, Mr. Doherty lost his left eye. Mr. Doherty now has a prosthetic 
COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL - Page 2 
device in his left eye. Mr. Doherty has gone through at least seven surgeries and has been advised that if 
he would have been properly treated on September 12, 1004, by Dr. Dixon, he would not have lost his 
eye and would not have lost his vision. 
9. That the conduct of Dr. Dixon was below the standard of care existing in the community 
of Blackfoot at the time and as a result of this breach of standard of care, Mr. Doherty has been damaged. 
10. Not only did Dr. Dixon breach the standard of care for failing to provide a visual acuity test, 
the charting and record keeping is also in breach of the standard of care. 
11. As a direct and proximate result ofthe negligence of Dr. Dixon, Mr. Doherty has incurred 
medical expenses in the amount of$95,448.17. He is likely to incur future medical expenses. He has wage 
loss past and future and non-economic damages for pain and suffering and bodily disfigurement for the lost 
eye. 
12. Mr. Doherty has complied with the prelitigation screening process by filing the request, but 
the hearing has yet to be held. Mr. Doherty requests that by filing of this Complaint, the statute of 
limitations be tolled by operation oflaw and coupled with the prelitigation screening request which has been 
filed; and that the matter be held inactive until the prelitigation screen process is concluded. 
13. As a further direct and proximate cause of Dr. Dixon's negligence, Mr. Doherty has been 
required to retain the service of Cooper & Larsen, Chartered, to prosecute this matter and requests 
reasonable attorney fees and costs be awarded. 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays judgment against the Defendants, as follows: 
(1) for the sum of$95 ,448.17 for medical expenses, and for future medical expenses, together 
with interest accruing from the date of the accident; 
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(2) for past and future wages; 
(3) for general damages for pain and suffering in an amount to be determined at trial; 
(4) for reasonable attorney fees and costs as may be determined by the Court; and, 
(5) for such other and further relief as the Court deems proper. 
DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL 
A trial by jury on all issues is demanded. 
1M 
DATED this.l day of September, 2006. 
COOPER & LARSEN, CHARTERED 
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GEXNIBtT I 
Reed W. Larsen (3427) 
COOPER & LARSEN, CHARTERED. 
151 North 3m Avenue, 2nd Floor 
P.O.Box4229 
Pooatello, ID 83205-4229 
Telephone: (208) 235-1145 
Facsimile: (208) 235-1182 
IDAHO STATE BOARD OF MEDICINE 


















JERRY DOHERTY, by and through the undersigned counsel, hereby states his claim for medical 
negligence pursuant to Idaho Code § 6-101 et seq. as follows: 
1. That at all times material herein, Jeny Doherty was a resident ofIdaho FaIls, BonneVille 
County, Idaho. He was employed by Albertson's bakery and worked in Bingham County. 
2. That on September 12,2004, Mr. Doherty was working at the Albertson's bakery was 
injured when a bakery cart, which cart had a bad wheel, and a metal portion of the bakery cart came into 
contact with Jerry Doherty hitting him in the left eye. AE a result of this accident, Mr. Doherty's left eye 
was severely injured. 
3. That on September 12, 2004, Mr. Doherty sought medical care from Gordon Dixon, 
M.D., a general practitioner in Blackfoot, Idaho, at the Blackfoot Medical Center. 
PRELITlGATION SCREENING COMPLAINT -l'nge 1 
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4. The standard of care for a medical provider ofM"r, Dixon's s1d.Il and practice in Blaokfoot 
for a left eye injury is to do a visual acuity test and to document that visual acuity test, both by record and 
exam. Dr. Dixon conducted no such test and gave Mr. DohertynoreferraI. Mr. Doherty had a loss of 
vision at the time of the accident. This resulted from the failure to properly to treat Mr. Doherty . 
.Mr. Doherty has lost his lost his sight completely in his left eye and now has a prosthetic device in his left 
eye. Mr. Doherty has gone thro~ghat least seven surgeries and has been advised that ifhe would have 
been properly treated on September 12, 1004, by Dr. Dixon, he would not have lost his eye and would 
not have lost his vision. 
5. That the conduct of Dr. Dixon was below the standard of care existing in the community 
ofBlackfoot at the time and as a result of this breach of standard of care, NIr. Doherty has been damaged 
6. Not only didDr. Dixon breach the stmldard of care for :fu:ilingto provide a visual acuity test, 
the charting and record keeping is also in breach of the standard of care, 
7. Accordingly, Mr. Doherty seeks a probable cause finding from the hearing panel and the 
right to proceed with litigation against Dr. Dixon. Attached hereto are the pertinent chart records for 
Mr. Doherty from the Blackf'ootMedical Center, the Center for Sight, Dr. Moffitt, and Teton Retinal 
Institute. 
DATED this ~y of August, 2006. 
COOPER & LARSEN, CHARTERED 
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{lO 
Reed W. Larsen (3427) 
COOPER & LARSEN, CHARTERED 
151 NOlih 3rd Avenue, 2nd Floor 
P. O. Box 4229 
Pocatello, ID 83205-4229 
Telephone: (208) 235-1145 
Facsimile: (208) 235-1182 
IN THE DISTRlCT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRlCT OF THE 
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Case No. CV-2006-2145 
FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT AND 
DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL 
COMES NOW the Plaintiff, and for his cause of action against the Defendants, complains and 
alleges as follows: 
JURISDICTION 
1. At all times material herein, Jerry Doheliy was and is a resident and domiciliary of 
Bonneville County, Idaho; 
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2. At all times material herein, Defendant Gordon Dixon, M.D., was and is a resident and 
domi ciliary 0 fB ingham County, Idaho, and was an empl oyee/ owner of the Defendant Blackfoot Medical 
Clinic, Inc., and Blackfoot Medical Center, LLC. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
3. That at all times material herein, Jerry Doherty was a resident ofIdaho Falls, Bonneville 
County, Idaho. He was employed by Albertson's bakery and worked in Bingham County. 
4. That on September 12,2004, Mr. Doherty was working at the Albertson's bakery and 
was injured when a bakery cart, which cart had a bad wheel, when a metal portion ofthe bakery cart came 
into contact with Jerry Doherty hitting him in the left eye. As a result of this accident, Mr. Doherty's left 
eye was severely injured. 
5. That on September 12,2004, Mr. Doherty sought medical care from Gordon Dixon, 
M.D., a general practitioner in Blackfoot, Idaho, at the Blackfoot Medical Center. 
6. A prelitigation screening request was requested by the Plaintiff and was filed on the 28th 
day of August, 2006. That request is evidenced by attached Exhibit] which is incorporated by reference. 
This action should be held in abeyance until the completion of the prelitigation process. 
7. At all times Dr. Dixon was an employee acting in the course and scope of his employment 
with the Blackfoot Medical Clinic. 
CAUSE OF ACTION 
(N egligence) 
8. TIle standard of care for a medical provider ofMr. Dixon's skill and practice in Blackfoot 
for a left eye injury is to do a visual acuity test and to document that visual acuity test, both by record and 
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exam. Dr. Dixon conducted no such test and gave Mr. Doherty no referral. Mr. Doherty had a loss of 
vision at the time ofthe accident. This loss of vision was reported to Dr. Dixon. Dr. Dixon failed to 
properly treat Mr. Doherty and as a result, Mr. Doherty lost his left eye. Mr. Doherty now has a prosthetic 
device in his left eye. Mr. Doherty has gone through at least seven surgeries and has been advised that if 
he would have been properly treated on September 12, 1004, by Dr. Dixon, he would not have lost his 
eye and would not have lost his vision. 
9. That the conduct of Dr . Dixon was below the standard of care existing in the community 
of Blackfoot at the time and as a result of this breach of standard of care, Mr. Doherty has been damaged. 
10. Not only didDr. Dixon breach the standard of care for failing to provide a visual acuity test, 
the charting and record keeping is also in breach of the standard of care. 
11. As a direct and proximate result ofthe negligence of Dr. Dixon, Mr. Doherty has incurred 
medical expenses in the amount of$9 5,448.17. He is likely to incur future medical expenses. He has wage 
loss past and future and non-economic damages for pain and suffering and bodily disfigurement for the lost 
eye. 
12. Mr. Doherty has complied with the prelitigation screening process by filing the request, but 
the hearing has yet to be held. Mr. Doherty requests that by filing of this Complaint, the statute of 
limitations be tolled by operation oflaw and coupled with the pre litigation screening request which has been 
filed; and that the matter be held inactive until the prelitigation screen process is concluded. 
13. As a further direct and proximate cause of Dr. Dixon's negligence, Mr. Doherty has been 
required to retain the service of Cooper & Larsen, Chartered, to prosecute this matter and requests 
reasonable attomey fees and costs be awarded. 
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WHEREFORE, Plaintiffprays judgment against the Defendants, as follows: 
(1) for the sum of$95, 448.17 for medical expenses, and for future medical expenses, together 
with interest accruing from the date of the accident; 
(2) for past and future wages; 
(3) for general damages for pain and suffering in an amount to be determined at trial; 
(4) for reasonable attomey fees and costs as may be determined by the Court; and, 
(5) for such other and further relief as the Court deems proper. 
DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL 
A trial by jury on all issues is demanded. 
DATED this 4 day of November, 2006. 
COOPER & LARSEN, CHARTERED 
BY~ 
REED W. LARSEN 
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EXII1BIT I 
Reed W, Larsen (3427) 
COOPER & LARSEN, CHARTERED 
151 North 3rd Avenue, 2nd Floor 
P, O. Box 4229 
Pocatello, ID 83205-4229 
Telephone: (208) 235-1145 
Facsimile: (208) 235-1182 
IDAHO STATE BOARD OF MEDICDfE 


















JERRY DOHERTY, by and through the undersigned counsel, hereby states his claim for medical 
negligence pursuant to Idaho Code § 6-101 et seq. as follows: 
1. That at all times material herein, Jerry Doherty was a resident of Idaho Falls, Bonneville 
County, Idaho. He was employed by Albertson's bakery and worked in Bingham County. 
2. That on September 12, 2004, Mr. Doherty was working at the Albertson's bakery was 
injured when a bakery cart, which cart had a bad wheel, and a metal portion ofthe bakery cart came into 
contact with Jerry Doherty hitting him in the left eye. As a result ofthis accident, Mr. Doherty's left eye 
was severely injured. 
3. That on September 12,2004, Mr. Doherty sought medical care from Gordon Dixon, 
M.D., a general practitioner in Blackfoot, Idaho, at the Blackfoot Medical Center. 
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4. The standard of care for a medical provider of Mr. Dixon's skill and practice in Blackfoot 
for a left eye injury is to do a visual acuity test and to document that visual acuity test, both by record and 
exam. Dr. Dixon conducted no such test and gave Mr. Doherty no referral. 1\.1r. Doherty had a loss of 
vision at the time of the accident. This resulted from the failure to properly to treat Mr. Doherty. 
Mr. Doherty has lost his lost his sight completely in his left eye and now has a prosthetic device in his left 
eye. Mr. Doherty has gone through at least seven surgeries and has been advised that ifhe would have 
been properly treated on September 12,1004, by Dr. Dixon, he would not have losthis eye and would 
not have lost his vision. 
5. That the conduct of Dr. Dixon was below the standard of care existing in the community 
of Blackfoot at the time and as a result of this breach of standard of care, Mr. Doherty has been damaged. 
6. Not only did Dr. Dixon breach the standard of care for failing to provide a visual acuity test, 
the charting and record keeping is also in breach of the standard of care. 
7. Accordingly, Mr. Doherty seeks a probable cause fmding from the hearing panel and the 
right to proceed with litigation against Dr. Dixon. Attached hereto are the pertinent chart records for 
Mr. Doherty from the Blackfoot Medical Center, the Center for Sight, Dr. Moffitt, and Teton Retinal 
Institute. 
79th--
DATED this _co day of August, 2006. 
COOPER & LARSEN, CHARTERED 
PRELITIGATlON SCREENING COMPLAINT - Page 2 
Gary T. Dance, ISB No. 1513 
Julian E. Gabiola, ISB No. 5455 
MOFFATT, THOMAS, BARRETT, ROCK & 
FIELDS, CHARTERED 
412 West Center 
Post Office Box 817 
Pocatello, Idaho 83204 
Telephone (208) 233-2001 




Attorneys for Gordon E. Dixon, M.D., 
Blackfoot Medical Clinic, Inc. and 
Blackfoot Medical Center, LLC 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 




GORDON DIXON, M.D., BLACKFOOT 
MEDICAL CLINIC, INC. and BLACKFOOT 
MEDICAL CENTER, LLC" 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV-2006-2145 
DEFENDANTS' ANSWER TO FIRST 
AMENDED COMPLAINT AND 
DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL 
COME NOW, defendants Gordon Dixon, D.O., Blackfoot Medical Clinic, Inc., 
and Blackfoot Medical Center, LLC, by and through undersigned counsel, and respond to the 
plaintiffs First Amended Complaint as follows: 
DEFENDANTS' ANS\VER TO FIRST AMENDED 
COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL - 1 R:I ... IANSWER.doc 
FIRST DEFENSE 
I. 
The plaintiffs First Amended Complaint fails to state a cause of action upon 
which rehef can be granted against defendants. 
SECOND DEFENSE 
II. 
Defendants deny each and every allegation ofthe plaintiffs First Amended 
Complaint that is not expressly and specifically admitted in this Answer. The allegations are 
denied based upon defendants' belief that they are incorrect, false and/or misconstrue facts, or 
are denied based upon the lack of sufficient information on the part of defendants to admit or 
deny the same. 
III. 
Responding to Paragraph 1 ofthe plaintiffs First Amended Complaint, 
defendants lack sufficient information and/or knowledge to admit or deny the allegations in said 
paragraph and, therefore, deny the same on that basis at this time. 
IV. 
Responding to Paragraph 2 ofthe First Amended Complaint, defendants admit 
that Gordon Dixon, D.O., is a resident and domiciliary of Bingham County, Idaho, and an agent 
of Blackfoot Medical Clinic. Defendants deny the remaining allegations in Paragraph 2. 
V. 
Responding to Paragraph 3 of the First Amended Complaint, defendants are 
without sufficient information and knowledge to admit or deny the allegations in this paragraph 
and, therefore, deny the same on that basis at this time. 
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VI. 
Responding to Paragraphs 4 and 5 of the First Amended Complaint, defendants 
admit that Dr. Dixon is a family practitioner in Blackfoot, Idaho, and that he saw Mr. Doherty at 
the Blackfoot Medical Clinic on September 12, 2004 for a left eye injury. Defendants are 
without sufficient information and knowledge to admit or deny the remaining allegations of these 
paragraphs and therefore deny the same on that basis at this time. 
VII. 
Responding to Paragraph 6 of the First Amended Complaint, defendants admit 
that plaintiff filed a prelitigation screening request on August 31,2006. 
VIII. 
Responding to Paragraph 7 of the First Amended Complaint, defendants admit 
that Dr. Dixon was an agent of the Blackfoot Medical Clinic and acting within the course and 
scope of his agency when he treated Mr. Doherty. 
IX. 
Responding to Paragraphs 8, 9, 10, and 11 of the First Amended Complaint, 
defendants deny. 
x. 
Responding to Paragraph 12 of the First Amended Complaint, defendants admit 
that Mr. Doherty has complied with the prelitigatiol1 screening process. 
XI. 
Responding to Paragraph 13 of the First Amended Complaint, defendants deny. 
DEFENDANTS' ANSWER TO FIRST AMENDED 
COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL - 3 R\ ... \ANSWER.doc 
XII. 
Responding to the prayer for relief in the plaintiff s First Amended Complaint, 
defendants deny that the plaintiff is entitled to any relief against them. 
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES 
FIRST AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
XIII. 
By raising the following defenses, defendants make no admission of any kind and 
do not assume any burdens of proof or production not otherwise properly resting upon them in 
this lawsuit. Rather, defendants merely identify defenses to preserve them for all proper uses 
under applicable law. Defendants have yet to complete discovery in this case, the result of which 
may reveal additional defenses to the plaintiffs complaint. As such, defendants reserve the right 
to supplement, modify, or delete defenses after discovery is completed. 
SECOND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
XIV. 
Recovery against defendants is barred because no act or omission on their part 
caused or contributed to the plaintiffs alleged damages. 
THIRD AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
XV. 
The injury and damage, if any, allegedly sustained by the plaintiff may have been 
proximately caused by the negligence or fault of parties, persons, or entities other than 
defendants, including plaintiff, and the negligence of all such entities must be compared pursuant 
to the comparative negligence laws of the state ofIdaho. In asserting this defense, defendants do 
DEFENDANTS' ANSWER TO FIRST AMENDED 
COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL - 4 30 R:\ ... \ANSWER.doc 
not admit any negligent conduct, and to the contrary, expressly deny any such conduct on their 
part. 
FOURTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
XVI. 
The plaintiffs damages, if any, may have been caused by acts both superseding 
and intervening, and/or omissions of parties and entities other than defendants, over whom they 
had no control and no right of control. 
FIFTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
XVII. 
The plaintiff may have failed to mitigate his damages as required by law. 
SIXTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
XVIII. 
Dr. Dixon met the applicable standard of health care practice ordinarily provided 
by other similar health care providers in good standing in the same community. At the time and 
place of the alleged malpractice, and at all times, Dr. Dixon used reasonable care and diligence 
in the exercise of his judgment, skill, and application of his learning in accordance with his best 
judgment. Dr. Dixon in no way breached or deviated from the standard of care with providing 
these services. To the contrary, Dr. Dixon rendered the same medical treatment as would have 
been rendered by other health care providers of similar expertise at the time that the services 
were provided. 
DEFENDANTS' ANSWER TO FIRST AMENDED 
COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL - 5 R.I ... \ANSWER.doc 
SEVENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
XIX. 
Plaintiffs cause of action against defendant Blackfoot Medical Center is barred 
by the applicable statute of limitations. 
EIGHTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
xx. 
To the extent that the plaintiff has received compensation from collateral sources 
for the damages of which he complains, the plaintiff is barred from recovery of such sums from 
Defendants pursuant to provisions ofIdaho Code § 6-1606, or other law. Defendants are entitled 
to a set off against the plaintiffs damages, if any, for the amount he has been compensated by 
any other person, entity, corporation, insurance fund, or a governmental program. 
NINTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
XXI. 
Plaintiff cannot recover any damages against defendants on the basis that 
defendants did not do anything or fail to do anything which resulted in or caused the plaintiff's 
alleged damages. 
TENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
XXII. 
The plaintiffs damages, if any, are subject to the limitation on non-economic 
damages pursuant to Idaho Code § 6-1603. 
DEFENDANTS' ANSWER TO FIRST AMENDED 
COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL - 6 R\ ... IANSWERdoc 
ELEVENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
XXIII. 
Defendant Blackfoot Medical Center has no liability, vicarious or otherwise, in 
this matter, since it did not exist as an entity until August of2006. 
TWELFTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
XXIV. 
Defendant Blackfoot Medical Center has no liability under Idaho Code section 6-
1001, et seq., or Idaho Code section 39-4301, et seq., because it never had a physician/patient 
relationship with the plaintiff and owed no duty to the plaintiff. 
THIRTEENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
XXV. 
Some or all of the injuries claimed by plaintiff may have pre-existed the incident 
alleged in the complaint and may have been the result of medical factors and conditions, or other 
emotional or mental disorders, not proximately caused by any action of Dr. Dixon. 
WHEREFORE, defendants pray for judgment: 
1. Dismissing the plaintiffs complaint against them, with prejudice, without 
f,'Tanting any relief against them; 
2. Awarding defendants their reasonable costs and attomey fees incurred in 
defending this action; 
3. For other such relief as the Court deems to be just and equitable under the 
circumstances. 
DEFENDANTS' ANS'WER TO FIRST AMENDED 
COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL - 7 R:\...\ANSWERdoc 
DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL 
Defendants hereby demand a jury trial for all claims and causes of action stated 
by this answer, pursuant to Rule 38 ofthe Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. 
ai! 
DATED this ~day of March, 2007. 
MOFFA TT, THOMAS, BARRETT, ROCK & 
FIELDS, CHARTERED 
By ~ f ~~~~ 
Gary T. Dance - Ofthe Firm 
Attorneys for Gordon E. Dixon, M.D., 
Blackfoot Medical Clinic, Inc. and 
Blackfoot Medical Center, LLC 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
0-'& 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this _,_ day of March, 2007, I caused a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing DEFENDANTS' ANSWER TO FIRST AMENDED 
COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL to be served by the method indicated 
below, and addressed to the following: 
Reed W. Larsen 
COPPER & LARSEN, CHARTERED 
P.O. Box 4229 
Pocatello, ID 83205-4229 
Facsimile: (208) 235-1182 
(l'U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
( ) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
( '1Facsimile 
Gary T. Dance 
DEFENDANTS' ANS\VER TO FIRST AMENDED 
COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL - 8 R;\ ... IANSWER.doc 
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GORDON DIXON, M.D., BLACKFOOT 
MEDICAL CLINIC, INC. and BLACKFOOT 
MEDICAL CENTER, LLC" 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV-2006-2145 
ORDER OF DISMISSAL WITH 
PREJUDICE 
The parties' Stipulation for Dismissal with Prejudice, having duly and regularly 
corne before this Court, and good cause appearing therefor, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED, that Blackfoot 
Medical Center is hereby dismissed with prejudice, each party to bear their own costs and fees. 
i,1t) 
DATED this ~ day of April, 2007. 
ORDER OF DISMISSAL \VITH PREJUDICE - 1 3 [; R:\ ... \ORD~DISMISSAL-BLKFT-MED-CTR.doc 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 1Z- day of April, 2007, I caused a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing ORDER OF DISMISSAL WITH PREJUDICE to be served by 
the method indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
Reed W. Larsen 
COPPER & LARSEN, CHARTERED 
P.O. Box 4229 
Pocatello, ID 83205-4229 
Facsimile: (208) 235-1182 
Gary T. Dance 
MOFFATT, THOMAS, BARRETT, ROCK & 
FIELDS, CHARTERED 
Post Office Box 817 
Pocatello, Idaho 83204-0817 
Facsimile: (208) 232-0150 
ORDER OF DISMISSAL WITH PREJUDICE - 2 
(---rtJ.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
( ) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
( ) Facsimile 
W/D.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
( ) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
( ) Facsimile 
I vI- ,/'//. ~ 
epu'ty Clerk 
l/ 
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GORDON DIXON, M.D., and ) 
BLACKFOOT MEDICAL CLINIC, INC., ) 




CASE NO. CV 2006-2145 
ORDER GRANTING IN PART 
AND DENYING IN PART 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO 
COMPEL 
I. INTRODUCTION 
BEFORE THIS COURT is the Motion of the plaintiff, Jerry Doherty (hereinafter 
"Doherty"), to compel discovery from the defendants, Gordon Dixon, M.D. (hereinafter 
"Dixon") and Blackfoot Medical Clinic, Inc. (hereinafter "BMC").I Dixon and BMC 
oppose Doherty's Motion.2 This Court held a hearing on Doherty'S Motion on September 
16,2008.3 At that hearing, this Court took the matter under advisement. 4 
11 Plaintiffs Motion to Compel, Doherty v. Dixon, Bingham County case no. CV 2006-2145 (filed August 
21,2008) (hereinafter "Doherty's Motion"). This Court notes that defendant Blackfoot Medical Clinic, 
LLC was dismissed with prejudice in April of 2007. See: Order of Dismissal with Prejudice, Doherty v. 
Dixon, Bingham County case no. CV 2006-2145 (filed April 17,2007). 
2 Defendant's Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion to Compel, Doherty v. Dixon, Bingham 
County case no. CV 2006-2145 (filed September 10,2008) (hereinafter "Defendants' Memorandum"). 
3 Minute Entry, Doherty v. Dixon, Bingham County case no. CV 2006-2145 (filed September 17,2008). 
4 Id. 
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Having reviewed Doherty's Motion, the Defendants' Memorandum, the record in 
this matter, and the relevant authorities, this Court shall grant Doherty's Motion in part 
and deny Doherty's Motion in part. 
II. BACKGROUND 
Doherty alleges that on September 12,2004, he sought medical care from Dixon, 
a general practitioner with BMC, for an injury to his eye. 5 Doherty alleges that as a result 
of Dixon's negligent failure to properly treat Doherty'S injured eye, Doherty 10s1 his eye.6 
In his Motion, Doherty requests production of Jason Joyner, Doherty'S Physician 
Assistant (hereinafter "Joyner") for further examination, since Joyner, on advice of 
counsel, refused to answer questions regarding the report and conclusion of the 
prelitigation screening paneJ.? Doherty also requests Dixon's and BMC's Practice 
Partner software program. 8 
Dixon and BMC respond that Doherty is seeking discovery of the prelitigation 
screening panel proceedings through Joyner's deposition, which is prohibited under 
Idaho Code ("I.C.") § 6-1001 and Idaho Rule of Evidence ("I.R.E.") 520. 9 Dixon and 
BMC further argue that they have tendered all documents to Doherty regarding his 
medical records and therefore there is no need to produce the Practice Partner software 
(hereinafter the "Software"). 10 
5 First Amended Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial, Doherty v. Dixon, Bingham County case no. CV 
2006-2145 (filed November 15, 2008) (hereinafter the "Amended Complaint"), at p. 2. 
6 Amended Complaint, at p. 3. 
7 Doherty's Motion, at p. 1. 
8 Id. 
9 Defendants' Memorandum, at pp. 2-3. 
10 Defendants' Memorandum, at p. 2. 
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Doherty replied that Dixon and BMC waived any prelitigation screening privilege 
and that the Software is necessary to discover if Dixon made any changes to his 
September 12,2004 chart on Doherty after the fact. II 
III. DISCUSSION 
A. Standard of Review - Motion to Compel. 
This Court's review of Doherty's Motion is a matter of discretion. 12 Accordingly, 
this Court must correctly perceive the issue as one of discretion, act within the boundaries 
of such discretion and consistently with legal standards applicable to specific choices, 
and reach its decision by an exercise of reason. 13 
B. Joyner's Testimony before the Prelitigation Screening Panel is Privileged 
and Not Subject to Discovery. 
In 1976, the Idaho Legislature enacted statutes relating to the prelitigation 
screening of medical malpractice cases. 14 One of the declared purposes of the legislation 
was "to encourage nonlitigation resolution of claims against physicians and hospitals by 
providing for prelitigation screening of such claims by a hearing panel. 15 To accomplish 
that purpose, the legislation provided that prelitigation screening proceedings were 
"compulsory as a condition precedent to litigation. "16 
Idaho Code § 6-1001, which regards the formation of prelitigation screening 
panels in medical malpractice cases, reads as follows: 
II Reply Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff's Motion to Compel, Doherty v. Dixon, Bingham County 
case no. CV 2006-2145 (filed September 15,2008) (hereinafter "Doherty's Reply"). 
12 Sirius LCv. Erickson, 144 Idaho 38, _,156 P.3d 539,544 (2007). 
13 Sirius LC, 144 Idaho at _, 156 P.3d at 544 [citing: Schwan's Sales Enterprises, Inc. v. Idaho 
Transportation Department, 142 Idaho 826,831,136 P.3d 297,302 (2006)]. 
14 Ruddv. Merritt, 138 Idaho 526,530,66 P.3d 230, 234 (2003). See: I.C. §§ 6-1001, et seq. 
15 IQ. [citing: Ch 278, § 1, 1976 Idaho Session Laws 953]. 
16 Ruddv. Merritt, 138 Idaho at 530,66 P.3d at 234 [citing: I.C. § 6-1001]. 
3 
The Idaho state board of medicine, in alleged malpractice cases involving 
claims for damages against physicians and surgeons practicing in the state 
of Idaho or against licensed· acute care general hospitals operating in the 
state of Idaho, is directed to cooperate in providing a hearing panel in the 
nature of a special civil grand jury and procedure for prelitigation 
consideration of personal injury and wrongful death claims for damages 
arising out of the provision of or alleged failure to provide hospital or 
medical care in the state of Idaho, which proceedings shall be informal 
and nonbinding, but nonetheless compulsory as a condition precedent to 
litigation. Proceedings conducted or maintained under the authority of 
this act shall at all times be subject to disclosure according to chapter 3, 
title 9, Idaho Code. Formal rules of evidence shall not apply and all such 
proceedings shall be expeditious and informal. 
Idaho Code § 9-340C addresses the confidentiality of prelitigation screening panel 
records. It reads, in pertinent part: 
The following records are exempt from disclosure: 
* * * 
(10) The records, findings, determinations and decisions of any 
prelitigation screening panel formed under chapters 10 and 23, title 6, 
Idaho Code. 
Idaho Rule of Evidence 520 also addresses pre litigation screening panels, and 
specifically communications which take place before such panels. It reads: 
Rule 520. Medical Malpractice screening panel privilege. 
(a) Confidential Communication. A communication is a 
"confidential communication" under this rule if it is made in a proceeding 
conducted or maintained under the authority of Idaho Code §§ 6-1001 to 
6-1011 and is not intended for disclosure to third persons, except persons 
present to further the purposes of or participate in the proceeding, or 
necessary for the transmission of the communication. 
(b) General rule of privilege. In any civil action or proceeding, a 
medical malpractice screening panel or any member thereof, any party to 
the medical malpractice screening panel proceeding, and any witness or 
other person who participated in the medical malpractice screening panel 
proceedings has a privilege to refuse to disclose and to prevent any other 
person from disclosing a confidential communication under this rule. 
(c) Who may claim the privilege. The privilege may be claimed 
by any holder of the privilege or for such person through the person's 
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lawyer. The authority of the lawyer to do so is presumed in the absence of 
evidence to the contrary. 
Doherty argues that Joyner has been named as a witness for the defense and, as 
such, Doherty is entitled, under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure ("LR. C.P") 26(b), to 
discover what Joyner said during the prelitigation process so that Doherty may properly 
cross-examine Joyner for inconsistent statements. 17 In other words, Doherty argues that 
the privilege against discovery of a witness's testimony before a prelitigation screening 
panel vanishes if that witness is named as a witness in a civil proceeding. 
The very language of LR.E. 520(b) negates Doherty's argument. The privilege 
against testifYing about the prelitigation screening proceeding applies to any civil action. 
To erase that privilege by naming a person such as Joyner as a potential witness 
eviscerates the privilege entirely and renders the language of LR.E. 520(b) moot. 
Doherty then argues that Dixon and BMC waived the privilege of confidentiality 
of testimony before the prelitigation screening panel by "producing and expecting to have 
Joyner testify at trial."18 Doherty cites no authority for this proposition. 
It is axiomatic that persons with relevant lmowledge of medical care which is later 
called into question will be witnesses not only in a prelitigation screening process, but 
also at a later trial if the matter proceeds in such direction. Again, Doherty's premise, if 
true, entirely defeats the privilege extended to witnesses before a prelitigation screening 
panel. 
This Court finds no merit in Doherty's request for information from Joyner about 
Joyner's statements before the prelitigation screening panel. Such information, and any 
17 Doherty's Reply, at pp. 1-2. 
18 Doherty's Reply, at p. 2. 
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record thereof, is specifically excluded from discovery by I.C. § 9-340C and I.R.E. 
S20(b). Doherty has provided no argument or authority for circumventing the statutes 
and rule which prevent disclosure. Therefore, this Court shall deny Doherty's Motiop as 
it pertains to Joyner's statements before the prelitigation screening panel. 
C. Production of an Audit of the September 12, 2004 Note is Not Overly Broad 
or Unduly Burdensome and Could Reasonably Lead to Admissible Evidence. 
Doherty's second request involves the Software utilized by Dixon and BMC. 19 
Specifically, Doherty seeks to learn whether or not Dixon changed his note summarizing 
his September 12,2004 visit with Doherty.20 Dixon and BMC argue Doherty's request is 
overbroad and unduly burdensome for the reason that production of the Software to 
Doherty would violate BMC's agreement with the owner of the Software, Physicians 
Micro Systems, Inc. 21 
The record reveals that a process exists by which the Software can produce an 
audit on Dixon's September 12,2004 note (hereinafter the "Note") which audit will show 
whether or not changes have been made to the Note since its creation.22 Given the nature 
of the Doherty's claims against Dixon and BMC, discovery of any changes to the Note 
after its creation could reasonably lead to admissible evidence. This Court finds that 
whereas Doherty's request for the Software is overbroad and unduly burdensome, 
Dixon's and BMC's production of the audit of the Note is sufficiently tailored and 
precise to meet Doherty's request and to sufficiently protect Dixon and BMC. 
19 Doherty's Reply, at pp. 2-3. 
20 Doherty's Reply, at p. 3. 
21 Defendants' Memorandum, at pp. 7-8. 
22 Affidavit of Javier L. Gabiola in Support of Reply Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs Motion to 
Compel, Doherty v. Dixon, Bingham County case no. CV 2006-2145 (filed September 15, 2008) 
(hereinafter the "Gabiola Affidavit"), at Exhibit E, pp. 27-28. 
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For these reasons, Doherty's request for the Software shall be granted in part. 
Dixon and BMC shall produce an audit of the Note within a reasonable period of time 
from the date of this Order. 
IV. CONCLUSION AND ORDER 
Doherty has not shown any reason why the confidentiality of the prelitigation 
screening records or the privilege accorded to witnesses before a prelitigation screening 
panel should be overcome. Therefore, Doherty'S Motion, as it pertains to Joyner's 
testimony about his statements before the prelitigation screening panel is denied. 
Furthermore, Doherty'S request for the Software is overly broad and unduly 
burdensome. However, an audit of the Note could reasonably produce admissible 
evidence. Therefore, Doherty's Motion, in regard to the Software, shall be granted in 
part. Dixon and BMC shall produce an audit of the Note within a reasonable period of 
time following the date of this Order. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
'W 
DATED this dI day of October 20 
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GORDON DIXON, M.D., BLACKFOOT 
MEDICAL CLINIC, INC. and BLACKFOOT 
MEDICAL CENTER, LLC, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV-2006-2145 
DEFENDANTS~ MOTION FOR 
PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
COME NOW defendants, by and through undersigned counsel, pursuant to Rules 
56(b) and 56( c) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, and move the Court for partial summary 
judgment as to plaintiffs claim that Dr. Dixon breached the standard of care regarding his chart 
notes and medical records. 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT-1 Client1304566.1 
This motion is based on the pleadings in the Court's file, the Affidavit of Julian E. 
Gabiola in Support of Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, and the Memorandum 
in Support ofthe Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. 
Oral argument is requested. 
DATED this ~ay of July, 2009. 
MOFFATT, THOMAS, BARRETT, ROCK & 
FIELDS, CHARTERED 
By kukn f· t~ "-' 
Gary T. Dance - Of the Firm 
Attorneys for Gordon E. Dixon, M.D. 
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GORDON DIXON, M.D., BLACKFOOT 
MEDICAL CLINIC, INC. and BLACKFOOT 
MEDICAL CENTER, LLC, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV-2006-2145 
DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM IN 
SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR PARTIAL 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
COME NOW defendants, by and through undersigned counsel, and submit this 
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
This is a medical malpractice case. Plaintiff Jerry Doherty ("Doherty") alleges 
that Gordon Dixon, D.O. ("Dr. Dixon"), breached the standard of care regarding treatment that 
he provided Doherty on September 12, 2004, when he presented to the Blackfoot Medical Clinic 
following a work-related injury to his left eye. Doherty claims that as a result of Dr. Dixon's 
treatment, he lost all vision in his left eye. 
In addition, Doherty claims that Dr. Dixon's charting and record keeping of the 
September 12, 2004 visit was below the standard of care. First Amended Complaint, '110. As 
discussed more fully below, defendants submit that Doherty call11ot establish a prima facie claim 
that Dr. Dixon breached the standard of care with regard to his September 12, 2004 clinic note of 
Doherty's visit, because Doherty's standard of care expert, Jack Davis, D.O., admitted in his 
deposition that Dr. Dixon did not breach the standard of care and because there is no evidence 
that Dr. Dixon altered or changed the September 12,2004 clinic note. 
II. STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
A. Doherty's September 12, 2004 and September 20, 2004 Visits. 
On September 12,2004, Doherty presented to Dr. Dixon at the Blackfoot Medical 
Clinic for an evaluation of a work related injury to his left eye. Affidavit of Julian E. Gabiola in 
Support of Motion for Partial Summary Judgment ("Gabiola Aff"), Exhibit A, September 12, 
2004 medical record of Jerry Doherty; Exhibit B, Deposition of Jerry Doherty ("Doherty 
Depo."), 16:9-24; Exhibit C, Deposition of Jan Wray ("Wray Depo."), 20:10-25. Doherty had no 
visual loss, no pain within the eye itself, and no loss of ability to move his eye in all fields of 
vision. Pupillary reflex was brisk and symmetric. There was no anterior chamber hyphema. 
Posterior exam with handheld light was normal; the retina was normal in appearance with no 
DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION 
FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 2 Client: 1 
vitreous disturbance; and Doherty was able to move all extraocular muscles without restriction or 
pam. Gabiola Aff., Exhibit A. 
Dr. Dixon contacted Pocatello ophthalmologist Charles Lawless, M.D., by phone 
to discuss the nature and findings of Doherty's injury. Id.; Doherty Depo., 22:10-21; Wray 
Depo., 46:3 to 48:22. Dr. Lawless advised anti-inflammatories, ice, and pain medications as 
needed. Gabiola Aff., Exhibit A. Dr. Dixon advised Doherty to return in three days for a repeat 
exam. Gabiola Aff., Exhibit A; Doherty Depo., 22:22-25; Wray Depo., 49: 10 to 50: 18; Gabiola 
Aff, Exhibit D, Deposition of Jayson Joyner ("Joyner Depo."), 37:6-15. Dr. Dixon also 
instructed Doherty to return immediately to the clinic or emergency room ifhe had light flashes, 
loss of visual acuity, bleeding in the anterior portion of the eye consistent with hyphema, or pain 
that was unmanaged. Gabiola Aff., Exhibit A; Wray Depo., 49: 1 0 to 50: 18. 
Unfortunately, Doherty did not present on September 15,2004. Joyner Depo., 
32:25 to 33: 13. Instead, he presented to the Blackfoot Medical Clinic on September 20,2004. 
Gabiola Aff., Exhibit E, September 20,2004 medical record of Jerry Doherty. Doherty noticed 
that he had blood in the iris three days before he presented on September 20,2004, but did not 
seek medical attention as instructed. Id.; Joyner Depo., 35:21-25. Doherty was diagnosed with 
hyphema, and Dr. Dixon referred him to see Robert Jones, M.D., an ophthalmologist in 
Pocatello, Idaho, the same day. Id. Dr. Jones diagnosed Doherty with hyphema and referred 
him to Dr. Moffett, an ophthalmologist in Idaho Falls, Idaho. 
Dr. Moffett first saw Doherty on September 23,2004, and at that time, did not 
diagnose Doherty with a ruptured open globe. Dr. Moffett noted that Doherty had a vitreous 
hemorrhage, cataract, and hyphema, but no obvious open globe. Doherty saw Dr. Moffett four 
days later on September 27, 2004. At that time, Dr. Moffett decided he needed to conduct open 
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globe exploratory surgery to rule out an open globe, and at that time discovered an irregular 
scleral rupture with uveal prolapse near the superior rectus of the left eye. Doherty had further 
treatment to his left eye, but ultimately chose to have it removed. He claims that he lost his left 
eye as a result of Dr. Dixon's negligence. 
B. Dr. Dixon's Dictation of the September 12, 2004 Clinic Note. 
Doherty also claims that Dr. Dixon breached the standard of care with regard to 
his September 12,2004 clinic note of Doherty's visit. A day or two after Dr. Dixon saw Doherty 
on September 12, 2004, he dictated the clinic note. Gabiola Aff., Exhibit F, Deposition of 
Gordon Dixon, D.O. ("Dixon Depo."), 75:11-16. Dr. Dixon dictates his clinic notes in batches 
on tape. He then gives the tape to a transcriptionist who transcribes the dictations onto a Word 
Perfect file. Gabiola AfC Exhibit G, Deposition of Ashley Johnson ("Johnson Depo. "), 11 :25 to 
12:10; 13:19 to 14:13; Exhibit H, Deposition of Karrie Moore ("Moore Depo."), 37:15-24; 39:21 
to 40:24; Exhibit I, Deposition of Tina Gail ("Gail Depo."), 26:19 to 27:3. The transcriptionist 
then loads the Word Perfect file in Practice Partner (a medical record software program), which 
is reviewed by Dr. Dixon and then electronically signed. Johnson Depo., 11 :25 to 12: 1 0; Moore 
Depo.,41:18-24. Dr. Dixon does not see the Word Perfect transcription of the clinic note, as he 
did not have access to the Word Perfect program. Only transcriptionists had access to the Word 
Perfect program. Johnson Depo., 20: 17-24. The only time Dr. Dixon would see the clinic note 
is after it is loaded onto Practice Partner. Johnson Depo., 12: 11-24. Ashley Johnson was the 
transcriptionist who transcribed the September 12, 2004 clinic note into Word Perfect, and she 
loaded it onto Practice Partner on September 21,2004. Gabiola Aff., Exhibit J. 
If any changes were made to the Practice Partner version, they would be reflected 
on the document when the physician electronically signed it. One can compare the Word Perfect 
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document (see Gabiola Aff., Exhibit K) with the electronically signed Practice Partner document 
(Gabiola Aff., Exhibit A) to determine if there were any changes made. Johnson Depo., 20: 17-
24; Moore Depo., 43:1-21. There are none. Gail Depo., 25:19 to 26:7. Furthermore, changes to 
a clinic note can be made only in Practice Partner. When they are made, Practice Partner 
requires an electronic signature in order for the changes to be allowed. Johnson Depo., 18:21 to 
19:2; Moore Depo., 41: 18-24. If the Practice Partner document is not electronically signed, then 
the changes are not made to the document. Johnson Depo., 19:3-10; Moore Depo., 42:23-25. 
Dr. Dixon testified in his deposition that he did not change his September 12, 
2004 clinic note after Doherty returned to the clinic on September 20, 2004. Dixon Depo., 75:20 
to 76:6. Since the filing of Doherty's First Amended Complaint, on April 17, 2009, an audit was 
conducted of Dr. Dixon's September 12,2004 clinic note. Gabiola Aff, Exhibit L, April 17, 
2009 email from Calvin Chaney (Practice Partner) to Javier Gabiola. After running the audit 
utility twice, it was confirmed that no changes had been made to the clinic note. Id. 
III. ARGUMENT 
A. Summary Judgment Standard 
Rule 56( c) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure provides that summary judgment 
"shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions and admissions on file, together with 
the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the 
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Idaho Bldg. Contractors Ass 'n v. City 
a/Coeur d'Alene, 126 Idaho 740, 890 P.2d 326 (1995); Avila v. Wahlquist, 126 Idaho 745,890 
P.2d 331 (1995). In making this determination, the Court should liberally construe the facts in 
the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. Id. The non-moving party should also 
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be given the benefit of all favorable inferences which might be reasonably drawn from the entire 
record. ld. 
In response to a motion for summary judgment, the non-moving party must 
affimlatively present evidence establishing each element of the claim; the motion cannot rest 
merely upon pleadings or unsupported assertions. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,322-
23,106 S. Ct. 2548, L. Ed. 2d 265 (1986); Badell v. Beeks, 115 Idaho 101,765 P.2d 126 (1988). 
Thus, "summary judgment should be granted if the evidence in opposition to the motion is 
merely colorable or is not significantly probative." G&M Farms v. Funk Irrigation Co., 119 
Idaho 514,517,808 P.2d 851,854 (1991). 
No affirmative duty to produce evidence rests on the party moving for summary 
judgment, and the moving party has no obligation to negate the opponent's claims. ld. 
However,the moving party always bears the burden of proving the absence of any genuine issue 
of a material fact. Petricevich v. Salmon River Canal Co., 92 Idaho 865,452 P.2d 362 (1969). 
Finally, a motion for summary judgment must be granted if reasonable persons 
cannot draw conflicting inferences or reach different conclusions from the evidence. Doe v. 
Durtschi, '110 Idaho 466, 470,716 P.2d 1238, 1242 (1986). The Idaho Supreme Court has stated 
'''[AJ mere scintilla of evidence or only slight doubt as to the facts' is not sufficient to create a 
genuine issue for purposes of summary judgment. The non-moving party 'must respond to the 
summary judgment motion with specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial. '" 
Marchand v. JEM Sportwear, Inc., 143 Idaho 458, 458-459, 147 P.3d 90,90-91 (2006) (quoting 
Samuel v. Hepworth, Nungester & Lezamiz, 134 Idaho 84, 87, 996 P.2d 303,306 (2000)). 
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B. There is No Genuine Issue of Material Fact That Dr. Dixon Breached the 
Standard of Care With Regard to the September 12, 2004 Clinic Note. 
There is no genuine issue of material fact that Dr. Dixon breached the standard of 
care with regard to his September 12,2004 clinic note of Doherty's visit, because Doherty's 
standard of care expert, Dr. Davis, testified in his deposition that Dr. Dixon did not breach the 
standard of care. Idaho Code section 6-1012 requires a plaintiff to present expert witness 
testimony that a breach of the standard of care occurred. Without such testimony, Doherty 
cannot establish that Dr. Dixon committed malpractice regarding the September 12, 2004 clinic 
note. 
In addition, there is no evidence that Dr. Dixon altered the September 12,2004 
clinic note or that he dictated the clinic note after Doherty's September 20,2004 visit. 
Therefore, Doherty's claim that Dr. Dixon's chart note breached the standard of care should be 
dismissed with prejudice. 
1. To avoid summary judgment for the defense in a medical malpractice 
case, the plaintiff must offer expert testimony indicating that the 
defendant health care provider negligently failed to meet the 
applicable community standard of health care practice. 
The elements of a medical malpractice claim are similar to other negligence 
claims. The plaintiff must establish: (1) the existence of a physician-patient relationship; (2) a 
duty of care, imposed by law, requiring the physician to conform to a certain standard of 
conduct; (3) a breach of that duty; (4) proximate cause; and (5) actual loss or damage. Dekker v. 
Magic Valley Reg. Med. Ctr., 115 Idaho 332, 766 P.2d 1213 (1988); Conrad v. St. Clair, 100 
Idaho 401, 404,599 P.2d 292, 295 (1979). Under Idaho law, a medical malpractice plaintiff 
must establish two of these elements, duty and breach of duty, by expert medical testimony. 
IDAHO CODE §§ 6-1012 and 6-1013. 
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According to the Idaho Code, proof of the community standard of health care is 
necessary in order to establish a claim for medical malpractice. § 6-1012. The applicable 
standard of practice and the defendant's failure to meet such standard must be established by the 
testimony of "one or more knowledgeable, competent expert witnesses." § 6-1013. To avoid 
summary judgment for the defense in a medical malpractice case, the plaintiff must offer expert 
testimony indicating that the defendant health care provider negligently failed to meet the 
applicable community standard of health care practice. In order for such expert testimony to be 
admissible, the plaintiff must lay a foundation required by Idaho Code Section 6-1013. Dulaney 
v. St. Alphonsus Reg 'I Med. Ctr., 137 Idaho 160, 164,45 P.3d 816, 820 (2002); Rhodehouse v. 
Stutts, 125 Idaho 208, 212,868 P.2d 1224, 1228 (1994) ("The question of whether an adequate 
foundation has been laid to express such medical testimony is an admissibility question that must 
be analyzed before applying the liberal construction and reasonable inference rules required in 
motions for summary judgment."). To do so, the plaintiff must offer evidence showing: (a) that 
such an opinion is actually held by the expert witness; (b) that the expert witness can testify to 
the opinion with a reasonable degree of medical certainty; ( c) that the expert witness possesses 
professional knowledge and expertise; and (d) that the expert witness has actual knowledge of 
the applicable community standard of care to which his expert opinion testimony is addressed. 
Dulaney, 137 Idaho at 164,45 P.3d at 820. 
Furthermore, "Idaho law defines the applicable standard of care as: (a) the 
standard of care for the class of health care provider to which the defendant belonged and was 
functioning, taking into account the defendant's training, experience, and fields of medical 
specialization, if any; (b) as such standard existed at the time of the defendant's alleged 
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negligence; and (c) as such standard existed at the place of the defendant's alleged negligence. 
Id. 
2. Doilerty's standard of care expert, Dr. Davis, testified that Dr. Dixon 
did not breach the standard of care with regard to the September 12, 
2004 clinic note. 
In his First Amended Complaint, Doherty alleges: "Not only did Dr. Dixon 
breach the standard of care for failing to provide a visual acuity test, the charting and record 
keeping is also in breach of the standard of care." First Amended Complaint, ,r 10. Doherty has 
no evidence that Dr. Dixon breached the standard of care regarding his September 12, 2004 chart 
note. Dr. Davis testified in his deposition that he does not believe Dr. Dixon lied in his 
September 12,2004 chart note: 
Q. Doctor, just a follow-up with respect to that last issue, 
because I had asked you whether you had any opinions and you 
have told me you had none, and now you have come up with 
another opinion regarding the medical record. So let me ask you a 
question regarding that. Do you have allY reason to believe that 
my client lied about the visit that he had with this patient on 
September 12 of 2004? 
A. I believe you said that he lied? 
Q. Yes. 
A. No. 
Gabiola Aff., Exhibit M, Deposition of Jack Davis, D.O. ("Davis Depo."), 73:7-17 (emphasis 
added). Dr. Davis further explained that Dr. Dixon's chart note did not deviate from the standard 
of care: 
Q. Do you have any opinion that his record of what he did do and 
what he didn't do is not accurate? 
MR. GABIOLA: I'll object, it's been asked and answered. Go 
ahead. 
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A. My opinion continues to be that I believe that there is an 
incongruency in the record. Do I believe that there is a lie? I 
dOIl't. 
Q. Do you believe that the record was in any way tampered with, 
dictated after the events of 9/20, or are you going to express any of 
those opinions? Because if you are, we are going to have to get 
into them. 
A. It's not opinion, it's fact, and you asked me about opinions. 
The fact is that the patient was seen on 9/12 and there wasn't a 
record generated or signed by a physician until 10111 and a follow-
up visit was on 9/20, and that's before 10/11. Those are factual 
representations in the medical record. 
Q. And is that a deviation from the standard of care? 
A. No. 
Davis Depo., 73:18 to 74:12 (emphasis added). 
Dr. Davis is Doherty's standard of care expert. He has testified that Dr. Dixon did 
not lie in his September 12,2004 chart note, and he has testified that Dr. Dixon's September 12, 
2004 chart note does not breach the standard of care. Absent any expert testimony, Doherty's 
claim that Dr. Dixon breached the standard of care regarding his September 12, 2004 chart note 
cannot be sustained and should be dismissed as a matter of law. 
3. There is no evidence that Dr. Dixon changed his September 12, 2004 
clinic note. 
Dr. Dixon dictated his September 12, 2004 clinic note a day or two after the visit, 
but well before Doherty's September 20, 2004 visit. Dr. Dixon dictates batches of clinic notes 
onto a tape, which is given to a transcriptionist who transcribes the dictation onto a Word Perfect 
file. Gabiola Aff, Exhibit J. One can see clearly that Dr. Dixon dictated Doherty's September 
12,2004 visit well before September 20,2004, as there are dictations of patient visits following 
DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION 
FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 10 57 Client: 1 
September 12,2004 in the clinic notes that Dr. Dixon dictated from September 12, 2004 to 
September 20, 2004. Gabiola Aff., Exhibit J. 
Additionally, Dr. Dixon did not make any changes to his September 12, 2004 
clinic note. Once the transcriptionist receives Dr. Dixon's dictation tape and transcribes the 
dictations into a Word Perfect file, it is then saved into Practice Partner. Dr. Dixon does not 
review or even see the Word Perfect file, as he does not have access to the clinic's Word Perfect 
program. The first time Dr. Dixon sees the clinic note is after it is loaded onto Practice Partner. 
If any changes were made to the Practice Partner version, they would be reflected on the 
document when the physician electronically signed it. One can compare the Word Perfect 
document (see Gabiola Aff., Exhibit J) with the electronically signed Practice Partner document 
(Gabiola Aff., Exhibit A) to detenuine ifthere were any changes made. There are none. 
Furthennore, changes to a clinic note can be made only in Practice Partner and when they are 
made, Practice Partner requires an electronic signature in order for the changes to be allowed. If 
the Practice Partner document is not electronically signed, then the changes are not made to the 
document. Finally, on April 17,2009, an audit was conducted of Dr. Dixon's September 12, 
2004 clinic note, and it was confinued that he did not make any changes to that clinic note. 
Accordingly, under Section 6-1012, Dr. Dixon submits that Doherty's claim 
regarding charting and record keeping, i.e., paragraph 10 of the First Amended Complaint, 
should be dismissed as a matter of law, as there is no genuine issue of material fact to support 
such a claim. 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing argument and authority, defendants respectfully request 
that the Court grant their Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. 
DATED this 1.> ~y of July, 2009. 
MOFFATT, THOMAS, BARRETT, ROCK & 
FIELDS, CHARTERED 
BY~/i;if~~' 
Attorneys for Gordon E. Dixon, M.D. 
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GORDON DIXON, M.D., BLACKFOOT 
MEDICAL CLINIC, INC. and BLACKFOOT 
MEDICAL CENTER, LLC, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV-2006-2145 
DEFENDANTS'REPLY 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
COME NOW defendants, by and through undersigned counsel, and submit this 
Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Contrary to plaintiff Jerry Doherty's ("Doherty") arguments, he is required to 
affirmatively prove with direct expert testimony his claim that Dr. Dixon's September 12,2004, 
chart note breached the standard of care. In addition, Doherty has not disclosed any expert 
testimony to establish that Dr. Dixon's September 12, 2004, chart note caused his left eye vision 
loss. Finally, there is no evidence that Dr. Dixon dictated his September 12, 2004, chart note on 
September 20, 2004, and there is no evidence that Dr. Dixon altered his September 12, 2004, 
chart note. Accordingly, defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law as to Doherty's 
claim that Dr. Dixon breached the standard of care regarding his September 12,2004, chart note. 
RELEV ANT FACTS 
Doherty claims that Dr. Dixon could not remember when he dictated his 
September 12, 2004, chart note. On the contrary, he testified that he dictated his September 12, 
2004, chart note a day or two after the visit: 
Q. Dr. Dixon, on 9/12 of '04, this visit (indicating), did you 
dictate that that day or the day after? 
A. The day after? 
Q. Yes. 
A. Like [did one or two days. 
Q. So you did this in one or two days? 
A. UII-hull (Witness nods head affirmatively.) 
Affidavit ofJulian E. Gabiola in Support of Motion for Partial Summary Judgment ("Julian 
Gabiola Aff. in Supp. ofMtn. for Partial Summ. Judg."), Exhibit F, Deposition of Gordon 
Dixon, D.O. ("Dixon Depo."), 75: 11-18 (emphasis added). 
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Doherty also claims that Dr. Dixon admitted he incorporated into his 
September 12, 2004, chart note what he learned from Doherty's September 20,2004, visit with 
Jayson Joyner. Again, this is contrary to what Dr. Dixon said in his deposition: 
Q. Did you ever go back and change this? 
A. No. 
Q. Did you find out what was going to happen on the 20th and 
put it in this note (indicating)? 
A. Yes. 
Q. No, did you, when you saw him 011 the 20th, did you 
change this note? 
A. No. 
Q. And you did all of these things on this day (indicating)? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And this is true (indicating)? 
A. Yes. 
Q. By true, and I am pointing to 9/12, Exhibit No.2. 
A. Yes. 
Dixon Depo., 75: 19 - 76:9 (emphasis added). 
Doherty also claims that it is important to note that the clinic staff did not know 
when Dr. Dixon dictated his clinic note. This is inelevant and does not create a reasonable 
inference that Dr. Dixon dictated his chart note on September 20, 2004, or that he changed it. 
Dr. Dixon dictates his clinic notes in batches on tape. Julian Gabiola Aff. in Supp. ofMtn. for 
Partial Summ. Judg., Exhibit K. Whether the transcriptionist Imows when Dr. Dixon dictates a 
chart note is inelevant, since Dr. Dixon testified that he dictated his September 12, 2004, chart 
note a day or two after he saw Doherty. We also can look at the WordPerfect files of 
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Dr. Dixon's 9/12/04 through 9/20104 patient visits and determine that he did not dictate the 
September 12, 2004, Doherty visit on September 20, 2004. 
Doherty highlights the fact that Jayson Joyner did not have Dr. Dixon's 
September 12, 2004, chart note when Joyner saw Doherty on September 20,2004. This fact is of 
no relevance, as defendants have explained that Ashley Johnson was the transcriptionist who 
transcribed the September 12,2004, clinic note into WordPerfect, and she loaded it into Practice 
Partner on September 21, 2004. Julian Gabiola Aff. in Supp. of Mtn. for Partial Summ. Judg. 
Exhibit J. Obviously, Joyner would not have Dr. Dixon's chart note on September 20,2004, 
when it was loaded into Practice Partner a day later. This does not create a reasonable inference 
that Dr. Dixon dictated his September 12, 2004, chart note on September 20, 2004. 
Doherty relies upon his standard of care expert, Jack Davis, D.O., to argue that 
there is an incongruity in Dr. Dixon's September 12, 2004, chart note and a concern that 
Dr. Dixon altered his chart note because he signed it on October 11,2004. Doherty fails to point 
to any evidence in the record to support Dr. Davis' incongruity opinion. Furthermore, the fact 
that Dr. Dixon signed his chart note on October 11,2004, does not create a reasonable inference 
that he changed the note. If any changes were made to the Practice Partner version, they would 
be reflected on the document when the physician electronically signed it. One can compare the 
WordPerfect document (Julian Gabiola Aff. in Supp. ofMtn. for Partial Summ. Judg., Exhibit K) 
with the electronically signed Practice Partner document (Julian Gabiola Aff. in Supp. of Mtn. 
for Pmiial Summ. Judg., Exhibit A) to determine ifthere were any changes made. Johnson 
Depo., 20:17-24; Moore Depo., 43:1-21. There are none. Gail Depo., 25:19 - 26:7. Finally, on 
April 17,2009, an audit was conducted of Dr. Dixon's September 12,2004, clinic note. Julian 
Gabio1a Aff. in Supp. ofMtn. for Partial Summ. Judg., Exhibit L, April 17,2009, e-mail from 
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Calvin Chaney (Practice Partner) to Javier Gabiola. After running the audit utility twice, it was 
confirmed that no changes had been made to the clinic note. Jd. Therefore, there is no factual 
basis to support Dr. Davis' opinion that Dr. Dixon changed his chart note because he signed it on 
October 11,2004. 
ARGUMENT 
I. IDAHO CODE SECTION 6-1012 REQUIRES DOHERTY TO ESTABLISH '\lITH 
DIRECT EXPERT TESTIMONY THAT DR. DIXON BREACHED THE 
STANDARD OF CARE REGARDINq HIS SEPTEMBER 12, 2004, CHART 
NOTE. 
Doherty argues that Idaho Code Section 6-1012 does not require him to establish 
with direct expert testimony that Dr. Dixon breached the standard of care with regard to his 
September 12, 2004, chart note. Doherty is incorrect for a number of reasons. First, he alleges 
in his complaint that Dr. Dixon breached the standard of care with regard to his charting: "Not 
only did Dr. Dixon breach the standard of care for failing to provide a visual acuity test, the 
charting and record keeping is also ill breach of the standard of care." First Amended 
Complaint, ~ 10 (emphasis added). 
Second, Section 6-1012 states that a plaintiffmust affirmatively prove by direct 
expert testimony that a physician breached the applicable standard of health care when asserting 
a claim "011 account of the provision of or failure to provide health care or 011 account OrallV 
matter incidental or related thereto . ... " IDAHO CODE § 6-1012 (West 2006) (emphasis 
added). "There is nothing in the statute or its statement of purpose to indicate that the type of 
negligence, ordinary or professional, has anything to do with the application of § 6-1012." 
Hough v. F,y, 131 Idaho 230,233,953 P.2d 980,983 (1998). "Rather, byits plain and 
unambiguous language, the statute applies when the damages complained of result from 
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providing or failing to provide health care." Id. "Thus, to determine ifI.C. § 6-1012 applies, 
courts need only look to see ifthe injury occurred on account of the provision of or failure to 
provide health care." Id. 
In Hough, Hough fell during a physical therapy session. She argued that 
Section 6-1012 did not apply to her negligence claim against the physical therapist regarding her 
fall and that each act of the health care provider should be analyzed to determine if the act 
required professional skill or judgment. The Idaho Supreme Court rej ected Hough's arguments, 
stating that Section 6-1012 "clearly treats the provision of health care as a single act and not a 
series of steps, each of which must be analyzed to determine if it involved professional 
judgment." Hough, 131 Idaho at 233,953 P.2d at 983. The court went on to hold that 
Section 6-1012 applied to Hough's claim, as her fall was "directly related to providing Hough 
with physical therapy .... " Id. 
In this case, Dr. Dixon's September 12,2004, chart note was related to the care he 
provided Doherty on September 12, 2004. It is his record of the care he provided Doherty, 
which Doherty challenges as insufficient and a breach of the standard of care. It cannot be 
reasonably argued that Section 6-1012 does not apply in this case. As such, Doherty must prove 
with direct expert testimony that Dr. Dixon's September 12,2004, chart note was a breach of the 
standard of care. Doherty cannot do so, because Dr. Davis testified unequivocally that Dr. Dixon 
did not breach the standard of care regarding his chart note of Doherty's visit: 
Q. Do you believe that the record was in any way tampered 
with, dictated after the events of 9/20, or are you going to express 
any of those opinions? Because if you are, we are going to have to 
get into them. 
A. It's not opinion, it's fact, and you asked me about opinions. 
The fact is that the patient was seen on 9112 and there wasn't a 
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record generated or signed by a physician until 10111 and a 
follow-up visit was on 9/20, and that's before 10/11. Those are 
factual representations in the medical record. 
Q. Ami is that a deviatio11 from the standard of care? 
A. No. 
Davis Depo., 73:18 -74:12 (emphasis added). 
"[E]xpert testimony is required if the claim is to survive a motion for summary 
judgment." Hough, 131 Idaho at 233,953 P.2d at 983; see also Dulaney v. St. Alphonsus Reg 'I 
Med. Ctr., 137 Idaho 160, 164,45 P.3d 816, 820 (2002) (to avoid summary judgment for the 
defense in a medical malpractice case, the plaintiff must offer expert testimony indicating that 
the defendant health care provider negligently failed to meet the applicable community standard 
of health care practice). Since Doherty has no expert testimony to prove his claim that Dr. Dixon 
breached the standard of care with regard to his September 12, 2004, chart note, the claim fails as 
a matter of law and must be dismissed with prejudice. 
II. THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THAT DR. DIXON'S SEPTEMBER 12, 2004, CLINIC 
NOTE WAS THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF DOHERTY'S ALLEGED 
DAMAGES. 
Alternatively, assuming, arguendo, that Section 6-1012 does not apply and that it 
is not related to the care Dr. Dixon provided Doherty on September 12, 2004, Doherty cannot 
establish that allegedly dictating the note on September 20, 2004, or allegedly altering it, caused 
the loss of his left eye. 
The Idaho Supreme Court has held, on several occasions, that a court should 
disregard lay opinion testimony relating to the cause of a medical condition, as a lay witness is 
not competent to testify to such matters. Swallow v. Emergency Medicine of Idaho, 138 Idaho 
589,594,67 P.3d 68, 73 (2003) (Whether the antibiotic plaintiff took caused his heart attack was 
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"a matter of science that is far removed from the usual and ordinary experience of the average 
person"); Cook v. Skyline Corp., 135 Idaho 26, 13 P.3d 857 (2000) ("[TJestimony offered by a 
lay person relating to the cause of a medical condition should be disregarded."); Bloching v. 
Albertson's, Inc., 129 Idaho 844, 846, 934 P.2d 17, 19 (1997) (court should disregard lay opinion 
testimony relating to the cause of a medical condition as a lay witness is not competent to testify 
to such matters); Evans v. Twin Falls County, 118 Idaho 210,796 P.2d 87 (1990) (affirming trial 
court's conclusion that husband's opinion that his wife's death by cardiac arrest was caused by 
events in question was inadmissible under LR.E. 701); Flowerdew v. Warner, 90 Idaho 164,409 
P.2d 110 (1965) (lay opinion testimony is inadmissible to prove the cause of a plaintiffs 
condition); see also Kolln v. St. Luke's Reg 'I Aled. Ctr., 130 Idaho 323,940 P.2d 1142 (1997) 
(holding that as a lay person, the plaintiff in medical malpractice case was not competent to 
testify about the cause of her injury). The Idaho Supreme Court also has explained: 
Where the subject matter regarding the cause of disease, injury, or 
death of a person is wholly scientific or so far removed from the 
usual and ordinary experience ofthe average person that expert 
knowledge is essential to the formation of an intelligent opinion, 
only an expert can competently give opinion evidence as to the 
cause of death, disease or physical condition. 
Evans, 118 Idaho at 214, 796 P.2d at 91. 
Doherty cannot testify that the September 12, 2004, clinic note caused the loss of 
vision in his left eye. His experts must do so. However, Doherty's experts, Dr. Davis and 
Dr. Leach, have not opined that the September 12, 2004, chart note caused the loss of vision in 
his left eye. Dr. Leach is expected to testify that "if Dr. Dixon had properly treated Mr. Doherty, 
including referral to the proper specialist, Mr. Doherty would not have lost his eye." See 
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Plaintiffs' Expert Witness Disclosure, dated March 18,2009, p. 2. Dr. Davis testified in his 
deposition that he is not offering a causation opinion in this case: 
Q. And the second one is whether or not the breach of the 
standard of care caused injury. And I am going to ask you again 
are you going to express an opinion on cause of injury? 
A. No, I am not an ophthalmologist and I would not do that. 
Davis Depo., 62:19-24. 
Absent any expert testimony that Dr. Dixon's September 12, 2004, chart note 
caused Doherty's loss of his left eye, Doherty cannot establish the causation element of this 
claim. Therefore, it must be dismissed with prejudice as a matter oflaw. 
III. THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THAT DR. DIXON DICTATED HIS 
SEPTEMBER 12,2004, CHART NOTE ON SEPTEMBER 20,2004, OR THAT 
THERE ARE INCONGRUITIES OR INACCURACIES IN THE CHART NOTE. 
Doherty argues that there is an issue of fact that Dr. Dixon dictated his 
September 12, 2004, chart note on September 20,2004, because (1) Dr. Dixon could not 
remember when he dictated the note; (2) Dr. Dixon incorporated information from Doherty's 
September 20,2004, visit into his September 12,2004, chart note; (3) Dr. Dixon's September 12, 
2004, chart note was transcribed onto WordPerfect and loaded into Practice Partner on 
September 21,2004; and (4) that Jason Joyner did not have Dr. Dixon's September 12,2004, 
clinic note on September 20, 2004. 
First, Dr. Dixon remembered when he dictated his September 12, 2004, chart 
note. He testified in his deposition that he dictated it a day or two after the September 12,2004, 
visit: 
Q. Dr. Dixon, on 9/12 of '04, this visit (indicating), did you 
dictate that that day or the day after? 
A. The day after? 
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Q. Yes. 
A. Like I did one or two days. 
Q. So you did this in one or two days? 
A. Uh-huh (Witness nods head affinnatively.) 
Dixon Depo., 75:11-18 (emphasis added). Second, Dr. Dixon did not incorporate his 
conversation with Jayson Joyner on September 20,2004, into his September 12,2004, chart 
note: 
Q. Didyou ever go back and change this? 
A. No. 
Q. Did you find out what was going to happen on the 20th and 
put it in this note (indicating)? 
A. Yes. 
Q. No, did you, when you saw him 011 the 20th, did you 
change this note? 
A. No. 
Q. And you did all of these things on this day (indicating)? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And this is true (indicating)? 
A. Yes. 
Q. By true, and I am pointing to 9/12, Exhibit No.2. 
A. Yes. 
Dixon Depo., 75:19 -76:9 (emphasis added). 
Third, Dr. Dixon dictated Doherty's September 12, 2004, visit well before 
September 20,2004, as there are a number of dictations of patient visits Dr. Dixon saw on 
September 16 and September 17, 2004, in his batch of dictations of patient visits from 
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September 12,2004 to September 20,2004. Julian Gabiola Aff. in Support ofMtn. for Partial 
Summ. Judg., Exhibit K. Fourth, the fact that Dr. Dixon's September 12,2004, chart note was 
transcribed into WordPerfect and loaded into Practice Partner on September 21,2004, and that 
Joyner did not have Dr. Dixon's clinic note when he saw Doherty on September 20,2004, does 
not create a reasonable inference that Dr. Dixon dictated his September 12, 2004, note on 
September 20,2004. There is no evidence to contradict Dr. Dixon's testimony that he dictated 
the September 12,2004, clinic note a day or two after September 12,2004. 
Finally, Dr. Dixon did not make any changes to his September 12, 2004, clinic 
note. One can compare the WordPerfect document with the electronically-signed Practice 
Partner document and see that no changes were made. Moreover, on April 17, 2009, Practice 
Partner conducted an audit of Dr. Dixon's September 12,2004, chart note and confinned that it 
had not been changed. 
IV. THERE IS NO EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT DR. DAVIS' OPINION THAT THERE 
ARE INCONGRUITIES AND INACCURACIES IN DR. DIXON'S 
SEPTEMBER 12,2004, CHART NOTE AND THAT HE ALTERED THE CLINIC 
NOTE. 
Doherty relies upon (1) Dr. Davis' factually unsupported assertion that there are 
incongruities and inaccuracies in Dr. Dixon's September 12, 2004, chart note and (2) Dr. Davis' 
concern with the chart note because Dr. Dixon signed it on October 11, 2004. A motion for 
summary judgment requires that the court look to the threshold question of whether the evidence 
is admissible under Idaho Rule of Evidence ("l.R.E.") 702 before moving on to the more liberal 
construction of Rule 56(c). This two-step process was described by the Idaho Supreme Court in 
Carnell v. Barker Management,lnc., 137 Idaho 322, 48 P.3d 651 (2002): 
LR.C.P. 56(e) provides that the adverse party may not rest upon 
mere allegations in the pleadings, but must set forth by affidavit 
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specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial. 
Rhodehouse v. Sutts, 125 Idaho 208,211,868 P.2d 1224, 1227 
(1994) (citation omitted). [ ... J "The admissibility of the evidence 
contained in affidavits and depositions in support of or in 
opposition to a motion for summary judgment is a threshold 
question to be answered before applying the liberal construction 
and reasonable inferences rule to determine whether the evidence 
is sufficient to create a genuine issue for trial." West v. Sonke, 132 
Idaho 133, 138, 968 P.2d 228, 233 (1998). 
Carnell, 137 Idaho at 327, 48 P.3d at 656. 
Idaho law requires that the Court look at the underlying evidence when analyzing 
whether a genuine issue of material fact exists. Although Idaho has not formally adopted the 
reporting requirements of the federal Daubert standard, Idaho courts similarly require the 
plaintiff to comply with the strict requirements ofI.R.E. 702, which states in relevant part: 
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist 
the trier offact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in 
issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, 
experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form 
of an opinion or otherwise. 
Idaho courts uniformly hold that I.R.E. 702 requires an expert opinion to be 
founded upon "scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge" and must be based upon 
"factual foundation." Carnell, 137 Idaho at 328, 48 P.3d at 657. "An expert opinion that is 
speculative or unsubstantiated by facts in the record is inadmissible because it would not assist 
the trier of fact to understand the evidence or determine a fact that is at issue." Swallow, 138 
Idaho at 592, 67 P.3d at 71 (emphasis added) (citations omitted) (affirming district court's 
decision granting summary judgment to defendant after ruling that plaintiffs' expert testimony 
regarding causation was inadmissible where the expert's opinion as to the nexus between the 
taking of Cipro and plaintiff s resulting heart attack was speculative and would not assist the trier 
of fact); see also Bloclling, 129 Idaho at 846, 934 P.2d at 20 (1997) (holding that expert's 
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opinion was properly excluded and summary judgment was appropriate because the opinion that 
the change in plaintiffs insulin led to plaintiffs seizures was speculative and would not assist 
the trier of fact). Ifthere is no factual foundation for an expert's opinion, then the evidence is 
not admissible under LR.E. 702. Of course, without underlying evidence, there can be no 
genuine issue of material fact and a motion for summary judgment must be granted, a result that 
should occur regardless of how vehemently the expert asserts an opinion. 
Dr. Davis merely concludes that there are incongruities and inaccuracies in 
Dr. Dixon's clinic note, without identifying any facts to support his conclusion. 1 He testified in 
his deposition that "J make 110 statement of distortion of a medical record or implication that 
anything was done and wasil 't, J dOll 't know; J wasn't there." Davis Depo., 45 :20-22 
(emphasis added). The only thing that bothers Dr. Davis about Dr. Dixon's September 12, 2004, 
chart note is that it was signed by Dr. Dixon on October 11,2004. However, there is no 
evidence Dr. Dixon changed the note. The Practice Partner audit done in April 2009 confirmed 
that no changes had been made to the chart note. Furthermore, it is identical to the WordPerfect 
version. Dr. Davis' concern about the October 11, 2004, signing date is unsupported by any 
facts in the record. 
What is most notable about Dr. Davis' opinion is that he stated Dr. Dixon's 
September 12, 2004, chart note does not breach the standard of care: 
Q. Do you believe that the record was in any way tampered 
with, dictated after the events of 9/20, or are you going to express 
any of those opinions? Because if you are, we are going to have to 
get into them. 
I Dr. Davis mentioned in his deposition (41: 16-18) that there was an inaccuracy in the 
September 12, 2004, chart note, because it states: "She has no anterior chamber hyphema" when 
it should state "he," as Doherty is a man. A mere typo is not an inaccuracy. 
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A. It's not opinion, it's fact, and you asked me about opinions. 
The fact is that the patient was seen on 9112 and there wasn't a 
record generated or signed by a physician until 10/11 and a 
follow-up visit was on 9/20, and that's before 10111. Those are 
factual representations in the medical record. 
Q. And is that a deviation from the standard of care? 
A. No. 
Davis Depo., 73:18 - 74: 12 (emphasis added). Without underlying evidence, there can be no 
genuine issue of material fact and a motion for summary judgment must be granted, a result that 
should occur regardless ofhow vehemently Dr. Davis asserts his opinion. 
Accordingly, Doherty's claim regarding charting and record keeping, i.e., 
paragraph 10 of the First Amended Complaint, should be dismissed as a matter of law as there is 
no genuine issue of material fact to support such a claim. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing argument and authority, defendants respectfully request 
that the Court grant their Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. 
rz.-,-::;., V; 
DATED this U- day of August, 2009. 
MOFFATT, THOMAS, BARRETT, ROCK & 
FIELDS, CHARTERED 
By IutcIW! f. t~ tP: 
Gary T. Dance - Of the Firm 
Attorneys for Defendants 
DEFENDANTS' REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 14 Client: 1328264.1 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this a'2aay of August, 2009, I caused a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing DEFENDANTS' REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT to be served by the method indicated below, and 
addressed to the following: 
Reed W. Larsen 
COPPER & LARSEN, CHARTERED 
P.O. Box 4229 
Pocatello, ID 83205-4229 
Facsimile: (208) 235-1182 
( )JhS. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
("")Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
( ) Facsimile 
Ld/U1 cf ftdwt- 0 
Gary T. Dance 
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L.;.s;:r A~T.:;"E ;.,O ..... F ..... ID..... A, ...,HO.,.....,.-q"">, 
NOTARY PUBLIC FOR IDAHO 
Residing at: Pocatello 
My Commission expires: 11121/13 
AFFIDAVIT OF JAVIER L. GABIOLA IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR ENLARGEMENT OF TIME TO 
RESPOND TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT RE JUDICIAL ESTOPPEL - PAGE 2 
77 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this...2i) day of August, 2009, I served a true and correct 
copy of the above and foregoing document to the following person(s) as follows: 
Gary T. Dance 
Julian E. Gabiola 
Moffatt, Thomas, Barrett Rock & Fields, Chtd. 
P.O. Box 817 
Pocatello, ID 83204-0817 
U.S. Mail/Postage Prepaid 
Hand Delivery 
Overnight Mail 
Facsimile / 232-0150 
AFFIDAVIT OF JA VIER L. GABIOLA IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR ENLARGEMENT OF TIME TO 
RESPOND TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT RE JUDICIAL ESTOPPEL - PAGE 3 
7Z 
Reed W. Larsen (3427) 
Javier L. Gabiola (5448) 
COOPER & LARSEN, CHARTERED 
151 North 3 rd Avenue, 2nd Floor 
P. O. Box 4229 
Pocatello, ID 83205-4229 
Telephone: (208) 235-1145 
Facsimile: (208) 235-1182 
Attorneysfor Plaintiff 
; i" 
IN THE DISTRlCT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 




GORDON DIXON, M.D., and 
BLACKFOOT MEDIC,u CLINIC, 
INC., 
Defendant. 
STATE OF IDi\HO ) 
: ss 













Case No. CV -2006-2145 
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OF TIME TO RESPOND TO 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT RE JUDICIAL 
ESTOPPEL 
REED W. LARSEN, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and states as follows: 
1. I am the lead attorney representing Plaintiff in this matter and make this Affidavit 
upon my own personal knowledge and information; 
2. On August 18 th , 2009, I first became aware of Defendants' request to dismiss 
Plaintiff's claim against Defendants based on their proposed theory of judicial estoppel. Defendants 
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allege that Mr. Doherty did not claim the lawsuit against Dr. Dixon as an asset in the bankruptcy he 
previously filed; 
3. I was not aware that Mr. Doherty had filed for bankruptcy, nor was I aware that he 
had failed to include his claim against Dr. Dixon in the bankruptcy schedules, until August 18 til 
2009; 
4. On August 20 th, 2009, I spoke with Mr. Doherty's bankruptcy attorney, Fred Cooper, 
who infonned me that he would be filing a Petition to Reopen the Bankruptcy to amend the 
bankruptcy schedules and list Mr. Doherty's claim against Dr. Dixon therein. Mr. Cooper also 
infonned me Mr. Doherty filed for bankruptcy because he fell behind on his truck payments, and 
did not list any medical expenses for his eye injury; 
5. I and Mr. Gabiola will also be filing petitions to be appointed special counsel on 
behalf of Mr. Doherty in the bankruptcy proceeding. 
(SEAL) 
FURTHER SAITH AFFIANT NAUGHT. 
DATED this/V day of August, 2009. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this Jare.. day of August, 2009. 
EUSABETH KLASSEN 
NOT ARY PUBLIC 
STATE OF IDAHO r 
" 
NOTARY PUBLIC FOR IDAHO 
Residing at: Pocatello 
My Commission expires: I-I:!-I/I ~) 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this ---.l£Z- day of August, 2009, I served a true and correct 
copy of the above and foregoing document to the following person(s) as follows: 
Gary T. Dance 
Julian E. Gabiola 
Moffatt, Thomas, Barrett Rock & Fields, Chtd. 
P.O.Box817 
Pocatello, ID 83204-0817 
U.S. Mail/Postage Prepaid 
Hand Delivery 
Overnight Mail 
Facsimile / 232-0150 
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g[ 
Reed W. Larsen (3427) 
Javier 1. Gabiola (5448) 
COOPER & LARSEN, CHARTERED 
151 North 3rd Avenue, 2nd Floor 
P. O. Box 4229 
Pocatello, ID 83205-4229 
Telephone: (208) 235-1145 
Facsimile: (208) 235-1182 
Attorneys/or Plaintiff" 
rJ;F~;'"1 ,.~"., i 
::.~ ---
, 'l \ 
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Case No. CV-2006-2145 
MOTION FOR ENLARGEMENT 
OF TIME TO RESPOND TO 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT RE JUDICIAL 
ESTOPPEL 
COMES NOW Plaintiff, by and through the undesigned counsel, and pursuant to I.R.c.P. 
56(£), moves this for an order for an extension of time in which to respond to Defendants' Motion 
for Summary Judgment to dismiss this case pursuant to judicial estoppel. Defendants untimely 
raised this Motion for Summary Judgment on August 18th , 2009. Pursuant to I.R.c.P. 56(b) and (c), 
Plaintiff is entitled to a stay on the Motion to allow him additional time in which to submit pleadings 
and affidavits and memoranda in opposition to Defendants' Motion. 
This Motion is supported by the record herein; the Affidavit of Javier 1. Gabiola in Support 
of Motion for Enlargement of Time to Respond to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment Re 
MOTlOr>.' FOR ENLARGEMEr>.'T OF TIME TO RESPOND TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGIVIE"iT RE 
JUDICIAL ESTOPPEL - PAGE 1 
Judicial Estoppel filed concurrently herewith; and the Affidavit of Reed W. Larsen also filed 
concurrently herewith. 
Oral argument is requested. 
DATED this;i>day of August, 2009. 
COOPER & LARSEN, CHARTERED 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
/)~ 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this ~ day of August, 2009, I served a true and correct 
copy of the above and foregoing document to the following person(s) as follows: 
Gary 1. Dance 
Julian E. Gabiola 
Moffatt, Thomas, Barrett Rock & Fields, Chtd. 
P.O. Box 817 





u.S. Mail/Postage Prepaid 
Hand Delivery 
Ovemight Mail 
Facsimile / 232-0150 
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Reed W. Larsen (3427) 
Javier L. Gabiola (5448) 
COOPER & LARSEN, CHARTERED 
151 North 3rd Avenue, 2nd Floor 
P. O. Box 4229 
Pocatello, ID 83205-4229 
Telephone: (208) 235-1145 
Facsimile: (208) 235-1182 
Attorneys/or Plaintiff 
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Case No. CV-2006-2145 
SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM IN 
SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S 
OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS' 
MOTION TO DISMISS RE: JUDICIAL 
ESTOPPEL 
COMES NOW, Plaintiff Jerry Doherty ("Jerry"), by and through undersigned counsel, and 
submits this Reply Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff s Motions in Limine. 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
Jerry filed his Bankruptcy petition on July 25, 2005. He did not file this lawsuit until 
~ September 6, 2006. Affidavit of Jerry Doherty. This occurred over one year after filing the 
bankruptcy. At the time he filed his bankruptcy, Jerry did not, and was not, contemplating filing his 
claim against Dixon. He did not do that until he met with his attorneys prior to filing his lawsuit 
against Dixon. 
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J eny did not file any claim in the Bankruptcy against Dixon, nor did he file any debt owed to Dixon, 
and Jerry was not seeking to discharge any debt owed to Dixon. Dixon was not a creditor in that 
proceeding. Jerry filed the banlauptcy to keep his pickup truck, the payments for which he got 
behind on. Jerry was not trying to take advantage of Dixon, the bankruptcy court or this court. Jerry 
also did not intentionally decide not to list his claim in the banlauptcy to mislead any court, nor did 
he engage in any scheme to do so. Further, Jerry made payments under the plan in the bankruptcy 
and recently made his payments in full. 
On August, 26,2009, undersigned counsel wrote the trustee assigned to the banlaupcty, 
Kathleen McCallister. Affidavit of Javier L. Gabiola in Support of Plaintiff's Opposition to 
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Re: Judicial Estoppel, Exh. A. Undersigned counsel spoke with the 
trustee on August 28, 2009, in which she stated that she would file a petition to reopen the 
proceedings to save the case. ld. 
ARGUMENT 
A. JERRY'S CLAIM AGAINST DIXON SHOULD GO TO THE JURY, AS BARRING HIS 
CLAIM BY JUDICIAL ESTOPPEL WOULD IMPROPERLY CREATE ANINEQUIT ABLE 
RESULT ON HIS MERITORIOUS CLAIM. 
1. Judicial estoppel is an equitable remedy, to which Dr. Dixon is not entitled. 
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that judicial estoppel is an equitable doctrine, invoked 
at the discretion of the court. Sword v. Sweet, 140 Idaho 242, 252,92 P.3d 492,502 (2004). 
Another court elaborated on this equitable doctrine: 
'[J]udicial estoppel 'is an equitable doctrine invoked by a court at its discretion. 
'Equitable'in this context refers more to fairness and discretion than to the 
technical distinction between law and equity. It follows that the fashioning of a 
remedy to implement a judicial estoppel must be grounded on notions of fairness 
SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION 
TO DISMISS RE: JUDICIAL ESTOPPEL - PAGE 2 
and preventing injustice. 
Preventing injustice and furthering notions of fairness are entrenched 
equitable principles that need to be taken into account whenever fashioning 
a remedy in the nature of estoppel. 
It is a maxim of equity that a court of equity seeks to do justice and not 
injustice. It will not do 'inequity in the name of equity.'[Emphasis added]. 
An-Tze v. K&S Diverstfied investments, inc., 308 B.R. 448, 459 (Bkrp. App. 2004). 
There is no question that if this Court were to dismiss Jerry's case against Dixon, it would 
be an act of "inequity in the name of equity." Jerry's not naming this claim in the bankrutpcy was 
a good faith omission, an inadvertent oversight, not an intentional act or scheme to mislead this 
Court or the bankruptcy court. "Judicial estoppel does not apply when a debtor's 'prior position was 
taken because of a good-faith mistake rather than as part of a scheme to mislead the court. ,,, Stallings 
v. Hussmann Corp., 447 F.3d 1041, 1049 (8 th Cir. 2006). Moreover, 
A rule that the 'requisite intent for judicial estoppel can be inferred from the mere 
fact of nondisclosure in a bankruptcy proceeding [would] unduly expand the 
reach of judicial estoppel in post-bankruptcy proceedings and would 
inevitably result in the preclusion of viable claims on the basis of inadvertent 
or good-faith inconsistencies. Careless or inadvertent disclosures are not the 
equivalent of deliberate manipulation. Courts should only apply the doctrine 
as an extraordinary remedy when a party's inconsistent behavior will result in a 
miscarriage of justice. 
Stallings, supra, citing Ryan v. Operations G.P. v. Santiam-lvfidwesf Lumber Co., 81 F.3d 
355,362 (3 fd Cir. 1996). Further, judicial estoppel is 
[NJot meant to be a teclmical defense for litigants seeking to derail 
potentially meritorious claims, especially when the alleged inconsistency 
is insignificant at best and there is no evidence of intent to manipulate or mislead 
the courts. Judicial estoppel is not a sword to be wielded by adversaries unless 
such tactics are necessary to secure substantial equity. 
Ryan, supra, 81 F.3d at 364. 
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Further, this case has nothing to do with the bankruptcy, as Jerry did not seek to discharge 
any debt owed to Dixon, nor was Dixon a creditor in that proceeding. It would be a different 
scenario if Jerry was indebted to Dixon and sought relieffrom such debt in bankruptcy, which is not 
the case. The lack of any evidence that Jerry intentionally decided not to list the claim in bankruptcy 
precludes barring his claim, as it would dismiss a meritorious claim. Indeed, dismissal of Jerry's 
claim would allow Dixon to escape liability for his negligent conduct, creating an "inequity in the 
name of equity." 
2. The cases Dixon cites to support his position are inapposite and should not be considered. 
Dixon relies solely onA & J CanstI'. Co. Inc., v. Wood, 141 Idaho 682, 116 P.3d 12 (2005). 
That case is distinguishable for several reasons. First, pursuant to Loomis v. Church, 76 Idaho 87, 
93-94,277 P.2d 561, 565 (1954), cited to by the court in A & J Constr., judicial estoppel applies 
where the alleged inconsistent statements "aris[ e ] out of the same transaction or subj ect matter." 
Here, Jerry's bankruptcy and his claim against Dixon did not arise out ofthe same transaction. Jerry 
filed for bankruptcy, as he got behind on his truck payments, and requested a restructuring of that 
debt in bankruptcy. Doherty AjJ. He did not file for bankruptcy due to his claim against Dr. Dixon. 
In A & J CanstI'. , the debtor in that case filed bankruptcy regarding a property purchase, 
and later sued a company with whom the debtor had purchased the property that he failed to list in 
the bankruptcy. Id., 141 Idaho at 683-84" 116 P.3d at 13-14. The debtor sought profits from the 
sale of that property. Id Thus, both cases arose out of the same transaction. Also, it is apparent 
from the facts of that case that the debtor intentionally chose not to disclose the property as an asset 
in the bankruptcy, seeking profits from the sale ofthe property, which was the subject of the dispute 
in the subsequent litigation. Further, the debtor in A&J certainly sought to gain an advantage 
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against the party by not listing the property as an asset. 
There is no such nexus between Jerry's need to file bankruptcy for his truck and his claim 
against Dixon. The two are unrelated and do not arise out of the same transaction. It would be 
different if Jerry filed for bankruptcy for relief from medical expenses, and then later sought a 
lawsuit against Dixon on those expenses, which he did not do. 
Further, the cases the court relied upon in A& J Constr. were cases involving intentional 
decisions by the debtor not to include the claim as an asset or involved the same parties. In Hmnilton 
v. State Farm, 270 F.3d 778 (9th• Cir. 200 1), the debtor, an insured of State Farm, filed a claim for 
vandalism and property damage, the basis for which State Farm knew was specious. State Farm 
denied the claim, days prior to the debtor filing for bankruptcy. In the schedules, the debtor listed 
a large vandalism loss, and when asked by the trustee about it, refused to provide imomlation. Id., 
at 781. There is no question that the debtor there deliberately concealed the suit against State Fann. 
Hamilton also relied upon Hay v. First Interstate Bank of Kalispell, 978 F.2d 555, 557 (9th 
Cir. 1992), where the debtor pursued a claim against First Interstate, one of the debtor's major 
creditors in the bankruptcty. Hamilton further relied on In re Coastal Plains, 179 F.3d 197,202 (5 th 
Cir. 1999). The debtor there, one week after filing bankruptcy, filed an adversary proceeding against 
its largest unsecured creditor, and did not disclose a $10 million claim against that creditor. 
Hamilton went on to cite to Oneida Motor Freight, Inc. v. United Jersey Bank, 848 F .2d 414, 
415-16 (3fd Cir. 1988), as case in which the debtor filed a separate lawsuit against one of its creditors 
in the bankruptcy, asserting breach of the loan agreements that gave rise to the debt at issue in the 
bankruptcy. 
It is important to note that the Ninth Circuit requires a finding that a debtor deliberately 
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concealed the possible suit. Valdez v. JDR LLC, 2006 LEXIS 51296 at p. 2 (July 20, 2006)(citing, 
Johnson v. Oregon Dep '/ of Human Res. Rehab., 141 F.3d 1361, 1369 ("If incompatible positions 
are based not on chicanery, but only on inadvertence or mistake, judicial estoppel does not apply")). 
Further, the doctrine should be applied with caution due to the harsh results attendant with 
precluding a party from asserting a position that would be available. ld, at 3. 
Dixon has not put forth any evidence in the record Jerry intentionally did not disclose the 
lawsuit. Instead, Dixon argues that Jerry knew at the time of his third surgery, which Dr. Moffett 
perfom1ed, that he blamed Dixon for his left eye issues. Doherty Deposition, p. J 5, II. J J to p. J 6, 
l. 8. I This only supports Jerry's position that his actions were merely a good faith oversight, not an 
intentional plan or scheme to mislead the court. Dixon offers no evidence of any intentional conduct 
or scheme committed by Jerry. 
Again, Jerry's bankruptcy did not pertain to any debt to Dixon, nor was Dixon a creditor. 
Nor did Jerry, like the fraudulent insured in Hamilton, or the intentional debtor inA& J Constr., the 
cases Dixon relies upon, try to conceal his claim to gain an advantage against Dixon in this case. 
3. Dixon is not prejudiced. 
In New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742, the U.S. Supreme Court set forth factors to 
consider in applying judicial estoppel, one of which is whether the party seeking to assert an 
inconsistent position would derive an unfair advantage or impose an unfair detriment on the 
lIt is ironic that Dixon cites, with emplpsis, to Jerry's deposition testimony. Specifically, 
Dixon cites to the transcript where Jerry stated Dr. Moffett told him that had he seen an eye 
doctor the day of the accident, he would have full eyesight today. At the same time, Dixon 
himself takes an inconsistent position, as he seeks to exclude this as evidence at trial. See 
Defendants' Memorandum in Support of-Motion in Limine, p. 6. 
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opposing party ifnot estopped. New Hampshire, 532 Us. at 750-51. The Idaho Supreme Court in 
A & J CansO'. noted that the factors identified in New Hampshire were not required elements, but 
did not preclude this Court from considering such in its analysis of this case. Here, Dixon will not 
suffer any unfair detriment, nor will Jerry obtain an unfair advantage ifhe is not estopped. Again, 
Dixon had no claim in the bankruptcy, and Jerry did not seek any discharge of debts owed to Dixon. 
4. Jerry will cure the alleged defect. 
Next,A & J Consli'. is distinguishable from Jerry's situation, as the debtor in that case failed 
to cure the deficiency by reopening the bankruptcy to amend his schedules. Here, Jerry filed a 
petition to reopen the bankruptcy, so as to amend his schedule to include the claim against Dixon 
as an asset. Gabiola AjJ Jerry's counsel will petition the bankruptcy court and request of that the 
trustee allow them to be appointed special counsel. Further, if the motion is granted, pursuant to 11 
U.S.c. § 362, a stay would be in place pending the resolution of the reopening of the bankruptcy 
proceedings. 
5. Dixon's motion is untimely. 
As Jerry previously asserted, Dixon had to have filed his motion 60 days prior to trial, or by 
July 29, 2009. Dixon violated this order, as he filed his motion August 18, 2009. Thus, his motion 
is untimely and should be stricken. Second, Dixon never listed the judicial estoppel defense in his 
answer, and, thus, waived it. See Affidavit 0.( Javier L. Gabiola in Support 0.( Plaintiff's Motionfor 
Enlargement 0.( Time to Respond to Defendants' Motion for SUmmaTJi Judgment re: Judicial 
Estoppel Exh. A. It is too late for Dixon to amend his Answer, and his motion should be stricken 
for these reasons. 
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C/o 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Jerry respectfully requests that the Court deny Dixon's Motion. 
DATED this 1 day of September, 2009. 
COOPER & LARSEN, CHARTERED 
By 9rnR~ 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this U( day of September, 2009, I served a true and 
correct copy of the above and foregoing document to the following person(s) as follows: 
Gary T. Dance 
Julian E. Gabiola 
Moffatt, Thomas, Barrett Rock & Fields, Chtd. 
P.O. Box 817 
Pocatello, ID 83204-0817 
Ci U.S. Mail/Postage Prepaid 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[] Facs·mile /232-0150 
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Reed W. Larsen (3427) 
Javier L. Gabiola (5448) 
COOPER & LARSEN, CHARTERED 
151 North 3rd Avenue, 2nd Floor 
P. O. Box 4229 
Pocatello, ID 83205-4229 
Telephone: (208) 235-1145 
Facsimile: (208) 235-1182 
Attorneys/or Plaintiff 
IN THE DISTRlCT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRlCT OF THE 




GORDON DIXON, M.D., and 
BLACKFOOT MEDICAL CLINIC, 
INC., 
Defendants. 
STA TE OF IDAHO ) 
: ss 













Case No. CV -2006-2145 
AFFIDAVIT OF JAVIER L. GABIOLA 
IN SUPPORT OF OPPOSITION TO 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT RE: JUDICIAL 
ESTOPPEL 
JA VIER L. GABIOLA, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and states as follows: 
1. I am one ofthe attorneys representing Plaintiff J erry Doherty in this matter and make 
this Affidavit upon my own personal knowledge and infonnation; 
2. On August 26 th , 2009, I sent a letter to the bankruptcy trustee assigned to Mr. 
Doherty's bankruptcy, Kathleen McCallister, requesting that she contact me regarding the reopening 
AFFIDAVIT OF JAVIER L. GABIOLA 11\ SUI)PORT OF OPPOSITIOI\' TO DEFENDANTS' MOTIOI\ FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT RE: JUDICIAL ESTOPPEL - PAGE 1 
of Mr. Doherty's bankruptcy. Attached hereto as Exhibit A is a copy of my letter to Ms. 
McCallister; 
3. On August 28 til, 2009, Ms. McCallister contacted me, we discussed reopening the 
bankruptcy. I was informed by Ms. McCallister that she would file a petition to reopen the 
bankruptcy and would set the matter for hearing in bankruptcy court in front of Judge Pappas for 
September 15th , 2009. Attached hereto is a copy of the Petition to Reopen the Bankruptcy; 
4. I also filed, at Ms. McCallister's request, an Amended Schedule B reflecting that Mr. 
Doherty was filing an amended schedule regarding his assets, to include this lawsuit as an asset in 
the bankruptcy. 
(SEAL) 
FURTHER SAITH AFFIANT NAUGHT. 
DATED this i day of September, 2009. 
COOPER & LARSEN, CHARTERED 
BY--~~;~A~\r-IE-~-L-.-G-A~B~IO-L-~--·-------
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this 1!!i. day of September, 2009. 
JAMIEFERR( 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
STATE OF IDAHO 
~6w' 
NOTARY PUBLIC FOR IDAHO 
Residing at: ~
My Commission expires:f ;)~.~/( 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this ~ day of September, 2009, I served a true and correct 
copy of the above and foregoing document to the following person(s) as follows: 
Gary 1'. Dance 
Julian E. Gabiola 
Moffatt, Thomas, Barrett Rock & Fields, Chtd. 
P.O. Box 817 





U.S. Mail/Postage Prepaid 
Hand Delivery 
Overnight Mail 
Facsimile / 232-0150 
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GARY L. COOPER 
REED W. LARSEN 
JAMES D. RUCHTI 
JAVIER L. GABIOLA 
Via Fax and Regular US Mail 
Kathleen McCallister 
Chapter 13 Trustee's Office 
P.O. Box 910 
Kuna,ID 83634 
COOPER & LARSEN 
151 NORTH 3'd AVE. - 20d FLOOR 
P.O. BOX 4229 
POCATELLO, ID 83205-4229 
Attorneys at Law 
August 27, 2009 
Re: BanA.7'uptcy of Jeny Doherty 
Case No. 05-41630-JDP Chapter 13 
Dear Ms. McCallister: 
RON KERL of Counsel 
TELEPHONE (208) 235-1145 
FAX (208) 235-1182 
I am writing to ask that you contact me to speak about the above bankruptcy filed by Jerry 
Doherty. 
Reed Larsen and I representMr. Doherty in a medical malpractice action, which is scheduled 
to go to trial September 29th, 2009. Mr. Doherty at the time of filing the bankruptcy had not filed 
the pending medical malpractice litigation that we represent him on. He did not file that until 
September 6th, 2006, and, was simply unaware and did not know that he had to include this as an 
asset in the bankruptcy schedules. 
It is our request that we come forward to amend the schedules in the bankruptcy filed by Mr. 
Doherty to claim the lawsuit as an asset. Related to that, we wanted to obtain your permission to 
have the bankruptcy estate hire Mr. Larsen and I on behalf of the estate, by having it, execute an 
application for employment. Mr. Larsen and I believe that it would be in the estate's best interest 
to do this, as Mr. Doherty would be providing 100% payoff of the debts owed, after payment of 
attorney fees and costs, upon receipt ofa favorable verdict. We believe Mr. Doherty's case is worth 
a substantial amount, and ifhe does prevail at the trial in this matter, it would benefit the estate for 
the aforementioned reasons. Also, the Chapter 13 filed by Mr. Doherty was not a huge amount. We 
note that he had about $11,000 in unsecured debt and that he has complied with the telms of the 
bankruptcy and made payments required of him therein. 
VISIT OUR WEB SITE AT HTTP:lM'WW.COOPER-LARSEN.COM 
Kathleen McCallister 
August 27, 2009 
Page 2 
Based on the foregoing, I would asked that you contact me or Mr. Larsen to discuss having 
the bankruptcy estate execute an application of employment to employ us as representatives of the 
estate. I look forward to hearing from you and thank you in advance for your immediate attention 








COOPER & LARSEN 
151 NORTH 3,d AVE. - 2nd FLOOR 
P.O. BOX 4229 
POCATELLO,iD 83205-4229 
TELEPHONE (208) 235-1145 
FAX (208) 235-1182 
FAX COVER SHEET 
August 27,2009 
Kathleen McCallister 
Chapter 13 Trustee's Office 
Javier L. Gabiola 
Bankruptcy of Jerry Doherty 
Case No. 05-41630-JDP Chapter 13 
Pages Transmitted: (3) 
The information contained in this transmission may be attorney/client privileged and therefore confidential. This 
information is intended only for the use of the individual or entity named above. If the reader of this message is not 
the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that any dissemination, distribution or copy of this communication is 
strictly prohibited. If you receive this transmission in error, or if you are not the individual or entity named above, 
the receipt of this transmission is not intended to and does not waive any privilege, attorney/client or otherwise. If 
you have received this communication in error, please notify us by telephone, collect, and return the original message 
to us at the above address via U.S. Postal Service. You will be reimbursed for any postage or any other expense 
associated with the return of this document. Thank you. 
PLEASE ADVISE IMMEDIATELY IF YOU EXPERIENCE ANY 
DIFFICULTIES RECEIVING THIS TRANSMISSION. 
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*******************>t(*******w******** - - ***** - - ********* 
R. Fred Cooper 
Attorney at Law 
Idaho State Bar No. 3418 
770 South Woodruff Avenue 
Idaho Falls, ID 83401 
Telephone: (208) 524-2015 
Facsimile: (208) 524-2051 
Reed W. Larsen (3427) 
Javier L. Gabiola (5448) 
COOPER & LARSEN, CHARTERED 
151 North yd Avenue, 2nd Floor 
P. O. Box 4229 
Pocatello, ID 83205-4229 
Telephone: (208) 235-1145 
Facsimile: (208) 235-1182 
Attorneys for Debtor 
UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF IDAHO 
In Re: 








Case No. 05-41630 
DEBTOR'S MOTION TO REOPEN 
BANKRUPTCY 
COMES NOW Debtor Jerry Doherty, by and through the undersigned counsel, pursuant to 
11 U.S.c. § 350(b) and Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 5010 and L.B.R. 5010.1, moves the 
Court for an order granting Mr. Doherty permission to reopen Mr. Doherty's Chapter 13 bankruptcy 
proceeding to amend schedules to include the lawsuit of Doherty v. Dixon, filed in the District Court 
of the Seventh Judicial District of the State ofIdaho in and for the County of Bingham, Case No. 
CV-2006-2145. 
DEBTOR'S MOTION TO REOPEN BANKRUPTCY - PAGE 1 
qq 
This Motion is supported by the Affidavit of Javier 1. Gabiola with attached exhibits, and 
the Affidavit of Jerry Doherty filed concurrently herewith and the Memorandum in Support of 
Debtors Motion to ReopenBankruptcy also filed concurrently herewith. 
DATED this q day of September, 2009. 
COOPER & LARSEN, CHARTERED 
DEBTOR'S MOTION TO REOPEN BANKRUPTCY - PAGE 2 
)OD 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this ~ day of September, 2009, I served a true and conect 
copy of the above and foregoing document to the following person(s) as follows: 
Trustee 
Kathleen A, McCallister 
P,O. Box 910 
Kuna, ID 83634 
U,S, Trustee 
Washington Group Central Plaza 
720 Park Blvd, Ste 220 
Boise, ID 83712 
Wells Fargo Financial 
1840 East l?h Street 
Idaho Falls, ID 83404 
VlPS Financial 
P.O, Box 25341 
Santa Ana, CA 92799-5341 
Bonneville Check Recovery 
Bonneville Collections 
P,O. Box 150621 
Ogden, UT 84415-0621 
Check A Check 
1325 Vista Avenue 
Boise, ID 83705 
Commercial Check Control 
7250 Beverly Blvd, Ste, 200 
Los .Angeles, CA 90036-2560 
Credit Bureau of Eastern Idaho 
P,O, Box 276 
Rexburg, ID 83440 








































U.S, Mail/Postage Prepaid 
Hand Delivery 
Facsimile 
ECF /Electronic Notification 
U.S, Mail/Postage Prepaid 
Hand Delivery 
Facsimile 
ECF /Electronic Notification 





















Direct Merchants Bank 
P.O. Box 22128 
Tulsa, OK 74121-2128 
Providian 
P.O. Box 60487 
Dallas, TX 75266-0487 
Quik Cash 
1259 East 17th Street 
Idaho Falls, ID 83404 
Telecheck Recovery Department 
P.O. Box 4857 
Houston, TX 77210-4857 
TRS Recovery Services, Inc. 
P.O. Box 60012 
City ofIndustry, CA 91716-0012 
U.S. Bank 
P.O. Box, CN-OH-WI5 
Cincinnati, OH 45201-5227 
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. 
P.O. Box 2864 
Tuscaloosa, AL 35403-2864 
Wells Fargo Financial 
P.O. Box 98798 
Las Vegas, NV 89193-8798 
Action Collection 
P.O. Box 4008 
Pocatello, ID 83205-4008 
DEBTOR'S MOTION TO REOPEN BANKRUPTCY - PAGE 4 
[ ] U.S. Mail/Postage Prepaid 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ ] Facsimile 
;~ ECF/Electronic Notification 
[ ] U.S. Mail/Postage Prepaid 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ J Facsimile 
[4 ECF/Electronic Notification 
! 
[ ] U.S. Mail/Postage Prepaid 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ ] Facsimile 
[)l ECF/Electronic Notification 
[ ] U.S. Mail/Postage Prepaid 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ ] Facsimile 
[r!r ECF/Electronic Notification 
I 
[ ] U.S. Mail/Postage Prepaid 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ ] Facsimile 
[>t ECF/Electronic Notification 
[ ] U.S. Mail/Postage Prepaid 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ ] Facsimile 
>f-/] ECF/Electronic Notification 
/' ", 
[ ] U.S. Mail/Postage Prepaid 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ ] Facsimile 
[Xl ECF/Electronic Notification 
,t " 
[ ] U.S. Mail/Postage Prepaid 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ ] Facsimile 
)~ ECF/Electronic Notification 
B 6B (Official Foml 6B) (12/07) 
Inre __ ~Je~ny~~C~u~rt~is~D~o~l~le~rtv~ __________________________ ~ Case No. 05-41630-lDP 
AMENDED SCHEDULE B - PERSONAL PROPERTY 
Except as directed below, list all personal property of the debtor of whatever kind. If the debtor has no property in one or more of 
the categories, place an "x" in the appropriate position in the column labeled "None." If additional space is needed in any category, attach a 
separate sheet properly identified with the case name, case number, and the number of the category. If the debtor is married, state whether 
the husband, wife, both, or the marital community own the property by placing an "H," "W," "J," or "e" in the column labeled "Husband. 
Wife, Joint, or Community." If the debtor is an individual or a joint petition is filed, state the amount of any exemptions claimed only in 
Schedule C - Property Claimed as Exempt. 
Do not list interests in executory contracts and unexpired leases on this schedule. List them in Schedule G - Executory Contracts 
and Unexpired Leases. 
lfthe property is being held [or the debtor by someone else, state that person's name and address under "Description and Location 
of Property." 
Type of property 
t. Cash on hand 
2. Checking, savings or other 
financial accounts, certificates of 
deposit or shares in banks, savings 
and loan, thrift, building and loan 
and homestead associations, or 
credit unions, brokerage houses, or 
cooperatives. 
3. Security deposits with public 
utilities, telephone companies, 
landlords, and others. 
4. Household goods and 
furnishings, including audio, 








Description and Location of Property 
Checking account at Washington Mutual (Chase 
Bank) , Idaho Falls, Idaho 
Savings account at Westrnark Credit Union, 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 
Kitchen Table 




Cleaning products, personal care items 
Couch and love seat 
Coffee table, 3 end tables 
3 lamps 
Wall hangings, clock 
Computer stand 
TV and stand 






Debtor's Interest in Property 
Without deducting any 

















Inre __ ~Je~rr~\~'~C~u~rt~is~D~01~1e~rt~\~' __________________________ ~ Case No. OS-41630-JDP 
AMENDED SCHEDULE B - PERSONAL PROPERTY 
(Continuation Sheet) 





5. Books; pictures and other art X 
objects; antiques; stamp, coin, 
record, tape, compact disc, and 
other collections or collectibles. 
6. Wearing apparel. 
7. Furs and jewelry. X 
8. Firearms and sports, X 
photographic, and other hobby 
equipment. 
9. Interests in insurance policies. X 
Name insurance company of each 
policy and itemize surrender or 
refund value of each. 
10. Annuities. Itemize and name X 
each issuer. 
11. Interests in IRA, ERISA, X 
Keogh, or other pension or profit 
sharing plans. Give particulars. 
12. Stock and interests in X 
incorporated and unincorporated 
businesses. Itemize. 
13. Interests in partnersh ips or X 
joint ventures. Itemize. 
14. Government and corporate 
bonds and other negotiable and X 
nonnegotiable instruments. 













Current Market Value of 
Debtor's Interest in Property 
Without deducting any 









111 re Jerry Curtis Doherty Case No. 05-4 J 630-JDP 
AMENDED SCHEDULE B - PERSONAL PROPERTY 
(Continuation Sheet) 





15. Accounts receivable X 
16. Alimony, maintenance, X 
support, and property settlements 
to which the debtor is or may be 
entitled. Give particulars. 
17. Other liquidated debts owed X 
to debtor including tax refunds. 
Give particulars. 
18. Equitable or future interests, X 
life estates, and rights or powers 
exercisable for the benefit of the 
debtor other than those listed in 
Schedule A - Real Property. 
19. Contingent and noncontingent X 
interests in estate of a decedent, 
death benefit plan, life insurance 
policy, or trust. 
20. Other contingent and 
unliquidated claims of every 
nature, including tax refunds, 
counterclaims of the debtor, and 
nghts to setoff claims. Give 
estimated value of each. 
21. Patents, copyrights, and other X 
intellectual property. Give 
particulars. 
22. Licenses, franchises, and X 
other general intangibles. Give 
particulars. 
Description and Location of Property 
Bingham County Case No. CV-2006-2145 
Jerry Doherty v. Gordon Dixon, M.D., and 
Blackfoot Medical clinic, Inc. 
23. Automobiles, trucks, trailers, 
and other vehicles and accessories. 
2000 Chevy 4x4 Silverado pickup 
24. Boats, motors, and 
accessories. 
X 
25. Aircraft and accessories X 






Current Market Value of 
Debtor's Interest in Property 
Without deducting any 





In re JeD]! Curtis Dohertv Case No. 05-4 I 630-JDP 
AMENDED SCHEDULE B - PERSONAL PROPERTY 
(Continuation Sheet) 





26. Office equipment, X 
furnishings, and supplies. 
27. Machinery, fixtures, X 
equipment, and supplies used in 
business. 
28. Inventory. X 
29. Animals. X 
30. Crops - growing or harvested. X 
Give particulars. 
31. Farming equipment and X 
implements 
32. Farm supplies, chemicals, and X 
feed. 
33. Other personal property of X 
any kind not already listed. 
Description and Location of Property 







Cunent Market Value of 
Debtor's Interest in Property 
Without deducting any 
Secured Claim or exemption 
0.00 
312,918.00 
Reed W. Larsen (3427) 
Javier L. Gabiola (5448) 
COOPER & LARSEN, CHARTERED 
151 North 3rd Avenue 2nd Floor , 
P. O. Box 4229 
Pocatello, ID 83205-4229 
Telephone: (208) 235-1145 
Facsimile: (208) 235-1182 
Attorneys/or Plaintiff 
t.' 
!.- ~ ~ 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 




GORDON DIXON, M.D., and 
BLACKFOOT MEDICAL CLINIC, 
INC., 
Defendants. 
STA TE OF IDAHO ) 
: ss 













Case No. CV-2006-2145 
AFFIDAVIT OF JERRY DOHERTY 
JERRY DOHERTY, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and states as follows: 
1. I am the Plaintiff in this matter and make this Affidavit upon my own personal 
knowledge; 
2. I did not file my claim against Dr. Dixon until September 6, 2006, after filing my 
petition for Bankruptcy on July 25 th, 2005. I did not contemplate or think about suing Dr. Dixon 
until I met with my attorneys in April 2006, just prior to filing my complaint against Dr. Dixon; 
AFFIDAVIT OF JERRY DOHERTY - PAGE 1 
/01 
3. I filed the bankruptcy because I was behind on my truck payments and wanted to 
keep it. I did not file any claim against Dr. Dixon in the banhuptcy, nor did I have any debt owed 
to Dr. Dixon, nor did I request the discharge of any medical expenses lowed to Dr. Dixon. Dr. 
Dixon was not a creditor in the bankruptcy; 
4. I simply made a good faith mistake in not including my claim against Dr. Dixon in 
the banhuptcy. I was not trying to conceal anything, no take advantage of Dr. Dixon, this Court or 
the Banhuptcy Court. I did not engage in any scheme to mislead any court either, nor intentionally 
decide that I should not list the claim in the banhuptcy case; 
5. Not all of my debt was discharged in the banhuptcy. A plan was set up for me to 
make payments to the creditors, and I made those payments, in a monthly amount of$360 per month 
for four years until recently, when my payments were made in full. 
FURTHER SAITH AFFIANT NAUGHT. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWOR.N TO before me this 4 day of September, 2009. 
(SEAL) 
AFFIDA VIT OF JERRY DOHERTY - PAGE 2 
JOg 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 3 day of September, 2009, I served a true and correct 
copy of the above and foregoing document to the following person(s) as follows: 
Gary T. Dance 
Julian E. Gabiola 
Moffatt, Thomas, Barrett Rock & Fields, Chtd. 
P.O. Box 817 
Pocatello, ID 83204-0817 




u.s. Mail/Postage Prepaid 
Hand Delivery 
Overnight Mail 
Facsimile / 232-0150 
Gary T. Dance, ISB No. 1513 
Julian E. Gabiola, ISB No. 5455 
MOFFATT, THOMAS, BARRETT, ROCK & 
FIELDS, CHARTERED 
412 West Center 
Post Office Box 817 
Pocatello, Idaho 83204 
Telephone (208) 233-2001 




Attorneys for Defendants 
··YIilP 
IN THE DISTRlCT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 




GORDON DIXON, M.D., BLACKFOOT 
MEDICAL CLINIC, INC. and BLACKFOOT 
MEDICAL CENTER, LLC, 
Defendants. 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss. 
County of Bannock ) 
Case No. CV-2006-2145 
AFFIDAVIT OF JULIAN E. GABIOLA 
IN SUPPORT OF JUDICIAL 
ESTOPPEL DEFENSE 
AFFIDAVIT OF JULIAN E. GABIOLA IN SUPPORT OF 
JUDICIAL ESTOPPEL DEFENSE - 1 
/10 
Client:1361325.1 
JULIAN E. GABIOLA, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and states as 
follows: 
1. I am one of the attorneys for the defendants in the above-referenced matter 
and, as such, have personal knowledge with respect to the matters herein. 
2. Attached as Exhibit A is a true and correct copy of the April 4, 2006 
Memorandum Opinion and Order Granting Summary Judgment, in Coffin v. Haddock, Case No. 
CV 2000-808. 
3. Attached as Exhibit B is a true and correct copy ofthe Notice of Last Day 
for Filing Complaints Objecting to Discharge in Jerry Doherty's Chapter 13 bankruptcy, Case 
No. 05-41630. 
JZ 
DATED this Kday of September, 2009. 
/u£c~ f.f~~L 
J{lful; E. Gabiola 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this ~ day of September, 2009. 
AFFIDAVIT OF JULIAN E. GABIOLA IN SUPPORT OF 
JUDICIAL ESTOPPEL DEFENSE - 2 
J [ l 
Client: 1361325.1 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
Jl-
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this ~ day of September, 2009, I caused a tme 
and correct copy of the foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF JULIAN E. GABIOLA IN SUPPORT OF 
JUDICIAL ESTOPPEL DEFENSE to be served by the method indicated below, and addressed 
to the following: 
Reed W. Larsen 
COPPER & LARSEN, CHARTERED 
P.O. Box 4229 
Pocatello, ID 83205-4229 
Facsimile: (208) 235-1182 
(0u.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
( ) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
( ) Facsimile 
;!vtitlWl f- fdU/1t- ,:~ 
Gary T. Dance 
AFFIDAVIT OF JULIAN E. GABIOLA IN SUPPORT OF 
JUDICIAL ESTOPPEL DEFENSE - 3 
II~ 
Client:1361325.1 
luau f\F'R ~ Lj. PI"') I; L: 7 
./ .; e t/- ~-Eo8 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BINGHAM 
THE ESTATE OF RICHARD T. COFFlN, ) 
NANCY LOUISE COFFlN, AND TINA ) 
BEARD, in their individual capacities and 
as heirs of the Estate of Richard T. CoffIn, 
3815 E. 200 N., Rigby, Idaho 83274, 
Plaintiff, 
VB. 
GARY K. HADDOCK, M.D., 
MEDICAL CLINIC, 625 W. Pacific, 















CASE NO. CV 2000-808 
MEMORANDUM OPINION 
AND ORDER GRANTING 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Defendants Gary K. Haddock, M.D., <l11d the Medical Clinic (collectively referred 
to as Haddock) ask in their third Motion for Summary Judgment that the Court dismiss a 
wrongful death claim brought against them by the Estate of Richard T. CoffIn, Nancy 
Louise Coffin, and Tina Beard (collectively refened to as Coffin). 
The COUli has reviewed the record, including Plaintiff Nancy Coffin's volw1tary 
petition for Chapter 7 bankruptcy, statement of financial affairs, summary of schedules 
1I3 
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER 
GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
EXHIBIT 
A 
and other related documents of the United States Bankmptcy Court, District of Idaho, 
Case #02~40212. I 
The s01e issue before the Court is whether or not the Court should summarily 
grant judgment for the defendants because Plaintiff failed to include this action on her 
bankruptcy petition. 
The Court grants Haddock's motion. 
II. BACKGROUND 
On May 22, 2000, Plaintiffs Nancy Coffm (Nancy) and Tina Beard filed a 
wrongful death action against Haddock, arising from the death of Mrs. Coffin's husband. 
After her husband died, Nancy claimed that she was unable to pay her debts as 
they came due. On February 22, 2002, she filed a chapter 7 Petition for Banhuptcy, 
Case 02-40212, United States Bankruptcy Court, Dishict of Idaho. In her Petition, 
Nancy did not disclose or set forth the wrongful death action filed in this Court. Under 
oath, she signed a petition which stated that her liabilities were in excess of her assets, 
that she had no liquidated claims of any nature, and when requested to "list all suits and 
administrative proceedings to which she was a party ... " she answered 'no'. Based on 
the Petition, the Bankruptcy Trustee filed a Trustee's Report of No Assets on March 19, 
2002. Nancy's creditors were not notified of any assets available and no one appeared or 
objected to her Chapter 7 Bankruptcy, She received a release and discharge on May 17, 
2002. 
I See Schedules A, B, and C, attached to the Affidavit of Julian E. Gabiola in Support of Defendant's Third 
Motion for Summary Judgment, setting forth the BarrIo-uptcy fomls from the petition of Defendant Nancy 
Coffin, United States Bankruptcy Court, District ofIdaho, No. 02-40212. 
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER 
GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
2 
/ ILf 
On January 30, 2003, the bankruptcy was reopened after Haddock moved for 
summary judgment in this case. On October Il, 2005, the Chapter 7 Banlauptcy Trustee 
filed a report of no distribution, indicating that Coffin's reopened estate had been fully 
administered. On October 12, 2005, the Bankruptcy Court entered an order closing the 
reopened estate and discharging the trustee. 
III. ANALYSIS 
A. Standard of Review-Motion for Summary Judgment 
Ifthe pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, 
if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any matelial fact and that the moving 
party is entitled to judgment as a matter oflaw, the Court may grant summary judgmenL2 
A party against whom a summary judgment is sought cannot merely rest on his 
pleadings. \Vhen faced with supporting affidavits or depositions, the opposing party must 
show material issues of fact, which preclude the issuance of surrunary judgment. 3 The 
Court infers contested facts in the opposing party's favor. The Court may not weigh the 
evidence or to resolve controverted factual issues.4 
The moving party must prove the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.:; On 
the other hand, the opposing party cannot simply speculate; a mere scintilla of evidence is 
2 I.R.c.P. 56( c); G & M Farms v. Funk Irrigation Co., 119 Idaho 514, 808 P.2d 851 (1991); Burgess v. 
Salmon River Canal Co. Ltd., 119 Idaho 299, 805 P .2d 1223 (1991). 
3 kG. Nelson, AJA. v. Steer, 118 Idaho 409, 410, 797 P.2d 117, 118 (1990); Zehm v. Associated Logging 
Contractors, lnc., 116 Idaho 349, 775 P.2d 1191 (1988). 
4 Petrieevieh v. Salmon River Canal Co., 92 Idaho 865,868,452 P.2d 362, 365 (1969); Wait v. Leavell Cattle, 
Inc., 1361daho 792, 798, 41 P.3d 220,226(2001). 
5 Pctricevieh, 92 Idaho at 868,452 P.2d at 365; Wait v. Leavell Cattle, Inc., 136 Idaho at 
798, 4' P.3d at 226. 
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER 
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not enough to create a genuine factual issue. 6 The Court grants summary judgment when 
the non-moving party cannot establish the essential elements of the claim? In these 
circumstances, all other "facts" become immaterial. 8 
B. Haddock's Third Motion for Summary Judgment Should be Granted Under 
the Doctrine of JudiciaJ Estoppel. ,. 
Haddock argues that Coffin's claims against the defendants are baned under the 
doctrine of judicial estoppel. In his Memorandum in Support ofTlllrd Motion for Summary 
Judgment, Haddock correctly sets fOlih the doctrine of judicial estoppel and explains how it 
applied to Coffin's situation (Brief Lodged December 29,2005, pp. 7-17): 
Judicial estoppel precludes a party from gaining an advantage by 
taking one position, and then seeking a second advantage by taking an 
incompatible position. A &.J ConstI', Co., Inc, v, Wood,-Idaho-, 116 P.3d 
12, 14 (2005)(citing Sword v. Sweet, 140 Idaho 242, 252,92 P.3d 492, 502 
[2004]), 
It is quite generally held that where a litigant, by means of such 
sworn statements, obtail1S a judgment, advantage or consideration from 
one party, he will not thereafter, by repUdiating such allegations and by 
means of inconsistent and contrary allega60ns or testimony, be permitted 
to obtain a recovery or a right against another party, arising out of the 
same transaction or subj eet matter. 
Jd., 116 P.3d at 15 (quoting Loomis v, Church, 76 Idaho 87, 93-94, 
277 F.2d 5761, 565[1954]), 
Essentially, this doctrine prevents a party from assuming a position in one 
proceeding and then talcing an inconsistent position in a subsequent 
proceeding, There are very important policies underlying the judicial 
estoppel doctrine, One purpose of the doctrine is to protect the integrity of 
the judicial system, by protecting the orderly administration of justice and 
having regard for the dignity of judicial proceedings, The doctrine is also 
intended to prevent parties from playing fast and loose with the courts, 
"Edwards v. Conchemco, Inc., 111 Idaho 851,853,727 P.2d 1279,1281 (CLApp. 1986); West v. Sonke, 132 
Idaho 133, 138, 968 P.2d 228, 233 (1998), 
7 Dekkerv. Magic Valley Regional Medica! Center, 115 Idaho 332, 333, 766 P.2d 1213, 1214 (1989); 
Badellv, Beeks, 115 Idaho 101,102, 765P.2d 126(1988). 
8 Podolal1 v. Idaho Legal Aid Services, Inc" 123 Idaho 937, 943, 854 P,2d 280, 286 (CLApp. 1993). 
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Id. (quoting Robertson Supply, Inc, v, Nicholls, 131 Idaho 99,101,952 P. 2d 
914, 116 [Ct. App, 1998]). 
Judicial estoppel protects the integrity of the judicial system, not the 
1· . 9 Itlgants. , . , 
In A & J Construction Co., Inc, v, Wood, the Idaho Supreme Court applied the 
Doctrine of Judicial Estoppel to a situation where the party later took an inconsistent 
position in a bankruptcy proceeding from the position that the party had taken in the district 
court. The Idaho Supreme Court ruled: "In a banJauptcy context, a party is judicially 
estopped :fi:om asserting a cause of action not raised in a reorganization plan or otherwise 
mentioned in the debtor's schedule for disclosure statements."JO 
The Wood court pointed out that the rationale for invoking the doctrine of judicial 
estoppel to prevent a party who failed to disclose a claim in bankruptcy proceeding from 
asserting that claim after emerging from banlauptcy is to protect the integrity of the 
bankruptcy system and require full and honest disclostrre by the debtors of all of their assets, 
According to the Idaho Supreme Court, 'Judicial estoppel will be imposed when the debtor 
has knowledge of enough facts to lmow that a potential cause of action exists during the 
pendency of the bankruptcy, but fails to amend the schedules or disclosure statements to 
identifY the cause of action as a contingent asset. 11 
The Idaho Supreme COUli further ruled that reliance upon advice from counsel 
excluding the assets from the bankruptcy proceedings was not a defense; neither was the 
fact that the schedules were an1ended after the discovery by Jhe court or by third parties of 
the omission. The precedent is clear: a known asset, including a cause of action, whether 
i 
9 Defendant's Memorandum in Support of Third Motion for Summary Judgment, Lodged December 29, 
2005, p. 7, 
I~A & J Construction Company, Inc. v Wood, 116 P.3d at 15. 
IIJd 116P.3d at 16. 
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exempt with or without value, must be listed. Failure to list a cause of action as a 
bankruptcy asset bars a party from pursuing that cause of action in another court. 
N. CONCLUSION 
No genuine issues of material fact have been presented to the comi. The 
defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law through the doctr'ine of judicial 
estoppel. 
Summary judgment is hereby granted in favor of the defendants. The plaintiffs 
shall take nothing by their wrongful death action against the defendants. This action is 
dismissed with prejudice. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
DATED this 4 tL day of April 2006. 
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER 
GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
6 
I if 
'~ . . , . 
I ... 1 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a fu11, true and correct copy ofthe foregoing 
instrument was mailed by first class mail with prepaid postage and/or hand delivered 
and/or sent by facsimile this t~day of April 2006, to: 
ROBERT K. BECK, ESQ 
2450 EAST 25111 STREET STE A 
IDAHO FALLS ID 83404 
GARY T DANCE ESQ 
POBOX 51505 
IDAl-IO FALLS ID 83405 
(S-£ A L) 
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER 
GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
SARA STAUB, CLERK 
7 
1[0 
Case 05-41630-JOP 28 Filed 12/16/08 Entered 1 
ntclastd Page 1 of 1 
12:39:12 Oesc 
UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT 
DISTRlCT OF IDAHO 
InRe: 
Jerry Curtis Doherty 
2160 Davidson Dr 
Idaho Falls, ID 83401 





) Chapter: 13 
) 




) NOTICE OF LAST DAY FOR FILING 






TO ALL CREDITORS AND PARTIES IN INTEREST: 
YOU ARE HEREBY NOTIFIED that the above named debtor has completed the Chapter 13 
Plan. 
NOW THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED AND NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the last day 
for filing COMPLAINTS with the Bankruptcy Court objecting to the discharge of the debtor 
pursuant to Section 523 is: 1/20/2009 
NOTICE IS ALSO GIVEN that an Order of Discharge of this debtor from all debts covered 
by the Plan will be entered, unless objections are allowed, on: 1/2112009 
Said Order of Discharge will declare any judgment on said debts null and void as a 
determination of personal liability of the debtor. In addition, said Order will enjoin all creditors 
whose debts are discharged in whole or in part from instituting or continuing any action or 
commencement of any process to collect such debts as the personal liability of the above named 
debtor. 
Dated: 12116/08 Cameron S. Burke 





Gary T. Dance, ISB No. 1513 
Julian E. Gabiola, ISB No. 5455 
MOFFATT, THOMAS, BARRETT, ROCK & 
FIELDS, CHARTERED 
412 West Center 
Post Office Box 817 
Pocatello, Idaho 83204 
Telephone (208) 233-2001 




Attorneys for Defendants 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRlCT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BINGHAM 
JERRY DOHERTY, 
Case No. CV-2006-2145 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM IN 
SUPPORT OF JUDICIAL ESTOPPEL 
DEFENSE 
GORDON DIXON, M.D., BLACKFOOT 
MEDICAL CLINIC, INC. and BLACKFOOT 
MEDICAL CENTER, LLC, 
Defendants. 
COME NOW defendants, by and through undersigned counsel, hereby submit this 
Memorandum in Support of Judicial Estoppel Defense. 
DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF JUDICIAL 




Contrary to Doherty's argument, he intentionally concealed his medical 
malpractice claim from the bankruptcy court and stood to gain from failing to disclose this claim 
in bankruptcy. Doherty filed his bankruptcy in 2005, then he filed his complaint in this case in 
2006. However, Doherty never disclosed this lawsuit to the bankruptcy court during the 
pendency of his Chapter 13 bankruptcy. Doherty enjoyed the benefits gained by filing his 
Chapter 13 bankruptcy, and he received a discharge of unsecured debt in January 2009, well 
after he filed this lawsuit. Yet, he never mentioned his potential lawsuit against Dr. Dixon, 
which he knew about as early as October 2004, and he never amended his bankruptcy schedules. 
Defendants submit that based upon these facts, Doherty intentionally failed to disclose this 
lawsuit in his bankruptcy. Accordingly, this Court should conclude that Doherty is judicially 
estopped from pursuing this medical malpractice claim. 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
Doherty knew as early as October 28, 2004, that he had a claim against Dr. 
Dixon. In his September 18, 2007, deposition Doherty testified that by the time of the third 
surgery that Dr. Moffett performed, he blamed Dr. Dixon for his eye problems: 
Q. By critical I mean criticized it, said it was wrong, shouldn't 
have done something or did do something that was wrong. 
A. The only thing in that situation is that Dr. Moffett telling me, 
and I don't know his exact words, it's been a while back, that if I 
was in his care the day it would have happened, I probably would 
have full eyesight today, because ofthe blood that dried in the 
back of my eye -- I'll tell you what happened. 
III my third surgery Dr. Moffett had me out twelve hours, he 
worked on me eight hours and he had to go in and clean it all out 
and he had to hook up the eye. And, anyway, after that I started 
counting fingers with this eye (indicating) with the nurse the next 
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four or five days, and then it was gone, and I was told that the scar 
tissue come up and disconnected it again and it's because of the 
blood that dried in the back of my eye. 
That's when I found out that I should have seen an eye doctor 
the day of tlte accident and I could have had surgery that night 
and had the blood drawn out of my eye and I would have full 
eyesight today. 
Q. Dr. Moffett told you that? 
A. Yes. 
Affidavit of Julian E. Gabiola in Support of Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, Exhibit B, 
Deposition of Jerry Doherty, 15: 11 to 16:8. Dr. Moffett performed his third surgery on Doherty 
on October 28, 2004. Affidavit of Julian E. Gabiola in Opposition to Plaintiff s Motion in 
Limine, Exhibit K, October 28,2004 Operative Note of Dr. Moffett. 
Doherty also had to have known by February 2, 2005, that he would pursue a 
claim against Dr. Dixon, because it was at that time that Dr. Moffett concluded that Doherty had 
a failed retinal attachment and that Doherty decided he did not want any further surgery. Julian 
Gabiola Aff. in Opp. to Plt.'s Mtn in Limine, Exhibit L, February 2,2005 Operative Note of Dr. 
Moffett. 
Doherty filed a Chapter 13 bankruptcy on July 25,2005. Julian Gabiola Aff. in 
Opp. to PIt. 's Mtn in Limine, Exhibit 1. Doherty's Chapter l3 plan was confilmed on September 
6, 2005. ld. Doherty's Chapter l3 plan had a term of 48 months. ld. On September 6, 2006, 
Doherty filed his medical malpractice complaint in this case, yet he failed to amend his 
bankruptcy schedules to include the lawsuit. On January 21,2009, Doherty received a discharge 
in his Chapter 13 bankruptcy. ld., Exhibit M. 
While Doherty now submits a self-serving, conclusory affidavit that he 
inadvertently failed to list his claim against Dr. Dixon, the fact that he admittedly failed to amend 
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his bankruptcy schedules demonstrates that he intentionally deceived the bankruptcy court and 
only sought to amend his schedules after Dr. Dixon brought it to the Court's attention. 
ARGUMENT 
1. DOHERTY IS JUDICIALLY ESTOPPED FROM ASSERTING HIS MEDICAL 
MALPRACTICE CLAIM, BECAUSE HE INTENTIONALLY FAILED TO LIST 
IT IN HIS BANKRUPTCY SCHEDULES. 
Doherty is judicially estopped from asserting his medical malpractice claim 
against defendants, because he took the inconsistent position of not listing his claim against Dr. 
Dixon in his Chapter 13 bankruptcy schedules and then filed a claim against Dr. Dixon in this 
Court. The doctrine of judicial estoppel clearly prohibits "a party from assuming a position in 
one proceeding and then taking an inconsistent position in a subsequent proceeding." A & J 
Constr. Co., Inc. v. Wood, 141 Idaho 682, 688, 116 P.3d 12, 18 (2005) (quoting Robertson 
Supply, Inc. v. Nicholls, 131 Idaho 99,101,952 P.2d 914, 916 (Ct. App. 1998)). 
"In the bankruptcy context, a party is judicially estopped from asserting a cause 
of action not raised ill a reorganization plan or otherwise mentioned in the debtor's schedules 
or disclosure statements." Wood, 141 Idaho at 685, 116 P.3d at 15 (2005) (emphasis added) 
(quoting Hamilton v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 270 F.3d 778, 783 (9th Cir. 2001)). "The 
rationale for ... decisions [invoking judicial estoppel to prevent a party who failed to disclose a 
claim in bankruptcy proceedings from asserting that claim after emerging from bankruptcy] is 
that the integrity of the bankruptcy system depends 011 full and honest disclosure by debtors of 
( 
all of their assets." ld. (quoting Hamilton, 270 F.3d at 785). 
The interests of both the creditors, who plan their actions in the 
banla'uptcy proceeding on the basis of information supplied in the 
disclosure statements, and the banla'uptcy court, which must 
decide whether to approve the plan of reorganization on the same 
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basis, are impaired when the disclosure provided by the debtor is 
incomplete. 
Wood, 141 Idaho at 686,116 P.3d at 16 (quoting Hamilton, 270 F.3d at 785). 
On July 25,2005, Doherty filed a Chapter 13 bankruptcy. In Schedule B., 
Personal Property, of his bankruptcy schedules, item number 20, "Other contingent and 
unliquidated claims of every nature, including, tax refunds, counterclaims of the debtor, and 
rights to setoff claims," Doherty listed "None." Even though Doherty knew as early as October 
28,2004, or at the latest, February 5, 2005, that, in his mind, it was Dr. Dixon's fault that he lost 
the vision in his left eye, he did not list his claim in his bankruptcy schedules. The bankruptcy 
code, specifically, 11 U.S.C. sections 521 and 541 (a)(7), and rules impose upon debtors an 
express, affirmative duty to disclose all assets, including contingent and unliquidated claims. 
"Judicial estoppel will be imposed when the debtor has knowledge of enough facts to know that a 
potential cause of action exists during the pendency of the bankruptcy, but fails to amend his 
schedules or disclosure statements to identify the cause of action as a contingent asset." Wood, 
141 Idaho at 686,116 P.3d at 16 (emphasis added) (quoting Hamilton, 270 F.3d at 785). 
What is worse is that Doherty failed to amend his bankruptcy schedules when he 
sought legal representation to file a complaint against Dr. Dixon or when he actually filed his 
complaint on September 6, 2006. "The debtor's duty to disclose potential claims as assets does 
not end when the debtor files schedules, but instead continues for the duration of the bankruptcy 
proceedings." Hamilton, 270 F.3d at 785. 
On January 21, 2009, Doherty received a discharge. Doherty, therefore, enjoyed 
the benefits gained by filing for bankruptcy, and he received a discharge ofthe balance of his 
unsecured indebtedness when his plan was approved. Yet, he never mentioned his potential 
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lawsuit against Dr. Dixon, which he knew about as early as October 28, 2004, and he never 
amended his bankruptcy schedules after he filed his medical malpractice claim in September 
2006. Defendants submit that Doherty is judicially estopped from pursuing this medical 
malpractice claim. The facts in this record show clearly that Doherty knew in October 2004, or 
at the latest, September 2006, that he had a claim and that he should have disclosed his claim 
during his bankruptcy but intentionally failed to do so. 
II. DOHERTY'S ARGUMENTS THAT JUDICIAL ESTOPPEL DOES NOT APPLY 
ARE WITHOUT MERIT. 
Doherty argues that judicial estoppel does not apply: (1) because Dr. Dixon was 
not a party to Doherty's bankruptcy and is not prejudiced by his failure to list his claim in his 
bankruptcy; (2) because Doherty's reason for filing bankruptcy bears no relation to his medical 
malpractice claim against Dr. Dixon; (3) because Doherty did not intentionally exclude his 
medical malpractice claim from his bankruptcy; (4) because Doherty has reopened his 
bankruptcy; and (5) because Dr. Dixon's judicial estoppel defense is untimely. As discussed 
more fully below, Doherty's arguments that judicial estoppel does not apply are without merit. 
A. It is Irrelevant That Dr. Dixon is Not a Party to Doherty's Bankruptcy or 
That Dr. Dixon is Not Prejudiced by Doherty's Failure to List His Medical 
Malpractice Claim, As These Are Not Required Elements of Judicial 
Estoppel in the Bankruptcy Context. 
It is irrelevant that Dr. Dixon was not a party to Doherty's bankruptcy or that Dr. 
Dixon is not prejudiced by Doherty's failure to list his medical malpractice claim in his 
bankruptcy. In Wood the COUli explained that '''[w]hile privity and/or detrimental reliance are 
often present in judicial estoppel, they are not required. '" Id., 141 Idaho at 686, 116 P. 3d at 16 
(quoting Burnes v. Pemco Aeroplex, inc., 291 F.3d 1282, 1286 (lIth Cir. 2002». Additionally, 
parties asserting judicial estoppel are not required to demonstrate individual prejudice since 
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courts have concluded that the doctrine is intended to protect the judicial system. ld. (citing 
Burnes, 291 F.3d at 1286 ("The doctrine of judicial estoppel protects the integrity of the judicial 
system, not the litigants"). 
Doherty further argues that he should not be estopped from asserting his medical 
malpractice claim because doing so would create "inequity in the name of equity." Dr. Dixon 
disagrees. Equity follows the law-"Equitas sequitur legem." And applying the law in this 
case must result in estopping Doherty from obtaining the benefit of a discharge of his unsecured 
debt to the detriment of his unsecured creditors and the possible benefit of his medical 
malpractice claim. 
B. It is Irrelevant Whether Doherty's Bankruptcy is Unrelated to His Medical 
Malpractice Action. 
Doherty argues that the doctrine of judicial estoppel cannot apply in this case, 
because the reason he filed for bankruptcy is unrelated to the reason he filed his medical 
malpractice claim. The Idaho Supreme Court in Wood never held that a plaintiffs banlauptcy 
must be related to a tort claim brought in another proceeding. If this were the law, then there 
would be no incentive for a debtor to fully disclose all assets and potential assets in his 
bankruptcy schedule. A debtor seeking shelter under the banlauptcy laws is required to disclose 
all assets, or potential assets, to the banlauptcy court under 11 U.S. C. § 521 (1), and 541 (a)(7). 
Wood, 141 Idaho at 686,116 P.3d at 16 (citing Burnes, 291 F.3d at 1286). "Full disclosure is 
'crucial to the effective functioning ofthe federal bankruptcy system. '" ld. (quoting Burnes, 291 
FJd at 1286). Because both creditors and bankruptcy cOUli rely on the accuracy ofthe 
disclosure statements, "the importance of full and honest disclosure cannot be overstated." ld. 
(quoting Burnes, 291 F.3d at 1286). 
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Other courts have affinned the dismissal of cases under the doctrine of judicial 
estoppel where the reason the plaintiff filed for bankruptcy was altogether unrelated to the non-
bankruptcy related litigation filed by the plaintiff in another court. For example, in Burnes v. 
Pemco Aeroplex, Inc., a case very similar to this case, one ofthe plaintiffs, Billups, filed a 
Chapter 13 bankruptcy in July 1997, and in January 1998 he filed an employment discrimination 
claim against his employer Pemco. Pemco did not participate in the bankruptcy. In December 
1999, Billups, along with 35 other plaintiffs, filed an employment discrimination lawsuit against 
Pemeo. In October 2000, Billups converted his Chapter 13 bankruptcy to a Chapter 7 
bankruptcy. Billups never amended his schedules to reflect his lawsuit against Pemco. Billups 
filed for bankruptcy for reasons unrelated to the employment discrimination claim that he 
brought against his employer after he filed for bankruptcy. The Eleventh Circuit Court of 
Appeals affirmed the district court's decision that Billups was judicially estopped from pursing 
his employment discrimination cause of action because he failed to disclose that claim in his 
bankruptcy. 
In summary, if the doctrine of judicial estoppel were to apply only to claims 
related to bankruptcy proceedings, there would be no incentive for debtors to identify claims or 
lawsuits unrelated to the bankruptcy as assets or potential assets. Such a rule would emasculate 
11 U.S.c. sections 521(1), and 541(a)(7) and a debtor's duty to fully and honestly disclose all 
assets and potential assets in bankruptcy. 
C. Doherty IntentionaHy Failed to List His Medical Malpractice Claim as an 
Asset in His Bankruptcy Schedules. 
Doherty argues that he did not intentionally fail to list his medical malpractice 
claim in his bankruptcy. Doherty relies upon a self-serving and conc1usory affidavit to support 
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his argument. In paragraph four of his affidavit, Doherty makes conclusory, legal statements, 
such as "I simply made a good faith mistake", "I was not trying to conceal anything", and "I did 
not engage in any scheme to mislead any court ... nor intentionally decide that I should not list 
the claim in the bankruptcy case." Dr. Dixon submits that these are conclusory statements that 
are inadmissible. See, e.g., CHARLES ALAN WRlGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & MARY KAY KANE, 
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2738, pp. 486 - 489 (1983) ("Thus, ultimate or 
conclusory facts and conclusions of law, as well as statements made on belief or 'on information 
or belief,' cannot be utilized on a summary judgment motion"). 
In addition, Dr. Dixon submits that deliberate or intentional manipUlation on 
Doherty'S part can be inferred from the record. Burnes, 291 F.3d at 1287. "[T]he debtor's 
failure to satisfy its statutory disclosure duty is 'inadvertent' only when, in general, the debtor 
either lacks knowledge ofthe undisclosed claims or has no motive for their concealment." Id. 
(quoting In re Coastal Plains, Inc., 179 F.3d 197,210 (5th Cir. 1999)). 
In Burnes, a case with facts quite similar to this case, the Eleventh Circuit Court 
of Appeals affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment based upon judicial estoppel 
grounds because there was sufficient evidence from which to infer intentional manipUlation by 
the debtor. The court first explained that there was evidence that Billups had knowledge of his 
claim during the bankruptcy proceedings: 
Specifically, it is undisputed that Billups filed and pursued his 
employment discrimination claims during the pendency of his 
Chapter 13 case, but never amended his financial statements to 
include the lawsuit. Additionally, at the time that Billups 
petitioned the bankruptcy court to convert his case to Chapter 7, he 
had already filed, and was pursuing, the employment claims. 
Nevertheless, he once again failed to disclose the pending lawsuit 
to the bankruptcy court. These undisputed facts make it clear that 
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Billups had knowledge of his claims during the bankruptcy 
proceedings. 
Burnes, 291 FJd 1287-88. The court then explained that Billups had the motive to conceal his 
lawsuit from the bankruptcy court: 
As to motive, it is undisputed that Billups stood to gain an 
advantage by concealing the claims from the bankruptcy court. It 
is unlikely he would have received the benefit of a conversion to 
Chapter 7 followed by a no asset, complete discharge had his 
creditors, the trustee, or the bankruptcy court known of a lawsuit 
claiming millions of dollars in damages. As discussed more fully 
below, Billups even acknowledges, at least implicitly, that 
disclosing this information would have likely changed the result of 
his banlauptcy because he now seeks to re-open his bankruptcy to 
include the undisclosed claims. Given these undisputed facts, we 
think the district court correctly concluded that Billups possessed 
the requisite intent to mislead the bankruptcy court and correctly 
barred him from pursuing his discrimination claims, at least to the 
extent that he sought money damages. 
This Court's predecessor, the Honorable James Herndon, granted summary 
judgment against the plaintiff in a wrongful death medical malpractice action when she failed to 
identify her wrongful death claim in her banlauptcy. Coffin v. Haddock, Case No. CV 2000-808 
(April 4, 2006 Memorandum Opinion and Order Granting Summary Judgment, attached as 
Exhibit A to Affidavit of Julian E. Gabiola in Support of Judicial Estoppel Defense). In Coffin, 
the plaintiff brought a wrongful death action based upon a medical malpractice claim after her 
husband died from constrictive pericarditis. Coffin filed her medical malpractice claim and then 
later filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy. The defendants in the medical malpractice action filed a 
motion for summary judgment, arguing judicial estoppel, and Judge Herndon granted the motion. 
Doheliy does not deny that he had knowledge of his undisclosed medical 
malpractice claim as early as October 28,2004 or February 2005, when he refused to have 
further surgery for his recurrent retinal detachment. What is worse, however, is that Doherty 
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does not dispute that he filed and pursued his medical malpractice claim during the pendency of 
his Chapter 13 bankruptcy, but never amended his bankruptcy schedules to include this lawsuit. 
These undisputed facts make it clear that Doherty had knowledge of his medical malpractice 
claim prior to filing bankruptcy and during his bankruptcy proceedings. 
As to motive, Doherty cannot dispute that he stood to gain an advantage by 
concealing his medical malpractice claim from the bankruptcy court. On December 16, 2008, 
notice was sent to Doherty's creditors that if they were to object to Doherty's discharge, they had 
to do so on or before January 20,2009. Gabiola Aff. in Support ofJudicial Estoppel, Exhibit B. 
It is unlikely that Doherty would have received a discharge of his unsecured debt from his 
unsecured creditors had they known of his medical malpractice claim when he filed it in 
September 2006, wherein he alleged close to $100,000.00 in special damages. Doherty even 
acknowledges that disclosing his medical malpractice claim could have changed the result of his 
bankruptcy because he has filed a petition to reopen his bankruptcy to include the undisclosed 
claim. In summary, there is sufficient evidence in this record from which to infer intentional 
manipulation by Doherty. 
D. It is Irrelevant Whether Doherty Reopens His Bankruptcy. 
Doherty argues that since he has filed a petition to reopen his Chapter 13 
bankruptcy, it is inappropriate to apply the doctrine of judicial estoppel to bar his wrongful death 
claim against the defendants. 
In A & J Construction Co., Inc. v. Wood, the Idaho Supreme Court cited to 
Hamilton v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., where the Ninth Circuit held that the 
plaintif:fldebtor was judicially estopped from pursuing a claim that he did not disclose during his 
bankruptcy, even if the discharge was later vacated: 
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Hamilton is precluded from pursuing claims about which he had 
knowledge, but did not disclose, during his bankruptcy 
proceedings, and that a discharge of debt by a bankruptcy court, 
under these circumstances, is sufficient acceptance to provide a 
basis for judicial estoppel, even if the discharge is later vacated. 
Hamilton, 270 F.3d at 784 (emphasis added). The Wood court also relied upon the decision in 
Burnes v. Pemco Aeroplex, Inc., where the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that 
allowing a plaintiff/debtor 
to back-up, re-open the bankruptcy case, and amend his 
bankruptcy filings, only after his omission has been challenged by 
an adversary, suggests that a debtor should consider disclosing 
potential assets only if he is caught concealing them. This so-
called remedy would only diminish the necessary incentive to 
provide the bankruptcy court with a truthful disclosure of the 
debtors' assets. 
Burnes, 291 F.3d at 1288 (emphasis added); see also Kristal Cadillac-Oldsmobile GMC Truck, 
Inc. v. Gen. Motors Corp., 337 F.3d 314, 321 (3d Cir. 2003), cert. denied 541 U.S. 1043, 124 S. 
Ct. 2172, 158 L.Ed.2d 732 (2004) (rejecting plaintiffs argument that it could amend its 
bankruptcy disclosure statement to reflect its claim against the defendant, stating, "The 
Bankruptcy Court was not impressed by Krystal's eleventh hour candor and neither are we. "); 
In re Superior Crewboats, Inc., 374 F.3d 330,336 (5th Cir. 2004) (holding that judicial estoppel 
was designed to prevent abuses such as allowing the debtor to reopen the bankruptcy and to 
amend their petition); Traylor v. Gene Evans Ford, LLC, 185 F. Supp.2d 1338, 1340 (N.D. Ga. 
2002) (holding that bankruptcy petitioner was judicially estopped from proceeding with his tort 
action when he disclosed the lawsuit in the bankruptcy matter only after being forced to do so 
after the defendant filed a motion for summary judgment); Scoggins v. Arrow Trucking Co., 92 
F.Supp.2d 1372, 1376 (S.D. Ga. 2000) (same); Chandler v. Samford University, 35 F. Supp. 2d 
861, 863-865 (N.D. Ala. 1999) (holding that plaintiff was judicially estopped from asserting a 
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previously undisclosed tort claim, even though she eventually infonned her attorney and the 
bankruptcy court of the claim). 
In Coffin v. Haddock, Judge Herndon granted Dr. Haddock's summary judgment 
motion on judicial estoppel grounds after Coffin had reopened her bankruptcy. See Gabiola Aff. 
in Support of Judicial Estoppel, Exhibit A, April 4, 2006 Memorandum Decision and Order 
Granting Summary Judgment. 
Doherty's eleventh hour candor and potential reopening of his Chapter 13 
bankruptcy came about only after the defendants unearthed his failure to disclose his medical 
malpractice action in his Chapter 13 bankruptcy. Allowing Doherty to escape the doctrine of 
judicial estoppel because he reopened his bankruptcy will serve only to reward him for being 
caught concealing potential assets and diminish the necessary incentive to provide the 
bankruptcy court with a truthful disclosure of his assets. 
E. Defendants Have Not Waived Their Judicial Estoppel Defense. 
Defendants have not waived their judicial estoppel defense. In their First 
Affinnative defense in the Answer, defendants specifically reserved the right to supplement their 
defenses: 
By raising the following defenses, defendants make no admission 
of any kind and do not assume any burdens of proof or production 
not otherwise properly resting upon them in this lawsuit. Rather, 
defendants merely identify defenses to preserve them for all proper 
uses under applicable law. Defendants have yet to complete 
discovery in this case, the result of which may reveal additional 
defenses to the plaintiff's complaint. As such, defendants reserve 
the right to supplement, modify, or delete defenses after discovery 
is completed. 
In addition, defendants did not learn of Doherty's bankruptcy until he filed his 
motion in limine. Furthermore, the Court provided Doherty additional time to respond to the 
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judicial estoppel argument. Therefore, Doherty's argument that defendants should be precluded 
from raising the doctrine of judicial estoppel as a defense is without merit. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing argument and authority, Dr. Dixon respectfully requests 
that the Court conclude that Doherty is judicially estopped from continuing his medical 
malpractice lawsuit against Dr. Dixon. 
r 
DATED this 1/ -day of September, 2009. 
MOFFATT, THOMAS, BARRETI, ROCK & 
FIELDS, CHARTERED 
By /utcWvt f- iwtWt- j;.. 
(fa;y T. Dance - Of the Firn1 
Attorneys for Defendants 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 1/ l'day of September, 2009, I caused a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
JUDICIAL ESTOPPEL DEFENSE to be served by the method indicated below, and addressed 
to the following: 
Reed W. Larsen 
COPPER & LARSEN, CHARTERED 
P. O. Box 4229 
Pocatello, ID 83205-4229 
Facsimile: (208) 235-1182 
(iV,s. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
( ) Band Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
( ) Facsimile 
/ve4/&A1 v 
Gary T. Dance 
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CHAMBERS AT BLACKFOOT, 
IDAHO ----
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BINGHAM 
JERRY DOHERTY, ) 
) CASE NO. CV 2006-2145 
Plaintiff, ) 
) ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' 
vs. ) MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY 
) JUDGMENT 
GORDON DIXON, M.D., BLACKFOOT ) 
MEDICAL CLINIC, INC., and BLACKFOOT ) 
MEDICAL CENTER, LLC, ) 
) 
Defendants. ) 
I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendants Gordon Dixon, M.D. (hereinafter "Dr. Dixon") and Blackfoot Medical Clinic, 
Inc. (hereinafter the "Clinic") filed a motion for partial summary judgment in the above-styled 
medical malpractice lawsuit.] Plaintiff Jerry Doherty (hereinafter "Doherty") filed (under seal) 
J Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, Doherty v. Dixon, Bingham County case no. CV-2006-2l4S (filed 
July 23, 2009) (hereinafter referred to as "Defendants' Motion"). Defendant Blackfoot Medical Center, LLC was 
dismissed from this lawsuit with prejudice. Order of Dismissal with Prejudice, Doherty v. Dixon, Bingham County 
case no. CV-2006-214S (filed April 17,2007). 
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTIOI\ FOR I'ARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
/5(P 
his opposition thereto.2 Following oral argument on the Defendants' Motion, the Motion was 
taken under advisement.3 
In his First Amended Complaint, Doherty alleges Dr. Dixon breached the local standard 
of medical care by failing to give Doherty a visual acuity test when Doherty presented with an 
eye injury.4 Doherty also claims that Dr. Dixon breached the standard of care with regard to his 
charting and record keeping. 5 Doherty further alleges that at all times relevant to this lawsuit, Dr. 
Dixon acted within the course and scope of his employment with the Clinic. 6 
II. ISSUE 
In their Motion, Dr. Dixon and the Clinic argue that no expert evidence supports 
Doherty's claim that Dr. Dixon breached the standard of care with regard to his charting and 
record keeping. 7 Doherty, on the other hand, contends that incongruences in Dr. Dixon's records 
raise a genuine issue of material fact that Dr. Dixon altered his records. 8 Doherty also maintains 
his negligence claim against Dr. Dixon goes to Dr. Dixon's failure to properly evaluate and treat 
Doherty, not to the creation of Dr. Dixon's recordsY 
2 Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, Doherty v. Dixon, 
Bingham County case no. CV-2006-2l45 (filed under seal August 10,2009) (hereinafter "Doherty's Opposition 
Isealed]"). 
3 Minute Entry, Doherty v. Dixon, Bingham County case no. CV-2006-2145 (filed August 25,2009). 
4 See: First Amended Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial, Doherty v. Dixon, Bingham County case no. CY-2006-
2145 (filed November 15,2006) (hereinafter the "First Amended Complaint"), at pp. 2-3. 
5 First Amended Complaint, at p. 3, ~ 10. 
6 First Amended Complaint, at p. 2, ~ 7. 
7 Defendants' Memorandum in Support of Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, Doherty v. Dixon, Bingham 
County case no. CY-2006-2145 (filed July 23,2009) (hereinafter the "Defendants' Memorandum"), at p. 7. 
8 Doherty's Opposition [sealed], at pp. 8-9. 
9 Doherty's Opposition [sealed], at p. 7. 
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The issue to be decided is: Should Doherty be allowed to put on evidence that Dr. 
Dixon's allegedly falsified medical records breached the local standard of care? 
III. FINDINGS OF FACT 
The following facts are found by a preponderance of the evidence, with all reasonable 
inferences drawn in favor of Doherty. ] 0 
1. In his First Amended Complaint, Doherty alleged: "Not only did Dr. Dixon breach 
the standard of care for failing to provide a visual acuity test, the charting and record keeping is 
also in breach of the standard of care."]] 
2. Doherty did not plead his "breach of the standard of care with regard to charting 
and records" as a cause of action separate from his negligence claim against Dr. Dixon. 12 
3. Doherty provided no expert opinion to support his allegation that Dr. Dixon's 
charting or recordkeeping violated the applicable standard of care. 
IV. PRINCIPLES OF LAW 
1. If the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with any affidavits, 
show there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law, a court may grant summary judgment. 13 Disputed facts are 
10 See: Buschi v. Sage Health Care, PLLC, 146 Idaho 764, 768, 203 P.3d 694, 698 (2009). 
1 I First Amended Complaint, at p. 3, ~ 10. 
12 See: Complaint, at pp. 2-3. 
13 Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure ("LR.C.P.") 56(c); Bushi v. Sage Health Care, PLLC, 146 Idaho 764, 768, 203 
P.3d 694, 698 (2009); G & M Farms v. Funk irrigation Co., 119 Idaho 514, 516-7, 808 P.2d 851, 853-4 (1991). 
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construed in favor of the non-moving party and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from 
the record are drawn in favor of the non-moving party. 14 
2. A party against whom a summary judgment is sought cannot merely rest on its 
pleadings. IS When faced with supporting affidavits or depositions, the opposing party must show 
material issues of fact which preclude the issuance of summary judgment. ]6 
3. While the moving party must prove the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, J 7 
the opposing party cannot simply speCUlate. 18 A mere scintilla of evidence is not enough to create a 
genuine factual issue. 19 Summary judgment is appropriate when the non-moving party cannot 
establish the essential elements of the claim. 20 
4. If reasonable persons could reach differing conclusions on material issues, or draw 
conflicting inferences therefrom, then the motion for summary judgment must be denied. 21 
5. Idaho Code § 6-1012 requires the plaintiff in a medical malpractice case to provide 
affirmative proof by direct expert testimony and by a preponderance of the evidence that the 
14 Bushi v. Sage Health Care, PLLC, 146 Idaho at 768, 203 P.3d at 698; Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Idaho State Tax 
Commission, 142 Idaho 790, 793,134 P.3d 641, 644 (2006). 
15 Partou! v. Hmper, 145 Idaho 683, 688, 183 P.3d 771, 776 (2008); R.G. Nelson, A.IA. v. Steer, 118 Idaho 409, 
410, 797 P .2d 117, 118 (1990). 
16 Esser Electric v. Lost River Ballistics Technologies, Inc., 145 Idaho 912, 919, 188 P .3d 854, 861 (2008). 
17 Watkins v. Peacock, 145 Idaho 704, 708, 184 P.3d 210,214 (2008); Wait v. Leavell Cattle, Inc., 136 Idaho 792, 798, 
41 P.3d 220, 226 (2001). 
18Cantwellv. City of Boise, 146 Idaho 127, 133, 191 P.3d205,211 (2008). 
19 Van v. Portneuj Medical Center, 147 Idaho 552, _, 212 P.3d 982,986 (2009); West v. Sonke, 132 Idaho 133, 138, 
968 P.2d 228,233 (1998). 
20 Summers v. Cambridge Joint School District No. 432, 139 Idaho 953, 956, 88 P.3d 772, 775 (2004); Dekker v. 
Magic Valley Regional Medical Center, 115 Idaho 332, 333, 766 P.2d 1213, 1214 (1989). 
21 Van v. Portneuj Medical Center, 147 Idaho at _,212 P.3d at 986; Cramer v. Slater, 146 Idaho 868,873,204 
PJd 508, 513 (2009). 
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT 4 
defendant negligently failed to meet the applicable standard of health care practice of the 
community in which the defendant practices. 
V. ANALYSIS 
Doherty, in his Opposition, states: "the breach of the standard of care pertains to damages 
resulting from Dr. Dixon's conduct in failing to properly evaluate and treat [Doherty], not in 
the creation of his records.,,22 This Court agrees. In Hough v. Fry,23 the Idaho Supreme Court 
interpreted Idaho Code § 6-1012 to apply "when the damages complained of result from 
providing or failing to provide health care.,,24 Nevertheless, Doherty, in his First Amended 
Complaint, states that Dr. Dixon's charting and record keeping breached the standard of care. 
Without an expeli witness to testify that Dr. Dixon's charting and record keeping 
breached the local standard of care at the time of their creation, Doherty cannot argue to the jury 
that Dr. Dixon's charting and record keeping breached the local standard of care. Doherty may 
certainly call Dr. Dixon's record keeping into question, and put on evidence that his charts and 
records in Doherty's case were allegedly falsified. However, such evidence goes only to the 
weight of Doherty's claim that Dr. Dixon failed to properly evaluate and treat Doherty'S eye 
lllJury. 
The charts and records allegation in Doherty's First Amended Complaint is confusing. 
To the extent Doherty intends to prove that Dr. Dixon breached the local standard of care by 
falsifying Doherty'S medical records, the Defendants' Motion shall be granted. Doherty may 
22 Doherty'S Opposition [sealed), at p. 7 (emphasis in original). 
23 131 Idaho 230, 953 P .2d 980 (1998). 
24 Hough. Fry, 131 Idaho 230, 233,953 P.2d 980, 983 (1998). 
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT 5 
ltD 
propound evidence that Dr. Dixon allegedly falsified Doherty's medical records. Doherty may 
not argue, however, that Dr. Dixon's recordkeeping breached the standard of care for medical 
providers in Blackfoot, Idaho. 
VI. CONCLUSION OF LAW 
Given the lack of expert testimony supporting the allegation, Doherty should not be 
allowed to put on evidence that Dr. Dixon's allegedly falsified medical records breached the 
local standard of care. 
VII. ORDER 
The Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is granted. Doherty may not argue that 
Dr. Dixon's recordkeeping breached the standard of care for medical providers in Blackfoot, 
Idaho. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
T(-t 
DATED this 2?J day of Septe~ber 2009. 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on 0 {2-g 121/(.:'0 , I served a true copy of the foregoing 
Order Granting Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on the persons listed below 
by mailing, first class, postage prepaid, or by hand delivery. 
Reed W. Larsen, Esq. 
Javier Gabiola, Esq. 
COOPER & LARSEN, 
CHARTERED 
151 North3 rd Ave., 2nd Floor 
P.O. Box 4229 
Pocatello, ID 83205-4229 
Gary 1. Dance, Esq. 
Julian E. Gabiola, Esq. 
MOFFATT, THOMAS, 
BARRETT, ROCK & FILEDS, 
CHARTERED 
412 West Center 
P.O. Box 817 
Pocatello, ID 83204 
o u.s. Mail 0 Courthouse Box .'" El Facsimile 
o U.S. Mail 0 Courthouse Box ~ bDFacsimile 
SARA 1. STAUB, Clerk of the Court 
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Attorneys/or Plaintiff 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 




GORDON DIXON, M.D., and 















Case No. CV-2006-2145 
SECOND SUPPLEMENTAL 
MEMORANDUM IN 
SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S 
OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS' 
JUDICIAL ESTOPPEL DEFENSE AND 
IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR 
JOINDER OF BANKRUPTCY TRUSTEE 
COMES NOW, Plaintiff Jerry Doherty ("J erry") , by and through undersi,brned counsel, and 
submits this Second Supplemental Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' ("Dixon") Judicial 
Estoppel Defense and in Support of Motion for Joinder of Bankruptcy Trustee. 
BACKGROUND 
Jerry filed his Petition to Reopen Bankruptcy, which Judge Pappas granted on March 4,2010. 
See Affidavit of Javier L. Gabiola in Support of Second Supplemental Memorandum in Support of 
SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM IN IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFf'S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS' 
JUDICIAL ESTOPPEL DEFENSE AND IN SUPPORT OF MOTJON FOR JOINDER OF BANKRUPTCY TRUSTEE-
PAGEl 
/LiS 
Plaintiff's Opposition to Defendants' Judicial Estoppel Defense (HGabiola Aff. "), Exhibit A. At 
Also, on March 4, 2010, Reed Larsen and Javier Gabiola were appointed special counsel for the 
bankruptcy estate and the trustee. Jd., Exh. B. Kathleen McCallister was appointed, pursuant to 11 
USC§§ 322 & 1302 as trustee of the bankruptcy estate. Jd., Exh. C. On April 30, 2010, Jerry filed 
his amended schedule of assets, listing his lawsuit against Dixon as an asset of the bankruptcy estate. 
Jd., Exh. D. 
ARGUMENT 
A. THE TRUSTEE SHOULD BE JOINED AS A PARTY. 
The bankruptcy trustee, who was appointed in the bankruptcy case, pursuant to IRCP I7(a) 
and IRCP 19(a)(I), should be joined as a party to this case. IRCP I7(a) provides as follows: 
Every action shall be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest. 
An executor, administrator, personal representative, guardian, conservator, bailee, 
trustee of an express trust, a party with whom or in whose name a contract has 
been made for the benefit of another, or a party authorized by statute may sue in 
this capacity without joining the party for whose benefit the action is brought; 
and when a statute of the state of Idaho so provides, an action for the use or benefit 
of another shall be brought in the name of the state ofIdaho. No action shall be 
dismissed on the ground that it is not prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest 
until a reasonable time has been allowed after objection for ratification of 
commencement of the action by, or joinder or substitution of, the real party in interest; 
and such ratification, joinder, or substitution shall have the same effect as if the 
action had been commenced in the name of the real party in interest. 
Additionally, IRCP 19(a)(l) provides: 
A person who is subject to service of process shall be joined as a party in the 
action if (1) in the person's absence complete relief cannot be accorded among 
those already parties, or (2) the person claims an interest relating to the subject 
of the action and is so situated that the disposition of the action in the person's 
absence may (i) as a practical matter impair or impede the person's ability to 
SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM IN IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS' 
JUDICIAL ESTOPPEL DEFENSE AND IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR JOINDER OF BANKRUPTCY TRUSTEE-
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/# 
protect that interest or (ii) leave any of the persons already parties subject to a 
substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations 
by reason of the claimed interest. If the person has not been so joined, the court 
shall order that the person be made a party. If the person should join as a plaintiff but 
refuses to do so, the person may be made a defendant, or, in a proper case, an involuntary 
plaintiff. 
The bankruptcy trustee, Kathleen McCallister is a proper party, as the estate holds the right 
to Jerry's claim against Dixon. Further, undersigned counsel represent the estate's interest in the 
potential asset Jerry seeks to obtain from Dixon in this lawsuit. As a result, Ms. McCallister, as the 
trustee of the bankruptcy estate, which holds the right to any proceeds J errymay obtain against Dixon, 
should be joined as a party to this litigation. 
B. DIXON'S JUDICIAL ESTOPPEL DEFENSE DOES NOT APPLY TO THE 
TRUSTEE/BANKRUPTCY ESTATE. 
Dixon's judicial estoppel argument does not apply to the trusteelbankruptcy estate. More 
specifically, Dixon's defense in that regard does not preclude the trustee from being able to pursue 
the claim in this case. The trustee holds the right to Jerry's claims against Dixon, and Jerry's acts do 
not apply to the trustee. It is axiomatic, that in order for judicial estoppel to apply, the party against 
whom the defense is raised must have taken an inconsistent or contrary position in gaining an 
advantage. See, Loomis v. Church, 76 Idaho 87,277 P.2d 561 (1954). The trustee has not taken any 
inconsistent or contrary position. As a result, Dixon's judicial estoppel defense should be stricken. 
C. AS JERRY AMENDED HIS BANKRUPTCY SCHEDULE LISTING THIS LAWSUIT 
AS AN ASSET, HIS CLAIM IS NOT BARRED BY JUDICIAL ESTOPPEL. 
In his prior memoranda, Dixon relied onA &J CanstI'. Co. Inc., v. Wood, 141 Idaho 682, 116 
P.3d 12 (2005) in support of his judicial estoppel defense. However, in A & J Constr., the party 
against whom judicial estoppel was asserted did not amend his bankruptcy schedules to list the 
SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM IN IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS' 
JUDICIAL ESTOPPEL DEFENSE AND IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR JOINDER OF BANKRUPTCY TRUSTEE-
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lawsuit as an asset. In this matter, Jerry sought and received permission from the Bankruptcy Court 
to reopen his bankruptcy and amend his petition to include this lawsuit as an asset in his bankruptcy. 
While the Idaho Supreme Court, in A& J CanstI'. did not consider the issue of whether judicial 
estoppel would bar a plaintiff's state court claim where the plaintiff amended his petition to include 
the lawsuit as an asset in the bankruptcy proceeding, the Georgia Appellate Courts have addressed 
this issue. Those courts held that once the plaintiff filed an amended petition, the judicial estoppel 
defense was eliminated. This Court should follow those decisions and strike Dixon's judicial 
estoppel defense. 
Judicial estoppel does not apply where a plaintiff in a state court proceeding, who initially 
failed to list the litigation as an asset in the bankruptcy proceeding, seeks to amend his bankruptcy 
schedules to include the litigation as an asset. CSXTransp.lnc. v. Howell, 675 S.E. 2d 306, 309-10 
(Ga. Ct. App. 2009; McBride v. Brown, 538 S.E.2d 863 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000)). The act of amending 
the bankruptcy schedules, to add a cause of action as an asset, nullifies the original position taken in 
the bankruptcy, such that the initial failure to list the claim as an asset cannot serve as a basis to assert 
ajudicial estoppel defense. Johnson v. Trust Co. Bank, 478 S.B. 2d 629, 631 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996). 
Further, the Georgia Court of Appeals reasoned, "[ w]e have since reiterated that amending the 
bankruptcy petition to include the claim, even after the bankruptcy case was closed, precludes judi cial 
estoppel from barring the claim." Jowers v. Arthur, 537 S.E. 2d 200, 201-02 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000). 
Furthermore, 
[W]hile the underlying purpose of judicial estoppel is to prevent 
manipulation of the judicial process, it is the bankruptcy court that primarily 
is being manipulated in this instance. The creditors lose the potential to recover 
where such a claim is not listed. Therefore, if the bankruptcy court permits an 
SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM IN IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS' 
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amendment allowing an omitted tort claim, it stands to reason that the Georgia 
court in which the tort claim is asserted should honor the bankruptcy court's 
actions. To hold otherwise would produce overly harsh and inequitable results, for 
then everyone ... would lose, including the debtor's innocent creditors. 
Jowers, supra, at 202 [Emphasis added]. Moreover, any alleged improper advantage the debtor may 
have gained by not disclosing the asset is eliminated when the debtor reopens the bankruptcy case and 
relinquishes control over the asset and its potential proceeds to a trustee. Rowan v. George H Green 
Oil Co., 572 S.E.2d 338 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002). A party can avoid judicial estoppel 
simply by filing a motion to amend the debtor's bankruptcy petition or a 
motion to reopen the debtor's bankruptcy case to declare the omitted claim or 
cause of action. Indeed 'amending the bankruptcy petition to include the 
claim, even after the bankruptcy case was closed, precludes judicial estoppel 
from barring the claim. ' 
Rowan, supra, at 339 (citing, Jowers, supra). 
Jerry successfully amended his bankruptcy schedules to list his cause of action against Dixon 
as an asset, which the Bankruptcy Court endorsed. Under the reasoning from the previously cited 
cases, Jerry's amendment of his bankruptcy schedule to include his claim against Dixon, even though 
his bankruptcy case was closed, precludes Dixon from asserting a judicial estoppel defense. Any 
alleged inconsistent position Jerry took was nullified when he amended his petition. Further, since 
Jerry relinquished contro 1 of his asset and its potential proceeds to the trustee, Dixon's judicial 
estoppel defense was eliminated. Also, there is no evidence in the record that Jerry intentionally 
attempted to manipulate and deceive the court. 
As highlighted by Jerry in his previous memoranda, this Court should deny Dixon's judicial 
estoppel defense to avoid inequity in the name of equity: 
SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM IN IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S OPPOSlTION TO DEFENDANTS' 
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'[JJudicial estoppel 'is an equitable doctrine invoked by a court at its discretion. 
'Equitable'in this context refers more to fairness and discretion than to the 
technical distinction between law and equity. It fonows that the fashioning of a 
remedy to implement a judicial estoppel must be grounded on notions of fairness 
and preventing injustice. 
Preventing injustice and furthering notions of fairness are entrenched 
equitable principles that need to be taken into account whenever fashioning 
a remedy in the nature of estoppel. 
It is a maxim of equity that a court of equity seeks to do justice and not 
injustice. It will not do 'inequity in the name of equity. '[Emphasis added]. 
An-Tze v. K&S Diversified investments, inc., 308 B.R. 448, 459 (Bkrp. App. 2004). 
Indeed, dismissal of Jerry's claim would allow Dixon to escape liability for his negligent 
conduct, creating an "inequity in the name of equity." 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Jerry respectfully requests that the Court preclude Dixon from 
asserting his judicial estoppel defense. 
DATED this C(; day ofJune, 2010. 
COOPER & LARSEN, CHARTERED 
-~ B6ii:1 lute 
REE~.LARSEN 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this -% day of June, 2010, I served a true and correct 
copy of the above and foregoing document to the following person(s) as follows: 
Gary T. Dance 
Julian E. Gabiola 
Moffatt, Thomas, Barrett Rock & Fields, Chtd. 
P.O. Box 817 
Pocatello, ID 83204-0817 
[..}- U.S. Mail/Postage Prepaid 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[J ~/232-0150 
~~~~~~-----
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Reed W. Larsen (3427) 
Javier 1. Gabiola (5448) 
COOPER & LARSEN, CHARTERED 
151 North 3rd Avenue, 2nd Floor 
P. O. Box 4229 
Pocatello, ID 83205-4229 
TeJephone: (208) 235-1145 
Facsimile: (208) 235-1182 
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GORDON DIXON, M.D., and 
BLACKFOOT MEDICAL CLINIC, 
INC., 
Defendants. 
STATE OF IDAHO 
:ss 













Case No. CV-2006-2145 
AFFIDAVIT OF JA VIER L. GABIOLA 
IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S 
OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS' 
JUDICIAL ESTOPPEL DEFENSE AND 
IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR 
JOINDER OF BANKRUPTCY TRUSTEE 
I, JAVIER 1. GABIOLA, being first duly sworn upon oath, depose and state as follows: 
1. I am one of the attorneys representing Plaintiff and make this affidavit upon my own personal 
knowledge; 
2. Attached hereto as Exhibit A is a copy of the Order Granting Motion to Reopen Bankruptcy; 
3. Attached hereto as Exhibit B is a copy ofthe Order Granting Motion to be Appointed Special 
Counsel for Trustee; 
AFFIDAVIT OF JAVIER L. GABlOLA II\' SUPPORT OF SECOND SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM !l', OPPOSITlON TO 
DEFENDANTS 'JUDICIAL ESTOPPEL DEFENSE AND II\'SUPPORTOFMOTJOI\' F OR JOINDER or BANKRUPTCY TRUSTEE 
AS A PARTY PLAIl\'TIFF - PAGE 1 
!60 
4. Attached hereto as Exhibit C is a copy ofthe Notice of Appointment of Trustee in Reopened 
Case; and 
5. Attached hereto as Exhibit D is a copy of Jerry Doherty's Schedule B Personal Property 
Amended in the Bankruptcy case. 
FURTHER SAITH AFFIANT NAUGHT. 
DATED this i day of June, 2010. 
By Q~ 
IER L. GABIOLA 




STATE 01= IDAHO 
DATEDthis<? dayofJune, 2010. 
NOTARY PUBLIC FOR IDAHO 
Residing at: FbC-CL+d(~, I/J 
My Commission Expires: 11/21113 
COOPE~, CHARTERED 
By <*,r;e -~EEW:LARSEN 
AFFIDAVIT OF JAVIER L. GABIOLA IN SUPPORT OF SECOND SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORADNUM IN OPPOSITJON TO 
DEFENDANTS' JUDICIAL ESTOPPEL DEFENSE AND IN SUPPORT OF MOTlON FOR JOINDER OF BANKRUPTCY TRUSTEE 
AS A PARTY PLAINTIFF. - PAGE 2 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this ~ day of June, 2010, I served a true and correct copy 
ofthe above and foregoing document to the following person(s) as follows: 
Gary T. Dance [;r- U.S. Mail/Postage Prepaid 
Julian E. Gabiola [ ] Hand Delivery 
Moffatt, Thomas, Barrett Rock & Fields, Chtd. [ ] Overnight Mail 
P.O.Box817 [J Facsimile/232-0150 
Pocatello, ID 83204-0817 
AFFIDAVIT OF JAVIER L. GABIOLA IN SUPPORT OF SECOND SUPPLElVlEl\TT AL MEMORADNUM IN OPPOSITlON TO 
DEFENDANTS' JUDICIAL ESTOPPEL DEFENSE AND IN SUPPORT OF MonON FOR JOINDER OF BANKRUPTCY TRUSTEE 
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Case 05-41630-JDP Doc 52 Filed 03/04/10 Entered 03/04/10 12:44:55 Desc Main 
In Re: 
Document Page 1 of 2 
UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT 
DISTRICT OF IDAHO 
Case No. 05-41630 









ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO REOPEN BANKRUPTCY 
The Court, having considered Debtor's Motion to Reopen Bankruptcy, and good cause 
appearing therefore, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Debtors Motion to 
Reopen Bankruptcy is GRANTED. It is further ordered that the U.S. Trustee shall appoint a 
Chapter 13 Trustee in this matter. / / end a f text! I 
Dated: March 4, 2010 
CLc1~ 
Honorable Jim D. Pappas 








Case 05-41630-JDP Doc 52 Filed 03/04/10 Entered 03/04/10 12:44:55 Desc Main 
Document Page 2 of 2 
Approved by: 
lsI Kathleen McCallister 
KATHLEEN MCCALLISTER 
Submitted by Debtor's attomeys: 
lsI Javier L. Gabiola lsI Reed W. Larsen 
JA VIER L. GABIOLA REED W. LARSEN 
lsI Fred R. Cooper 
R. FRED COOPER 
16+ 
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InRe: 
Document Page 1 of 2 
UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT 
DISTRICT OF IDAHO 
Case No. 05-41630 









ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO BE APPOINTED 
SPECIAL COUNSEL FOR TRUSTEE 
A hearing was held on November 3rd, 2009 on the Debtor's counsel's Motion to Be 
Appointed Special Counsel for Trustee. Appearing on behalf of Debtor Jerry Doherty were Javier 
Gabiola and R. Fred Cooper. 
The Court, having considered the pleadings, affidavits and memoranda on file, and good 
cause appearing therefore, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Javier L. Gabiola and 
Reed W. Larsen of the finn Cooper & Larsen, Chartered shall be appointed as special counsel for 
the banlcruptcy estate and, as special counsel for the trustee, should a trustee be appointed in the 
matter. It is further ordered that the U.S. Trustee shall appoint a Chapter 13 Trustee in this matter. 
Ilend of text/I 
Dated: March 4, 2010 
(L~~ 
Honorable Jim D. Pappas 









Case 05-41630-JDP Doc 53 Filed 03/04/10 Entered 03/04/10 12:47:26 Desc Main 
Document Page 2 of 2 
Approved by: 
lsi Kathleen McCallister 
KATHLEEN MCCALLISTER 
Submitted by Debtor's attorneys: 
Is/ Javier L. Gabiola I sf Reed W. Larsen 
JA VIER L. GABIOLA REED W. LARSEN 
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IN RE: 
Document Page 1 of 1 
UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT 
DISTRICT OF IDAHO 










Case No. 05-41630-JDP 
Chapter 13 
NOTICE OF APPOINTMENT 
OF TRUSTEE IN REOPENED 
CASE 
------------------------------) 
Pursuant to 11 USC 322 & 1302 and Bankruptcy Rule 2008 the below named trustee is 
appointed as Standing Trustee of the estate of the above named debtor( s) to serve under 
the trustee's blanket bond. 
KATHLEEN MCCALLISTER, POBOX 910, KUNA, IDAHO 83634 
Unless the trustee notifies the United States Trustee and the Court, in writing, of their 
rej ection of the appointment within five (5) days after receipt of this notice, the trustee 
shall be deemed to have accepted the appointment. 
Dated: March 4, 2009 
ROBERT D. MILLER JR. 
Acting United States Trustee 
/s/ Man' P. Kimmel 
MARY P. KIMMEL 








Case 05-41630-JDP Doc 57 Filed 04/30/10 Entered 04/30/10 13:29:48 Desc Mail1'3011o 1:16PM 
Document Page 1 of 4 
In re Jerry Curtis Doherty Case No. _-"'0""5-4"""""'1.:<6""30"--_______ _ 
Debtor 
SCHEDULEB-PERSONALPROPERTY-AMENDED 
Except as directed below, list all personal property of the debtor of whatever kind. If the debtor has no property in one or more of the categories, place 
an "x" in the appropriate position in the column labeled "None." If additional space is needed in any category, attach a separate sheet properly identified 
""jth the case name, case number, and the number of the category. If the debtor is married, state whether husband, wife, or both own the property by placing 
an "H," "W," "]," or "C" in the column labeled "Husband, Wife, Joint, or Community." If the debtor is an individual or a joint petition is filed, state the 
amount of any exemptions claimed only ill Schedule C - Property Claimed as Exempt. 
Do not list interests in executory contracts and unexpired leases on this schedule. List them in Schedule G Executory Contracts and Unexpired Leases. 
If the property is being held for the debtor by someone else, state that person's name and address under "Description and Location of Property." 
Type 0 f Property 
1 . Cash on hand 
2. Checking, savings or other financial 
accounts, certificates of deposit, or 
shares in banks, savings and loan, 
thrift, building and loan, and 
homestead associations, or credit 
unions, brokerage houses, or 
cooperatives. 
3. Security deposits with public 
utilities, telephone companies, 
landlords, and others. 
4. Household goods and furnishings, 
including audio, video, and 
computer equipment. 
5. Books, pictures and other art 
objects, antiques, stamp, coin, 
record, tape, compact disc, and 
other collections or collectibles. 
6. Wearing apparel. 
7. Furs and jewelry. 
8. Fireanns and sports, photographic, 
and other hobby equipment. 
9. Interests in insurance policies. 
Name insurance company of each 
policy and itemize surrender or 











(Total of this page) 
_2 __ continuation sheets attached to the Schedule of Personal Property 
Software Copyright (c) 1996~2010· Best Case Solutions - Evanston. IL - www.bestcase.com J5S 
Current Market Value of 
Debtor'S Interest in Property, 
without Deducting any 
Secured Claim or Exemption 
0.00 
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Case 05-41630-JDP Doc 57 Filed 04/30/10 Entered 04/30/10 13:29:48 
Document Page 2 of 4 
Desc Main1l30/10 1:16PM 
]n re Jerry Curtis Doherty Case No. _~O""-5-4:::w1..!<6,,,,-30~ _______ _ 
Debtor 
SCHEDULE B - PERSONAL PROPERTY - AMENDED 
Type of Property 
1 O. Annuities. Itemize and name each 
issuer. 
1 I. Interests in IRA, ERISA, Keogh, or 
other pension or profit sharing 
plans. Itemize. 
12. Stock and interests in incorporated 
and unincorporated businesses. 
itemize. 
1 3. Interests in partnerships or joint 
ventures. Itemize. 
J 4. Government and corporate bonds 
and other negotiable and 
nOImegotiable instruments. 
1 5. Accounts receivab Ie. 
] 6. Alimony, maintenance, support, and 
property settlements to which the 
debtor is or may be entitled. Give 
particulars. 
17. Other liquidated debts owing debtor 
including tax refunds. Give 
particulars. 
] 8. Equitable or future interests, life 
estates, and rights or powers 
exercisable for the benefit of the 
debtor other than those listed in 
Schedule of Real Property. 
19. Contingent and nOllcontingent 
interests in estate of a decedent, 
death benefit plan. life insurance 





Sheet of_2_ continuation sheets attached 
to the Schedule 0 f Personal Property 
Software Copyright (c) 1996-2010 - Best Case Solutions - Evanston, IL - wW'.v.bestcase.com 
(Continuation Sheet) 






(Total of this page) 
Current Market Value of 
Debtor's Interest in Property, 
without Deducting any 
Secured Claim or Exemption 
0.00 
Best Case Bankruptcy 
Case 05-41630-JDP Doc 57 Filed 04/30/10 Entered 04/30/10 13:29:48 Desc Mai~/3o/10 1:16PM 
Document Page 3 of 4 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 




GORDON DIXON, M.D., BLACKFOOT 
MEDICAL CLINIC, INC. and BLACKFOOT 
MEDICAL CENTER, LLC, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV-2006-2145 
DEFENDANTS' SUPPLEMENTAL 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
JUDICIAL ESTOPPEL DEFENSE-
COME NOW Defendants, Gordon Dixon, D.O. ("Dr. Dixon"), and Blackfoot 
Medical Center, by and through undersigned counsel, pursuant to the Court's May 25, 2010, 
Minute Entry, hereby submit this Supplemental Memorandum in Support of Judicial Estoppel 
Defense. 
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In addition to this supplemental memorandum, the Court should have in its file 
Defendants' Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motions in Limine, filed on August 18, 
2009, and Defendants' Memorandum in Support of Judicial Estoppel Defense, filed on 
September 14,2009. Defendants will be relying upon the Affidavit of Julian E. Gabiola in 
Support of Judicial Estoppel Defense, filed on September 11,2009, the Affidavit of Julian E. 
Gabiola in Support of Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, filed on July 23, 2009, and the 
Affidavit of Julian E. Gabiola in Opposition to Plaintiff s Motion in Limine, fi led on August 18, 
2009. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The Court should hold that Doherty is judicially estopped from continuing his 
medical malpractice claim against the Defendants. Doherty intentionally concealed his medical 
malpractice claim from the bankruptcy court. Doherty knew as early as October 2004 that he 
had a claim against Defendants. Doherty filed a Chapter 13 bankruptcy in July 2005, and his 
plan was confirmed in September 2005. In 2006, Doherty filed his complaint in this case. In 
January of2009, Doherty received a discharge of his unsecured debt. 
Doherty never disclosed this lawsuit to the bankruptcy court during the pendency 
of his Chapter 13 bankruptcy, and he never amended his bankruptcy schedules. Doherty did so 
only after Defendants raised this issue with this Court. Defendants submit that based upon these 
facts, Doherty intentionally failed to disclose this lawsuit in his bankruptcy. Defendants further 
submit that the majority of jurisdictions adhere to the rule that a debtor is judicially estopped 
from pursuing a tort claim that he intentionally failed to disclose in bankruptcy proceedings, 
even if the debtor subsequently reopens bankruptcy proceedings. The rationale for the majority 
view is that allowing a debtor to reopen the bankruptcy case suggests that a debtor should 
consider disclosing potential assets only ifhe is caught concealing them and that such a remedy 
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would diminish the incentive for debtors to provide the bankruptcy court with a truthful 
disclosure of assets. 
Accordingly, this Court should conclude that Doherty is judicially estopped from 
pursuing this medical malpractice claim and dismiss the complaint against Defendants with 
prejudice as a matter of law. 
II. RELEVANT FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
Doherty knew as early as October 28, 2004, that he had a claim against Dr. 
Dixon. In his September 18, 2007, deposition Doherty testified that by the time ofthe third 
surgery that Dr. Moffett performed, he blamed Dr. Dixon for his eye problems: 
Q. By critical I mean criticized it, said it was wrong, shouldn't 
have done something or did do something that was wrong. 
A. The only thing in that situation is that Dr. Moffett telling me, 
and I don't know his exact words, it's been a while back, that if I 
was in his care the day it would have happened, I probably would 
have full eyesight today, because ofthe blood that dried in the 
back of my eye -- I'll tell you what happened. 
111 my third surgery Dr. Moffett had me out twelve hours, he 
worked on me eight hours and he had to go in and clean it all out 
and he had to hook up the eye. And, anyway, after that I started 
counting fingers with this eye (indicating) with the nurse the next 
four or five days, and then it was gone, and I was told that the scar 
tissue come up and disconnected it again and it's because of the 
blood that dried in the back of my eye. 
That's when] found out that] should have seen all eye doctor 
the day of the accident and I could have had surgery that night 
and had the blood drawn out of my eye and I would have full 
eyesight today. 
Q. Dr. Moffett told you that? 
A. Yes. 
Affidavit of Julian E. Gabiola in Support of Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, Exhibit B, 
Deposition of Jerry Doherty, 15:11 to 16:8. Dr. Moffett performed his third surgery on Doherty 
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on October 28,2004. Affidavit of Julian E. Gabiola in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion in 
Limine, Exhibit K, October 28,2004 Operative Note of Dr. Moffett. 
Doherty also had to have known by February 2, 2005, that he would pursue a 
claim against Dr. Dixon, because it was at that time that Dr. Moffett concluded that Doherty had 
a failed retinal attachment and that Doherty decided he did not want any further surgery. Julian 
Gabiola Aff in Opp. to Plt.'s Mtn in Limine, Exhibit L, February 2,2005 Operative Note of Dr. 
Moffett. 
Doherty filed a Chapter 13 bankruptcy on July 25, 2005. Julian Gabiola Aff. in 
Opp. to PIt.' s Mtn in Limine, Exhibit 1. Doherty's Chapter 13 plan was confinned on September 
6,2005. Id. Doherty's Chapter 13 plan had a term of 48 months. ld. In April 2006, Doherty 
met with attorneys to discuss his medical malpractice claim. Affidavit of Jerry Doherty, ~ 2. On 
September 6, 2006, Doherty filed his medical malpractice complaint in this case, yet he failed to 
amend his bankruptcy schedules to include the lawsuit. On January 21,2009, Doherty received a 
discharge in his Chapter 13 bankruptcy. Id., Exhibit M. 
On March 4, 2010, Doherty reopened his Chapter 13 Bankruptcy, only after 
Defendants alerted Doherty and the Court that Doherty had failed to identify his medical 
malpractice claim as an asset in the bankruptcy. See Defendants' Memorandum in Opposition to 
Plaintiff s Motion in Limine, filed on August 18, 2009. 
III. ARGUMENT 
A. The Court Must Conc1ude That Doherty is JudiciaJly Estopped From 
Asserting His Medical Malpractice Claim, Because He Failed to List It as an 
Asset in His Bankruptcy Schedules. 
The Court must conclude that Doherty is judicially estopped from asserting his 
medical malpractice claim against Defendants, because he took the inconsistent position of not 
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listing his medical malpractice claim in his Chapter 13 bankruptcy schedules and then filed a 
claim against Defendants in this Court. 
The doctrine of judicial estoppel clearly prohibits "a party from assuming a 
position in one proceeding and then taking an. inconsistent position in a subsequent proceeding." 
A & J Constr. Co., Inc. v. Wood, 141 Idaho 682, 688,116 P.3d 12, 18 (2005) (quoting Robertson 
Supply, Inc. v. Nicholls, 131 Idaho 99,101,952 P.2d 914, 916 (Ct. App. 1998». "In the 
bankruptcy context, a party is judicially estopped from asserting a cause of action not raised in 
a reorganization plan or otherwise mentioned in the debtor's schedules or disclosure 
statements." Wood, 141 Idaho at 685, 1 16 P.3d at 15 (2005) (emphasis added) (quoting 
Hamilton v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 270 F.3d 778, 783 (9th Cir. 2001). The rationale for 
invoking judicial estoppel to prevent a party who failed to disclose a claim in bankruptcy 
proceedings from asserting that claim after emerging from bankruptcy is that "the integrity of the 
bankruptcy system depends on full and honest disclosure by debtors of all of their assets." 
ld. (quoting Hamilton, 270 F.3d at 785) (emphasis added); see also New Hampshire v. Maine, 
532 U.S. 742, 121 S. Ct. 1808, 149 L. Ed.2d 968 (2001) (The doctrine of judicial estoppel's 
"purpose is to protect the integrity ofthe judicial process by prohibiting parties from deliberately 
changing positions according to the exigencies ofthe moment."). In addition, 
[tJ he interests of both the creditors, who plan their actions in the 
bankruptcy proceeding on the basis 0/ in/ormation supplied in the 
disclosure statements, and the bankruptcy court, which must 
decide whether to approve the plan o/reorganization on the same 
basis, are impaired when the disclosure provided by the debtor is 
incomplete. 
Wood, 141 Idaho at 686, 116 P .3d at 16 (quoting Hamilton, 270 F.3d at 785). 
On July 25,2005, Doherty filed a Chapter 13 bankruptcy. In Schedule B., 
Personal Property, of his bankruptcy schedules, item number 20, "Other contingent and 
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unliquidated claims of every nature, including, tax refunds, counterclaims of the debtor, and 
rights to setoff claims," Doherty listed "None." Even though Doherty knew as early as October 
28, 2004, or at the latest, February 5,2005, that, in his mind, it was Dr. Dixon's fault that he lost 
the vision in his left eye, he did not list his claim in his bankruptcy schedules. The bankruptcy 
code (11 U.S.c. sections 521 and 541 (a) (7)) and rules impose upon debtors an express, 
affinnative duty to disclose all assets, including contingent and unliquidated claims. "Judicial 
estoppel will be imposed when the debtor has knowledge of enough facts to know that a 
potential cause of action exists during the pendency of the bankruptcy, but fails to amend his 
schedules or disclosure statements to identify the cause of action as a contingent asset." Wood, 
14] Idaho at 686, 116 P.3d at 16 (emphasis added) (quoting Hamilton, 270 F.3d at 785). 
What is worse is that Doherty failed to amend his bankruptcy schedules when he 
sought legal representation to file a complaint against Defendants and when he actually filed his 
complaint on September 6, 2006. "The debtor's duty to disclose potential claims as assets does 
not end when the debtor files schedules, but instead continues for the duration of the bankruptcy 
proceedings." Hamilton, 270 F.3d at 785. 
On January 21,2009, Doherty received a discharge of his Chapter 13 bankruptcy. 
Doherty, therefore, enjoyed the benefits gained by filing for bankruptcy, and he received a 
discharge of the balance of his unsecured indebtedness when his plan was approved. Yet, he 
never mentioned his potential medical malpractice claim against Defendants, which he knew 
about as early as October 28, 2004, and he never amended his bankruptcy schedules after he filed 
his medical malpractice claim in September 2006. Doherty did so only after Defendants called 
attention to his failure. 
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B. Doherty Intentionally Failed to List His Medical Malpractice Claim as an 
Asset in His Bankruptcy Schedules. 
Doherty argues that he did not intentionally fail to list his medical malpractice 
claim in his bankruptcy. Doherty relies upon a self-serving and conclusory affidavit to support 
his argument. In paragraph four of his affidavit, Doherty makes conclusory, legal statements, 
such as "I simply made a good faith mistake", "I was not trying to conceal anything", and "I did 
not engage in any scheme to mislead any court ... nor intentionally decide that I should not list 
the claim in the bankruptcy case." Defendants submit that these are conclusory statements that 
are inadmissible. See, e.g., CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & MARY KAy KANE, 
FEDERALPRACTICEANDPROCEDURB § 2738, pp. 486 - 489 (1983) ("Thus, ultimate or 
conclusory facts and conclusions of law, as well as statements made on belief or 'on information 
or belief,' cannot be utilized on a summary judgment motion"); see also R Homes Corp. v. Herr, 
142 Idaho 87, 93-94, 123 P.3d 720, 726-27 (Ct. App. 2005) (Holding that district court correctly 
held that portions of affidavit that contained vague, conclusory statements was inadmissible). 
In addition, Defendants submit that deliberate or intentional manipulation on 
Doherty's part can be inferred from the record. Burnes v. Pemco Aeroplex, Inc., 291 F.3d 1282, 
1287 (11 th CiT. 2002). "[T]he debtor's failure to satisfy its statutory disclosure duty is 
'inadvertent' only when, in general, the debtor either lacks knowledge ofthe undisclosed claims 
or has no motive for their concealment." ld. (quoting In re Coastal Plains, Inc., 179 F.3d 197, 
210 (Sth Cir. 1999)). 
In Burnes, a case with facts quite similar to this case, the Eleventh Circuit Court 
of Appeals affinned the district court's gran~ of summary judgment based upon judicial estoppel 
grounds because there was sufficient evidence from which to infer intentional manipulation by 
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the debtor. The court first explained that there was evidence that the plaintiff/debtor had 
knowledge of his employment discrimination claim during the bankruptcy proceedings: 
Specifically, it is undisputed that Billups filed and pursued his 
employment discrimination claims during the pendency of his 
Chapter 13 case, but never amended his financial statements to 
include the lawsuit. Additionally, at the time that Billups 
petitioned the bankruptcy court to convert his case to Chapter 7, he 
had already filed, and was pursuing, the employment claims. 
Nevertheless, he once again failed to disclose the pending lawsuit 
to the bankruptcy court. These undisputed facts make it clear that 
Billups had knowledge of his claims during the bankruptcy 
proceedings. 
Burnes, 291 F.3d 1287-88. The court then explained that Billups had the motive to conceal his 
lawsuit from the bankruptcy court: 
As to motive, it is undisputed that Billups stood to gain an 
advantage by concealing the claims from the bankruptcy court. It 
is unlikely he would have received the benefit of a conversion to 
Chapter 7 followed by a no asset, complete discharge had his 
creditors, the trustee, or the bankruptcy court known of a lawsuit 
claiming millions of dollars in damages. As discussed more fully 
below, Billups even acknowledges, at least implicitly, that 
disclosing this information would have likely changed the result of 
his bankruptcy because he now seeks to re-open his bankruptcy to 
include the undisclosed claims. Given these undisputed facts, we 
think the district court correctly concluded that Billups possessed 
the requisite intent to mislead the bankruptcy court and correctly 
barred him from pursuing his discrimination claims, at least to the 
extent that he sought money damages. 
This Court's predecessor, the Honorable James Herndon, granted summary 
judgment against the plaintiff in a wrongful death medical malpractice action when she failed to 
identify her wrongful death claim in her bankruptcy. Coffin v. Haddock, Case No. CV 2000-808 
(April 4, 2006 Memorandum Opinion and Order Granting Summary Judgment, attached as 
Exhibit A to Affidavit of Julian E. Gabiola in Support of Judicial Estoppel Defense). In Coffin, 
the plaintiff brought a wrongful death action based upon a medical malpractice claim after her 
husband died from constrictive pericarditis. Coffin filed her medical malpractice claim and then 
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later filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy. She also reopened her bankruptcy after the defendant filed 
a motion for summary judgment. The defendants in the medical malpractice action filed a 
motion for summary judgment, arguing judicial estoppel, and Judge Herndon granted the motion. 
Doherty does not deny that he had knowledge of his undisclosed medical 
malpractice claim as early as October 28, 2004. Doherty also does not dispute that he filed and 
pursued his medical malpractice claim during the pendency of his Chapter 13 bankruptcy, but 
never amended his bankruptcy schedules to include this lawsuit. These undisputed facts make it 
clear that Doherty had knowledge of his medical malpractice claim prior to filing bankruptcy and 
during his bankruptcy proceedings. 
As to motive, Doherty cannot dispute that he stood to gain an advantage by 
concealing his medical malpractice claim from the bankruptcy court. On December 16, 2008, 
notice was sent to Doherty's creditors that ifthey were to object to Doherty's discharge, they had 
to do so on or before January 20,2009. Julian E. Gabiola Aff. in Support of Judicial Estoppel, 
Exhibit B. It is unlikely that Doherty would have received a discharge of his unsecured debt 
from his unsecured creditors had they known of his medical malpractice claim when he filed it in 
September 2006, wherein he alleged close to $100,000.00 in special damages. Doherty even 
acknowledges that disclosing his medical malpractice claim could have changed the result of his 
bankruptcy because he has reopened his bankruptcy to include the undisclosed claim. In 
summary, there is sufficient evidence in this record from which to infer intentional manipulation 
by Doherty. 
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C. The Majority of Jurisdictions Adhere to the Rule that a Debtor's Reopening 
of His Bankruptcy Does Not Preclude the Application of the Doctrine of 
Judicial Estoppel. 
Citing cases issued by the Georgia Court of Appeals, Doherty argues that the 
Court cannot apply the doctrine of judicial estoppel because he has reopened his Chapter 13 
bankruptcy proceedings. However, the Georgia Court of Appeals' view is in the minority. 
In A & J Construction Co., Inc. v. Wood, the Idaho Supreme Court cited to 
Hamilton v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., where the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that 
the plaintiff/debtor was judicially estopped from pursuing a claim that he did not disclose during 
his bankruptcy, even if the discharge was later vacated: 
Hamilton is precluded from pursuing claims about which he had 
knowledge, but did not disclose, during his bankruptcy 
proceedings, and that a discharge of debt by a bankruptcy court, 
under these circumstances, is sufficient acceptance to provide a 
basis for judicial estoppel, even if the discharge is later vacated. 
Hamilton, 270 F.3d at 784 (emphasis added). The Wood court also relied upon the decision in 
Burnes v. Pemco Aeroplex, Inc., where the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that 
allowing a plaintiff/debtor 
to back-Up, re-open the bankruptcy case, and amend his 
bankruptcy filings, only after his omission has been challenged by 
an adversary, suggests that a debtor should consider disclosing 
potential assets only if he is caught concealing them. This so-
called remedy would only diminish the necessary incentive to 
provide the bankruptcy court with a truthful disclosure of the 
debtors' assets. 
Id., 291 F.3d at 1288 (emphasis added). 
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals in Krystal Cadillac-Oldsmobile GMC Truck, 
Inc. v. Gen. Motors Corp., 337 F.3d 314 (3d Cir. 2003), cert. denied 541 U.S. 1043, 124 S. Ct. 
2172,158 L.Ed.2d 732 (2004), refused to apply a lesser sanction than judicial estoppel, such as 
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requiring the debtor to pay unsecured creditors the balance of their claims out of any damages 
the debtor might recover, and explained: 
Applying a lesser sanction here (such as requiring Krystal to pay 
unsecured creditors the balance of their claims out of any damages 
Krystal might recover from the instant action) would reward 
Krystal for what appears to be duplicitous conduct in the course of 
its bankruptcy proceeding. Krystal would still reap the benefit of 
any recovery beyond the amount paid to satisfy outstanding debts. 
In addition, the integrity of both the bankruptcy process and the 
judicial process would suffer. In short, allowing Krystal the lesser 
sanction it advocates would send a message that "a debtor should 
consider disclosing potential assets only if he is caught 
concealing them." Pemco, 291 F.3d at 1288. The Bankruptcy 
Court was understandably reluctant to allow Krystal to use sleight 
of hand to show its cards to its creditors and so are we. Dismissal 
is necessary to prevent Krystal from profiting from its omission. It 
is also "required to preserve the integrity of the earlier 
proceedings." Oneida, 848 F.2d at 418. 
Krystal, 337 F.3d at 325 (emphasis added). 
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in In re Superior Crewboats, Inc., held that the 
debtors "cannot be permitted, at this late date, to re-open the bankruptcy proceeding and amend 
their petition. Judicial estoppel was designed to prevent such abuses." In re Superior 
Crewboats, Inc, 374 F.3d 330,336 (5th Cir. 2004) (citing Burnes, 291 F.3d at 1288). 
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals in Eastman v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., 
493 F.3d 1151 (10th Cir. 2007), affirmed the trial court's decision granting the defendant 
summary judgment based upon the doctrine of judicial estoppel. In that case, the district court 
concluded that the plaintiff/debtor and the bankruptcy trustee were estopped from pursuing a 
personal injury claim against the defendant, even after the plaintiff/debtor had had his 
bankruptcy reopened and the trustee had been substituted as the real-party-in-interest to the 
personal injury claim. The court also refused to adopt a lesser sanction than judicial estoppel: 
That Gardner's bankruptcy was reopened and his creditors were 
made whole oltce his omission became known is inconsequential. 
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A discharge in bankruptcy is sufficient to establish a basis for 
judicial estoppel, "even if the discharge is later vacated." 
Hamilton, 270 F.3d at 784. Allowing Gardner to "back up" and 
benefit from the reopening of his bankruptcy only after his 
omission had been exposed would "suggest that a debtor should 
consider disclosing potential assets only ifhe is caught concealing 
them. This so-called remedy would only diminish the necessary 
incentive to provide the bankruptcy court with a truthful disclosure 
of the debtor's assets." Burnes, 291 F.3d at 1288. 
Eastman, 493 F.3d at 1160. 
Courts from a host of other jurisdictions have applied the doctrine of judicial 
estoppel even though the plaintiffi'debtor had reopened their bankruptcy or amended his 
bankruptcy schedules. Grant v. CRST Van Expedited, Inc., 2009 WL 3067221 (N.D. Iowa 2009) 
("Allowing [plaintiff/debtor] to pursue her claims simply because she ultimately succeeded in 
reopening the bankruptcy proceeding would provide the wrong incentive to litigants"); Traylor v. 
Gene Evans Ford, LLC, 185 F. Supp.2d 1338, 1340 (N.D. Ga. 2002) (holding that bankruptcy 
petitioner was judicially estopped from proceeding with his tort action even though he later 
modified his bankruptcy petition to reflect his lawsuit after defendant moved for summary 
judgment on judicial estoppel grounds); Scoggins v. Arrow Trucking Co., 92 F. Supp.2d 1372, 
1376 (S.D. Ga. 2000) (holding that bankruptcy petitioner was judicially estopped from 
proceeding with his tort action when he disclosed the lawsuit in the bankruptcy matter only after 
being forced to do so after the defendant filed a motion for summary judgment); Chandler v. 
Samford University, 35 F. Supp.2d 861,863-865 (N.D. Ala. 1999) (holding that plaintiff was 
judicially estopped from asserting a previously undisclosed tort claim, even though she 
eventually informed her attorney and the bankruptcy court of the claim in a second bankruptcy 
filing). 
Additionally, three ofthe Georgia cases upon which Doherty relies are 
distinguishable from this case, because the debtor in each of those cases had informed the 
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bankruptcy trustee of the personal injury action at the 11 U.S.c. Section 341 First Meeting of 
Creditors or in the debtor's Statement of Financial Affairs. CSX Transportation, Inc. v. Howell, 
675 S.E.2d 306, 307 (Ga. Ct. App. 2009) ("However, according to an affidavit filed by Howell's 
bankruptcy attorney, Howell did disclose at the 341 hearing that he had a lawsuit against CSXT 
on account of being injured."); McBride v. Brown, 538 S.E.2d 863, 864 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000) 
("Brown apprised those present at a bankruptcy creditors' meeting of this personal injury claim 
as indicated by the trustee's notes."); Johnson v. Trust Company Bank, 478 S.E.2d 629, 651 (Ga. 
ct. App. 1996) ("Plaintiff also specifically referred to the potential claim in the Statement of 
Financial Affairs he filed with the bankruptcy. court. "). 
Finally, Defendants submit that the Idaho Supreme Court would not follow the 
Georgia Court of Appeals decisions, but instead follow the decisions of those courts upon which 
it has relied in the Wood case, i.e., Burnes v. Pemco Aeroplex, Inc.; Hamilton v. State Farm Fire 
& Casualty Co. 
In summary, Doherty's eleventh hour candor and reopening of his Chapter 13 
bankruptcy came about only after the Defendp.nts unearthed his failure to disclose his medical 
malpractice action in his Chapter 13 bankruptcy. Allowing Doherty to escape the doctrine of 
judicial estoppel because he reopened his bankruptcy will serve only to reward him for being 
caught concealing his medical malpractice claim and diminish the necessary incentive to provide 
the bankruptcy court with a truthful disclosure of his assets. 
D. It is Irrelevant That Dr. Dixon is Not a Party to Doherty's Bankruptcy or 
That Dr. Dixon is Not Prejudiced by Doherty's Failure to List His Medical 
Malpractice Claim, As These Are Not Required Elements of Judicial 
Estoppel in the Bankruptcy Context. 
It is irrelevant that Dr. Dixon was not a party to Doherty's bankruptcy or that Dr. 
Dixon is not prejudiced by Doherty's failure to list his medical malpractice claim in his 
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bankruptcy. In Wood the court explained that "'[w]hile privity and/or detrimental reliance are 
often present in judicial estoppel, they are not required. '" Id., 141 Idaho at 686, 116 P.3d at 16 
(quoting Burnes, 291 F.3d at 1286). Additionally, parties asserting judicial estoppel are not 
required to demonstrate individual prejudice since courts have concluded that the doctrine is 
intended to protect the judicial system. Id. (citing Burnes, 291 F.3d at 1286 ("The doctrine of 
judicial estoppel protects the integrity ofthe judicial system, not the litigants. "). 
Doherty further argues that he should not be estopped from asserting his medical 
malpractice claim because doing so would create "inequity in the name of equity." Defendants 
disagree. Equity follows the law-"Equitas sequitur legem." And applying the law in this case 
must result in preventing Doherty from pursuing his medical malpractice claim in order to 
protect the integrity of judicial proceedings and to provide the incentive for truthful disclosure of 
the debtor's assets to the bankruptcy courts. 
E. It is Irrelevant Whether Doherty's Bankruptcy is Unrelated to His Medical 
Malpractice Action. 
Doherty argues that the doctrine of judicial estoppel camlOt apply in this case, 
because the reason he filed for bankruptcy is unrelated to the reason he filed his medical 
malpractice claim. The Idaho Supreme Court in Wood never held that a plaintiffs bankruptcy 
must be related to a tort claim brought in another proceeding. If this were the law, there would 
be no incentive for a debtor to fully disclose all assets and potential assets in his bankruptcy 
schedule. A debtor seeking shelter under the bankruptcy laws is required to disclose all assets, or 
potential assets, to the bankruptcy court under 11 U.S.c. § 521(1), and 541(a)(7). Wood, 141 
Idaho at 686, 116 P.3d at 16 (citing Burnes, 291 F.3d at 1286). "Full disclosure is 'crucial to the 
effective functioning of the federal bankruptcy system.'" Id. (quoting Burnes, 291 F.3d at 1286). 
Because both creditors and bankruptcy courts rely on the accuracy of the disclosure statements, 
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"the importance of full and honest disclosure cannot be overstated." Id. (quoting Burnes, 291 
F.3d at 1286). 
Other courts have affirmed the dismissal of cases under the doctrine of judicial 
estoppel where the reason the plaintiff filed for bankruptcy was altogether unrelated to the non-
bankruptcy related litigation filed by the plaintiff in another court. For example, in Burnes v. 
Pemco Aeroplex, Inc., a case very similar to this case, one of the plaintiffs, Billups, filed a 
Chapter 13 bankruptcy in July 1997, and in January 1998 he filed an employment discrimination 
claim against his employer Pemco. Pemco did not participate in the bankruptcy. In December 
1999, Billups, along with 35 other plaintiffs, filed an employment discrimination lawsuit against 
Pemeo. In October 2000, Billups converted his Chapter 13 bankruptcy to a Chapter 7 
bankruptcy. Billups never amended his schedules to reflect his lawsuit against Pemco. Billups 
filed for bankruptcy for reasons unrelated to the employment discrimination claim that he 
brought against his employer after he filed for bankruptcy. The Eleventh Circuit Court of 
Appeals affirmed the district court's decision that Billups was judicially estopped from pursing 
his employment discrimination cause of action because he failed to disclose that claim in his 
bankruptcy. 
In summary, if the doctrine of judicial estoppel were to apply only to claims 
related to bankruptcy proceedings, there would be no incentive for debtors to identify claims or 
lawsuits unrelated to the bankruptcy as assets or potential assets. Such a rule would emasculate 
11 U.S.C. sections 521(1), and 541(a)(7) and a debtor's duty to fully and honestly disclose all 
assets and potential assets in bankruptcy. 
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F. The Court Must Dismiss This Case on Judicial Estoppel Grounds Even if the 
Bankruptcy Trustee is Substituted as the Real-Part-in-Interest. 
As noted previously, in Eastman v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., the Tenth Circuit 
Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision granting the defendant summary judgment 
based upon the doctrine of judicial estoppel. In that case, the district court concluded that the 
plaintiff/debtor and the bankruptcy trustee were estopped from pursuing a personal injury claim 
against the defendant, even after the plaintif£ldebtor had had his bankruptcy reopened and the 
trustee had been substituted as the real-party-in-interest to the personal injury claim. The court 
also refused to adopt a lesser sanction than judicial estoppel, explaining: "That Gardner's 
bankruptcy was reopened and his creditors were made whole once his omission became known 
is inconsequential. A discharge in bankruptcy is sufficient to establish a basis for judicial 
estoppel, "even if the discharge is later vacated." Eastman, 493 F.3d at 1160 (quoting 
Hamilton, 270 F.3d at 784). The court further explained that allowing Gardner to back up and 
benefit from the reopening of his bankruptcy only after his omission had been exposed "would 
'suggest that a debtor should consider disclosing potential assets only ifhe is caught concealing 
them" and that such a "remedy would only diminish the necessary incentive to provide the 
bankruptcy court with a truthful disclosure ofthe debtor's assets. '" ld. (quoting Burnes, 291 
F.3d at 1288). 
Defendants submit that regardless of whether the bankruptcy trustee is substituted 
as the real-party-in-interest, the Court must still conclude that the trustee and Doherty are 
judicially estopped. The reason being that allowing the claim to proceed will not serve to protect 
the integrity of the courts. "The doctrine of judicial estoppel protects the integrity of the judicial 
system, not the litigants." Burnes, 291 F.3d at 1286. It is also "required to preserve the integrity 
of the earlier proceedings." Oneida Motor Freight, Inc. v. United Jersey Bank, 848 F.2d 414, 
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418 (3d Cir. 1988). Furthermore, allowing the medical malpractice claim to move forward will 
diminish the necessary incentive to provide the bankruptcy court with a truthful disclosure of a 
debtor's assets and serve only to reward Doherty for intentionally failing to disclose his claim. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing argument and authority, Defendants respectfully 
request that the Court conclude that Doherty is judicially estopped from pursuing his medical 
malpractice claim and that his complaint should be dismissed with prejudice as a matter of law. 
Itft. 7!-DATED this ~day of June, 2010. 
MOFFAIT, THOMAS, BARREIT, ROCK & 
FIELDS, CHARTERED 
By ;id(/01 f. ~ ~'. 
Gary T. Dance Ofthe Firm 
Attorneys for Defendants 
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GORDON DIXON, M.D., BLACKFOOT ) 
MEDICAL CLINIC, INC., and BLACKFOOT ) 
MEDICAL CENTER, LLC, ) 
) 
Defendants. ) 
CASE NO. CV-2006-2145 
ORDER GR4.NTING DEFENDANTS' 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT AND SUBSTITUTING 
THE BANKRUPTCY TRUSTEE AS 
THE PARTY PLAINTIFF 
1. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendants Gordon Dixon, M.D. (hereinafter "Dr. Dixon") and Blackfoot Medical Clinic, 
Inc. (hereinafter the "Clinic"), in response to a motion in limine filed by Plaintiff Jerry Doherty 
(hereinafter "Doherty"), argued that "there is an issue as to whether Doherty should be judicially 
estopped from asserting his medical malpractice claim for not including his claim against Dr. 
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Dixon in his bankruptcy schedules 
,,] Doherty considered Defendants' Opposition to 
Doherty's Motion in Limine as a "de facto motion for summary judgment,,2 and requested 
additional briefing time.3 Doherty received additional time for briefing the judicial estoppel 
. 4 
Issue. 
Doherty filed a supplemental memorandum supporting his opposition to the defendants' 
estoppel issue, 5 together with affidavits. 6 During a status conference, Doherty informed the 
Court of his petition to reopen his bankruptcy. 7 Thus, submission of the estoppel issue became 
I Defendants' Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motions in Limine, Doherty v. Dixon, Bingham County case 
no. CV-2006-2145 (filed August 18, 2009) (hereinafter "Defendants' Opposition to Doherty's Motion in 
Limine"), at pp. 7-13. Defendant Blackfoot Medical Center, LLC was dismissed with prejudice by stipulation of the 
parties. Order of Dismissal with Prejudice, DohertyI'. Dixon, Bingham County case no. CV-2006-2145 (filed April; 
17,2007). 
2 Reply Memorandum in SUppOlt of Plaintiffs Motions in Limine, Doherty v. Dixon, Bingham County case no. CV-
2006-2145 (filed August 21,2009) (hereinafter "Doherty's Reply in Support of Motions in Limine"), at pp. 5-7, ~ 
E. 
3 Doherty's Reply in Support of Motions in Limine, at p. 7, ~ E.4; Motion for Enlargement of Time to Respond to 
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment re Judicial Estoppel, Doherty v. Dixon, Bingham County case no. CV-
2006-2145 (filed August 21,2009) (hereinafter "Doherty's Motion for Enlargement of Time"). 
4 See: Minute Entry, Doherty v. Dixon, Bingham County case no. CV-2006-2145 (filed August 25, 2009) 
(hereinafter the" August 24, 2009 Minute Entry"). 
5 Supplemental Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Re: Judicial 
Estoppel, Doherty v. Dixon, Bingham County case no. CV -2006-2145 (filed September 8, 2009) (hereinafter 
"Doherty's Supplemental Memorandum"). 
6 Affidavit of Javier L. Gabiola in Support of Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment re: Judicial 
Estoppel, Doherty v. Dixon, Bingham County case no. CV-2006-2145 (filed September 8, 2009) (hereinafter the 
"Javier Gabiola Affidavit IV"; Affidavit of Jerry Doherty, Doherty v. Dixon, Bingham County case no. CV -2006· 
2145 (filed September 8, 2009) (hereinafter the "Doherty Affidavit"). 
7 Minute Entry, Doherty v. Dixon, Bingham County case no. CV-2006-2145 (filed September 9, 2009) (hereinafter 
the "September 9, 2009 Minute Entry"). 
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dependent upon the bankruptcy court's decision whether to reopen Doherty's bankruptcy.8 The 
parties continued to file additional briefs and affidavits in support of their respective positions. 9 
The banlauptcy court later reopened Doherty's banlauptcy, resulting in a stay of all 
matters pending in this lawsuit. 10 Approximately two months later, the parties informed the 
Court that the banlauptcy case was complete and that this matter could proceed. II Doherty 
moved to join the bankruptcy trustee as a party plaintiff. 12 
A hearing was held on the judicial estoppel issue and on Doherty's Motion to Join the 
Trustee.13 Based upon the record, the relevant authorities, and the arguments of the parties, this 
cause of action belongs to the bankruptcy estate and the trustee is the real party in interest. The 
trustee may proceed with Doherty's claims. Doherty, on the other hand, should be judicially 
estopped from proceeding with this matter. 
8 Id. 
9 See: Defendants' Memorandum in Support of Judicial Estoppel Defense, Doherty v. Dixon, Bingham County case 
no. CV-2006-2145 (filed September 14, 2009) (hereinafter the "Defendants' Memorandum"); Second 
Supplemental Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs Opposition to Defendants' Judicial Estoppel Defense and in 
Support of Motion for Joinder of Bankruptcy Trustee, Doherty v. Dixon, Bingham County case no. CY-2006-2145 
(filed June 9, 2010) (hereinafter "Doherty's Second Supplemental Memorandum"); Affidavit of Javier L. Gabiola 
in SuppOli of Plaintiffs Opposition to Defendants' Judicial Estoppel Defense and in Support of Motion for Joinder 
of Bankruptcy Trustee, Doherty v. Dixon, Bingham County case no. CY -2006-2 145 (filed June 9, 2010) (hereinafter 
the "Javier Gabiola Affidavit V"); and Defendants' Supplemental Memorandum in Support of Judicial Estoppel 
Defense, Doherty v. Dixon, Bingham County case no. CV -2006-2145 (filed June 18, 2010). 
iO Minute Entry, Doherty v. Dixon, Bingham County case no. CY -2006-2145 (filed March 29, 2010). 
II Minute Entry, Doherty v. Dixon, Bingham County case no. CV-2006-2145 (filed May 25,2010) (hereinafter the 
"May 24, 2010 Minute Entry"). 
12 Plaintiffs Motion for Joinder of Bankruptcy Trustee as a Party Plaintiff, Doherty v. Dixon, Bingham County case 
no. CY -2006-2145 (filed June 9, 2010) (hereinafter "Doherty's Motion to Join Trustee"). 
13 Minute Entry, Doherty v. Dixon, Bingham County case no. CY-2006-2l45 (filed July 8, 2010) (hereinafter the 
"July 7, 2010 Minute Entry"). 
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II. ISSUES 
The defendants take the position that Doherty is judicially estopped from continuing his 
suit against them because Doherty failed to list the lawsuit as a contingent asset in his banlauptcy 
schedules. 14 Doherty contends that he did not intend to mislead the bankruptcy court, and that 
dismissal of this lawsuit would be creating inequity in the name of equity. IS He also argues that 
the defendants are not prejudiced by Doherty's failure to list this lawsuit in his banlauptcy 
schedules, that he cured the defect by reopening his bankruptcy, the defendants' "motion for 
summary judgment" is untimely under the relevant scheduling order, and the defendants failed to 
list judicial estoppel as a defense in their answer, thereby waiving it. 16 Doheliy also seeks to join 
the banJauptcy trustee (hereinafter the "Trustee") as a party plaintiff. 
Based upon these arguments, the following issues must be decided: 
(1) Should the defendants' "motion for summary judgment" be stricken as untimely? 
(2) Did the defendants waive their judicial estoppel claim by failing to include it as a 
defense in their answer? 
(3) Did Doherty have a duty to list a potential tort claim in his banlauptcy schedules? 
14 Defendants' Opposition to Doherty's Motion in Limine, at pp. 12-13. 
15 Doherty's Supplemental Memorandum, at pp. 1-4. 
16 Doherty's Supplemental Memorandum, at pp. 6-7. 
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(4) Did Doherty have a duty to amend his banlauptcy schedules, prior to discharge, to 
include this lawsuit as a potential asset? 
(5) Did Doherty's request to reopen his banlauptcy cure his earlier failure to declare 
this lawsuit as a potential asset? 
(6) Does Doherty's declaration that he did not intend to mislead the banlauptcy court 
absolve his failure to declare a potential asset? 
(7) Does the lack of prejudice to the defendants absolve Dohel1y of his failure to 
declare a potential asset in banl(ruptcy? 
(8) Does the potential for inequity to Doherty's creditors trump the doctrine of 
judicial estoppel in this case? 
(9) Should the Trustee be substituted for Doherty as the real party in interest in this 
case? 
(10) Should Doherty be judicially estopped from pursumg his claim against the 
defendants? 
III. FINDINGS OF FACT 
The following facts are found by a preponderance of the evidence, with all reasonable 
inferences drawn in favor of Doherty. 17 
17 See Busch!v. Sage Health Care, PLLC, 146 Idaho 764, 768, 203 P.3d 694, 698 (2009). 
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1. Doherty injured his eye on September 12, 2004. 18 Doherty sought treatment from 
Dr. Dixon, a general practitioner at the Clinic. 19 Doherty claims Dr. Dixon failed to perform 
appropriate tests and failed to refer Doherty to an eye specialist, thereby causing Doherty to lose 
h· 70 IS eye.-
2. Some ten months later, on July 25, 2005, Doherty filed his bankruptcy petition.21 
According to Doherty, he filed bankruptcy because he was behind on his truck payments and 
wanted to keep the truck.22 In his banlauptcy petition, Doherty did not claim any debts owed to 
Dr. Dixon, nor did Doherty owe money to Dr. Dixon?3 Doherty did not list his potential claim 
against the defendants in his original banlauptcy asset schedules. 24 
3. On September 6, 2005, Doherty's Chapter 13 Plan (hereinafter the "Plan") was 
confirmed by the bankruptcy court. 25 Under the Plan, Doherty would avoid over $12,000.00 in 
d d· l' 26 unsecure cre ItOI' c allTIS. 
18 First Amended Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial, Doherty l' Dixon, Bingham County case no. CY-2006-2145 
(filed November 15, 2006) (hereinafter the "First Amended Complaint"). 
19 First Amended Complaint, at p. 2. 
20 First Amended Complaint, at p. 3. 
21 Doherty Affidavit, at p. 1, ~ 2. 
22 Dohelty Affidavit, at p. 2, ~ 3. 
23 1d. 
24 Dohelty Affidavit, at p. 2, ~ 4. 
25 Affidavit of Julian E. Gabiola in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion in Limine, Doher~)' v. Dixon, Bingham County 
case no. CY -2006-2145 (filed August 18, 2009) (hereinafter the "Julian Gabiola Affidavit"), at Exhibit 1. 
26 Julian Gabiola Affidavit, at Exhibit 1, pp. 10 (showing aggregate amount of unsecured claims), 42 (Chapter 13 
Plan showing no provision for unsecured claims), and at Exhibit J (Order Confirming Chapter 13 Plan). 
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4. One year later, on September 6, 2006, Doherty filed this lawsuit against the 
defendants?7 Doherty did not amend his bankmptcy asset schedules to reflect this potential 
asset. 28 
5. The bankruptcy court discharged Doherty on January 21,2009. 29 
6. In their Answer, the defendants did not include judicial estoppel as an affirmative 
defense to Doherty's claims. 3D 
7. By its 3rd Amended Scheduling Order, this Court notified the parties that the jury 
trial was scheduled on September 22, 2009. 31 All summary judgment motions were to be filed 
by July 24,2009.32 
8. On August 11,2009, Doherty filed his motions in limine in anticipation oftria1.33 
In his Motions in Limine, Doherty sought to exclude evidence of his bankmptcy.34 In his 
supporting memorandum, Doherty stated simply that he had filed for bankruptcy in the past. 35 
27 Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial, Doherty v. Dixon, Bingham County case no. CV-2006-214S (filed 
September 6, 2006). 
28 Doherty Affidavit, at p. 2, ~ 4. 
29 Julian Gabiola Affidavit, at Exhibit M, p. I. 
30 Defendants' Answer to First Amended Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial, Doherty v. Dixon, Bingham County 
case no. CY-2006-2145 (filed March 9, 2007) (hereinafter the "Defendants' Answer"). 
31 3rd Amended Scheduling Order, Doherty v. Dixon, Bingham County case no. CY-2006-2145 (filed February 3, 
2009) (hereinafter the "3 rd Amended Scheduling Order"), at p. I, ~ A.I. 
32 ld. 
33 Plaintiff's Motions in Limine, Doherty v. Dixon, Bingham County case no. CV-2006-2145 (filed August I J, 2009) 
(hereinafter "Doherty's Motions in Limine"). 
34 Doherty's Motions in Limine, at p. 2, ~ (E). 
35 Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff's Motions in Limine, Doherty v. Dixon, Bingham County case no. CY-2006-
2!45 (filed August!!, 2009). 
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9. On August 18,2009, the defendants, in response to Doherty's Motions in Limine, 
raised the issue of Doherty's failure to include this lawsuit in his bankruptcy asset schedules and 
failure to amend his bankruptcy asset schedules after Doherty filed this lawsuit. 36 Doherty 
treated Defendants' Opposition to Doherty's Motions in Limine as a motion for summary 
. d 37 JU gment. 
10. On August 26, 2009, Doherty sought to reopen his bankruptcy, and filed an 
Amended Schedule B reflecting this lawsuit as a bankruptcy asset. 38 The bankruptcy court 
reopened Doherty's bankruptcy on March 4, 2010. 39 
11. On September 9,2009, this Court vacated the September 29,2009 jury tria1. 4o 
12. On June 9, 2010, Doherty moved to join the banlauptcy trustee (hereinafter the 
"Trustee") as a party plaintiff to this lawsuit. 4 ! 
IV. APPLICABLE PRINCIPLES OF LAW 
1. If the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with any affidavits, 
show there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to 
36 Defendants' Opposition to Doherty's Motions in Limine, at section V, pp. 7-13. 
37 Motion for Enlargement of Time to Respond to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment re Judicial Estoppel, 
Doherty v. Dixon, Bingham County case no. CV -2006-2145 (filed August 21, 2009); Affidavit of Javier L. Gabiola 
in SUPPDl1 of Plaintiff's Motion for Enlargement of Time to Respond to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment 
re: Judicial Estoppel, Doherty v. Dixon, Bingham County case no. CV -2006-2 J 45 (filed August 21, 2009) 
(hereinafter the "Javier Gabiola Affidavit III"), at p. 1, ~ 2. 
38 Javier Gabiola Affidavit IV, at pp. J -2, ~~ 2,4. 
39 Javier Gabiola Affidavit V, at Exhibit A. 
40 September 9,2009 Minute Entry. 
41 See: Doherty'S Motion to Join Trustee. 
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judgment as a matter oflaw, summary judgment may be granted.42 Disputed facts are construed 
in favor of the non-moving party and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the record 
are drawn in favor ofthe non-moving party.43 
2. A pmiy against whom a summary judgment is sought cannot merely rest on its 
pleadings. 44 When faced with SuppOliing affidavits or depositions, the opposing party must show 
material issues of fact which preclude the issuance of summary judgment.45 
3. While the moving pmiy must prove the absence of a genuine issue of material fact,46 
the opposing party cannot simply speculate.47 A mere scintilla of evidence is not enough to create a 
genuine factual issue.48 Summary judgment is appropriate when the non-moving party cmIDot 
establish the essential elements of the claim.49 
42 Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c); Bushi v. Sage Health Care, PLLC, 146 Idaho 764, 768,203 P.3d 694, 698 
(2009); G & M Farms v. Funk Irrigation Co., 119 Idaho 514, 516-7, 808 P.2d 851, 853-4 (1991). 
43 Bushi v. Sage Health Care, PLLC, 146 Idaho at 768, 203 P.3d at 698; Lockheed Martin Corp. v. idaho State Tax 
Commission, 142 Idaho 790,793,134 P.3d 641, 644 (2006). 
4'1 Par/aU! v. Harper, 145 Idaho 683, 688, 183 P.3d 771, 776 (2008); He. Nelson, A.l.A. v. Steer, 118 Idaho 409, 
410,797 P.2d 117,118 (1990). 
45 Esser Electric v. Lost River Ballistics Technologies, Inc., 145 Idaho 912, 919, 188 P.3d 854, 861 (2008). 
46 Watkins v. Peacock, 145 Idaho 704, 708, 184 P.3d 210, 214 (2008); Wai! v. Leavell Caltle, Inc., 136 Idaho 792, 798, 
41 PJd 220, 226 (2001). 
47 Cantwell v. City ()lBoise, 146 Idaho 127, 133, 191 P Jd 205, 211 (2008). 
48 Van\,. Portnel!lMedical Center, 147 Idaho 552, 556,212 PJd 982, 986 (2009); West v. Sonke, 132 Idaho 133, 138, 
968 P.2d 228, 233 (1998). 
49 Summers v. Cambridge Joint School Distric! No. 432, 139 Idaho 953, 956, 88 P.3d 772, 775 (2004); Deldeer v. 
Magic Valley Regional Medical Center, 115 Idaho 332, 333, 766 P.2d 1213, 1214 (1989). 
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4. If reasonable persons could reach differing conclusions on material issues, or draw 
conflicting inferences therefrom, then the motion for summary judgment must be denied. 50 
5. The purpose for the briefing deadlines set f011h in Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 
56(c) is to give the opposing paIiy an adequate and fair opportunity to support its case. 51 
Although the deadlines under Rule 56(c) are mandatory, a trial court may shorten them for good 
cause shown. 52 
6. Under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 8(c), a party must set forth in his or her 
pleading any affirmative defenses to the other party's pleading. 53 The purpose of this rule requiring 
that affirmative defenses be pleaded is to aleli the paIiies about the issues of fact that will be tried 
and to afford them an opportunity to present evidence to meet those defenses. 54 
7. A debtor seeking shelter under the bankruptcy laws is required to disclose all assets, 
or potential assets, to the bankruptcy court under 11 United States Code § 521 (1) and 541 (a)(7). 55 
The duty to disclose all assets and potential assets continues after the initial filing since a debtor is 
required to amend his or her financial statements if circumstances change. 56 
50 Van v. Portneu! Medical Center, 147 ldaho at 556, 212 P.3d at 986; Cramer v. Slater, 146 Idaho 868, 873, 204 
P.3d 508, 513 (2009). 
51 Sun Valley Potatoes, Inc. v. Rosholt, Robertson & Tucker, 133 Idaho 1,5,981 P.2d 236, 240 (1999). 
52 Sun Valley Potatoes, Inc. v. Rosholt, Robertson & Tucker, 133 Idaho at 6, 98 I P.2d at 241. 
53 Nguyen v. BlIi, 146 Idaho 187, 191, 191 P.3d 1107, III (Ct. App. 2008) [citing: Cole v. State, 135 Idaho 107, 
110, 15 P.3d 820, 823 (2000); Garren v. Butigen, 95 Idaho 355, 357-9, 509 P.2d 340, 342-4 (1973); Hartwell Corp. 
v. Smith, 107 Idaho 134, 138,686 P.2d 79,83 (Cl. App. 1984)] .. 
54 Nguyen v. Bu!, 146 Idaho at 191, 191 P.3d at 1 I 11 [citing: Williams v. Paxton, 98 Idaho 155, 163-4 at fn.l, 559 
P.2d 1123, 1131-2atfn.1 (1976)]. 
55 A & J Construction Company v. Wood, 141 Idaho 682,685-6, 116 P.3d 12, 15-6 (2005). 
56 A & J Construction Company v. Wood, 141 Idaho 686, 116 P.3d 16. 
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8. The doctrine of judicial estoppel prohibits "a party from assuming a position in one 
proceeding and then taking an inconsistent position in a subsequent proceeding."s7 Judicial 
estoppel is applied when a litigant obtains a judgment, advantage, or consideration from one party, 
through means of sworn statements, and subsequently adopts inconsistent and contrary allegations 
or testimony to obtain a recovery or a right against another party, arising out of the same transaction 
or subject matter. 58 Idaho cOUlis may apply the doctrine even if the prior proceeding was a 
banhuptcyaction.59 
9. Judicial estoppel is inappropriate in cases of conduct amounting to nothing more 
than mistake or inadvertence,6o or in instances of fraud or duress. 6l Two circumstances in which a 
debtor's failure to disclose might be deemed inadvertent are: (1) "where the debtor lacks knowledge 
of the factual basis of the undisclosed claims," and (2) where "the debtor has no motive for 
6? concealment." -
1 O. Because judicial estoppel is an equitable doctrine existing to protect the dignity of 
the judicial process it is "invoked by a court at its discretion.,,63 Abuse of the court's discretion is 
measured under a three-part test: (1) whether the court con'ectly perceived the issue as one of 
57 Riley v. WR. Holdings, LLC, 143 Idaho 116,121-2,138 P.3d 316, 321-2 (2006) [citing: A & J Construction 
Company 1'. Wood, 141 Idaho at 688, 116 P.3d at 18]. 
58 Heinze v. Bauer, 145 Idaho 232,235-6, 178 P.3d 597, 600-1 (2008) [citing: Loomis v. Church, 76 Idaho 87, 93-4, 
277 P.2d 561,565 (1954)J. 
59 Riley v. WR. Holdings, LLC, 143 Idaho at 122, 138 P.3d at 322 [citing: A & J Construction Company v. Wood, 
141 Idaho at 688, 116 P.3d at 18). 
60 White v. Wvndham Vacation Ownership, lnc., _ F.3d _,2010 WL 3155161, at *3 (6 th Cif. 2010). 
61 Heinze v. Bauer, 145 Idaho at 235, 178 P.3d at 600. 
62 White v. Wyndham Vacation Ownership, lnc., _ F.3d at _, 2010 WL 3155161, at *3 [citing: Browning v. 
Levy, 283 F.3d 761,776 (6 th Cir. 2002»). 
63 Riley v WR. Holdings, LLC, 143 Idaho at 122,138 P.3d at 322 [citing: Swordv. Sweet, 140 Idaho 242, 252, 92 
P.3d 492, 502 (2004»). 
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discretion; (2) whether the court acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion and consistently 
with the legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (3) whether the court 
reached its decision by an exercise of reason. 64 
11. Under the Banlauptcy Code, all of the debtor's assets and claims are the property 
of the bankruptcy estate, which is created when a banlauptcy petition is filed. 65 If a debtor fails 
to carry out his affirmative duty to schedule any asset or claim, or revise his asset schedules, the 
asset or claim continues to belong to the banlauptcy estate. 66 The trustee of the estate is the real 
party in interest with exclusive standing to pursue the asset or claim. 67 
V. ANALYSIS 
A. The Defendants' Opposition to Doherty's Motion in Limine shall Not be Stricken as 
Untimely. 
Initially, the timeliness of the defendants' Opposition to Doherty's Motion, which 
Doherty considered as a motion for summary judgment, should be addressed. The record 
confirms that the defendants did not file a motion for summary judgment pertaining to judicial 
estoppel within the time limits established by the 3rd Amended Scheduling Order. 
6·j Riley v. WR Holdings, LLC, 143 Idaho at 122, 138 P.3d at 322 [citing: Sun Valley Shopping Center v. Idaho 
Power, 1191daho 87, 94, 803 P.2d 993,1000 (1991)]. 
65 A & J Construction Company, Inc, ]I, Wood, 141 J daho at 688, fn. I, 1 16 P .3d at J 8, fn, 1. 
66 Id, [citing: Cusano v. Klein, 264 F,3d 936,945-6 (9 th Cir. 2001)]. 
67 A & J Construction Company, Inc, v, Wood, 141 Idaho at 688, fn, 1, 116 P.3d at J 8, fn, I [citing: Wieburg v, GTE 
Southwest, inc, 272 F.3d 302, 306 (5 th Cif. 2001)], 
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Almost immediately after the defendants filed their Opposition to Doherty's Motion in 
Limine, Doherty requested additional time to respond thereto. 68 Doherty's request wasgranted.69 
Then,theSeptember 29, 2009 jury trial was vacated and the hearing on the Defendants' 
Opposition to Doherty's Motion in Limine was stayed until after the bankruptcy court ruled on 
Doherty's request to reopen his bankruptcy.7o Once the bankruptcy was re-opened, the parties 
were allowed to submit supplemental briefing on the judicial estoppel issue. 71 
This Court's scheduling orders serve the same objective as Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 
56. By setting deadlines for filing dispositive motions, the panies are given adequate and fair 
opportunities to support their cases, and defend against dispositive motions filed againstthem. A 
scheduling order also forces the parties to prepare for the set trial date. 
The defendants never actually filed a motion for summary judgment on the estoppel issue. 
It was Doherty who initially considered the Defendants' Opposition to Doherty's Motion in 
Limine as a motion for summary judgment. Thereafter, however, both Doherty' and the Court 
assumed that either a motion to dismiss or a motion for summary judgment was at issue.72 Since 
the defendants never actually filed a motion for summary judgment, they were not in violation of 
the 3rd Amended Scheduling Order. 
68 Doherty's Motion for Enlargement of Time. 
69 August 24, 2009 Minute Entry. 
70 September 9,2009 Minute Entry. 
71 May 24, 2010 Minute Entry. 
72 See: Doherty'S Supplemental Memorandum; Javier Gabiola Affidavit III; May 24,2010 Minute Entry; 
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Even if the Defendants' Opposition to Doherty's Motion in Limine is considered as a 
motion for summary judgment, and was therefore untimely under the deadlines set forth in the 3 rd 
Amended Scheduling Order, Doherty was afforded additional time to respond to the defendants' 
claims. Given the circumstances peculiar to this case, the trial setting was vacated. Cancelling 
the scheduled trial allowed the bankruptcy court to consider Doherty's request to reopen his 
bankruptcy. Thus, the 3rd Amended Scheduling Order, and its deadlines, is no longer in effect 
and does not limit any dispositive motion at this stage of the proceedings. 
Another question arises, however. Doherty's bankruptcy preceded the filing of this case. 
Not until three years after suit was filed did the defendants raise the issue of Doherty's failure to 
include the lawsuit in his banlauptcy schedules. Were the defendants dilatory in raising judicial 
estoppel? 
The record reveals that the defendants took Doherty's deposition on September 18, 
2007. 73 The defendants neither asked, nor did Doherty reveal, anything about a bankruptcy.74 It 
appears from the record that the defendants were unaware of Doherty's bankruptcy until Doherty 
himself revealed it in his August 7, 2009 motion in limine. 75 The defendants responded with 
their judicial estoppel argument immediately thereafter, on August 18,2009. 
73 Affidavit of Javier L. Gabiola in Support of Plaintiff's Motions in Limine, Doherzy v. Dixon, Bingham County 
case 110. CV -2006-2145 (filed August 1 J, 2009) (hereinafter the "Javier Gabiola Affidavit I"), at Exhibit A. 
74 Javier Gabiola Affidavitl, at Exhibit A. 
75 See: Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff's Motion in Limine, Doherty v. Dixon, Bingham County case no. CV-
2006-2145 (filed August 11, 2009), at p. 7. 
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The facts in the record infer that the defendants were unaware of Doherty's concurrent 
bankruptcy until August of 2009. Thereafter, they immediately raised their judicial estoppel 
argument. Based upon these facts, the defendants have not waived the judicial estoppel issue by 
failing to raise it sooner. 
B. The Defendants' Failure to Include their Judicial Estoppel Defense in their Answer 
does Not Waive the Defense under the Circumstances of this Case. 
Doherty also argues that the defendants failed to include judicial estoppel as an 
affirmative defense in their Answer. As with motion deadlines, Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 
8(c) requires the inclusion of affirmative defenses in a party's answer in order to put the plaintiff 
on notice thereof. Such requirement allows the plaintiff to prepare to rebut the defense as the 
plaintiff prepares for trial. 
In this case, the record infers that the defendants did not lmow about Doherty's 
bankruptcy until immediately before they filed their Opposition to Doherty's Motion in Limine. 
Thus, the defendants could not include judicial estoppel in their Answer due to ignorance. 
Judicial estoppel is a legal issue, properly raised by dispositive motion. Although the 3rd 
Amended Scheduling Order was in place when the defendants filed their Opposition to Doherty's 
Motion in Limine, the trial of this matter was later vacated to allow the bankruptcy court to 
consider Dohelty's request to reopen his bankruptcy to amend his asset schedules. Therefore, the 
3rd Amended Scheduling Order was voided. 
The parties were given additional time to brief the judicial estoppel issue after the 
bankruptcy comt re-opened Doherty's bankruptcy. Doherty has not been limited in his ability to 
combat the Defendants' Opposition to Dohelty's Motion in Limine. Almost one year has passed 
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smce the defendants raised the issue, and Doherty has been gIve ample opportunity to 
supplement his briefing and to argue his position. 
For these reasons, the defendants have not waived their defense of judicial estoppel by 
failing to include it in their Answer. The merits of the Defendants' Opposition to Doherty's 
Motion in Limine shall be considered. 
C. Doherty had a Duty to List his Potential Tort Claim III his Bankruptcy Asset 
Schedules and/or to Amend his Bankruptcy Schedules. 
It is well-settled that a debtor filing for banlauptcy must list not only existing assets, but 
also potential assets. 76 Furthermore, the duty to list all assets continues during the pendency of 
the bankruptcy.77 The Idaho Supreme Court, quoting the Ninth Circuit federal Court of Appeals, 
stated: 
Judicial estoppel will be imposed when the debtor has knowledge of enough facts 
to Imow that a potential cause of action exists during the pendency of the 
bankruptcy, but fails to amend his schedules or disclosure statements to identify 
1 f · . 78 t le cause 0 actIOn as a contmgent asset. 
After DoheIiy's third surgery with Dr. Moffett, Doherty believed that but for Dr. Dixon's 
failure to refer him to an eye specialist on the date of his injury, he would have retained full 
eyesight in his injured eye. 79 Dr. Moffett performed surgeries on Doherty on September 28, 
76 II United States Code § 521 (l) and § 541 (a)(7); A & J Construction Company v. Wood, 141 Idaho at 686, 116 
P.3d at 16 [citing: Burnes v. Pemco A eroplex, Inc., 291 F.3d 1282, 1286 (11 til Cir. 2002)]. 
77 A & J Construction Company v. Wood, 141 Idaho at 686, 116 P.3d at 16 [citing: Burnes v. Pemco Aeroplex, Inc., 
291 F.3d at 1286]. 
78 A & J Construction Company v. Wood, 141 Idaho at 686,116 P.3d at 16 [citing: Hamilton v. State Farm Fire & 
Casualty Company, 270 F.3d 778, 784 W" Cir. 2001)]. 
79 Javier Gabiola Affidavit 1, at Exhibit A, pp. 15-16. 
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2004, October 19, 2004, and October 28, 2004. 80 Thus, by October 28, 2004, approximately 
eight (8) months before he filed for bankruptcy, Doherty recognized that he had a potential claim 
against Dr. Dixon. In addition, by September 6, 2006, when Doherty filed suit against Dr. Dixon 
and the Clinic, Doherty was fully aware that he had a potential claim against Dr. Dixon and the 
Clinic. 
Doherty failed to either list this lawsuit as a potential asset when he initially filed for 
bankruptcy, or to amend his asset schedules after he filed this lawsuit. Doherty thereby breached 
his duties under the Bankruptcy Code. 
D. Doherty's Re-Opening of his Bankruptcy Did Not Cure his Earlier Failure to Declare 
this Lawsuit as a Potential Asset. 
Doherty contends that since the bankruptcy court granted his motion to re-open his 
bankruptcy to declare this lawsuit as a potential asset, no harm has been done. Courts that have 
considered this defense have generally not favored Doherty's position. 
The federal Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, in a very recent opinion, refused to accept the 
debtor's re-opened bankruptcy as a defense to judicial estoppel. The court wrote: 
We will not consider favorably the fact that [the debtor] updated her initial filings 
after the motion to dismiss was filed. To do so would encourage gamesmanship, 
since [the debtor] only fixed her filings after the opposing party pointed out that 
1 fil ' . 81 t lose 1 mg were maccurate. 
80 Affidavit of Javier L. Gabiola in support of Plaintiffs Opposition to Defendants' Motion in Limine, Doherty v. 
Dixon, Bingham County case no. CY-2006-2145 (filed August 118 2009) (hereinafter the "Javier Gabiola 
Affidavit II"), at Exhibit A, pp. 16-21. 
81 White v. Wyndham Vacation Ownership, lnc., _ F.3d ))), 20]0 WL 3155161 at p. *7 (6 th Cir. 2010). 
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The federal Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals took a similar stance, when it wrote: 
'" [the debtor's] attempt to reopen the bankruptcy estate to include her 
discrimination claim hardly casts her in the good light she would like. She only 
sought to reopen the bankruptcy estate after the defendants moved the district 
court to enter summary judgment against her on judicial estoppel grounds. 
"Allowing [a debtor] to back-up, re-open the banlauptcy case, and amend his 
banlauptcy filings, only after his omission has been challenged by an adversary, 
suggests that a debtor should consider disclosing potential assets only if he is 
caught concealing them. This so-called remedy would only diminish the 
necessary incentive to provide the bankruptcy court with a truthful disclosure of 
the debtor's assets." [Citation omitted.] As such, [the debtor's] disclosure upon 
82 re-opening the bankruptcy estate deserves no favor. 
The bankruptcy court for the eastern district of California dismissed the "re-opening cure" 
offered by Doherty as irrelevant, stating "[t]here is no authority that such actions, occurring after 
the discharge of the [debtor's] debts, excuses the debtor's failure to timely declare all interests of 
the bankruptcy estate. ,,83 
Doherty relies heavily upon caselaw from the state of Georgia to support his claim that re-
opening his bankruptcy renders the doctrine of judicial estoppel inapplicable. 84 The state of 
Georgia adheres to the principal that amending the bankruptcy petition to include the claim, even 
after the bankruptcy case is closed, precludes judicial estoppel from barring the claim. 85 The 
Georgia courts reason that "if the bankruptcy court permits an amendment allowing an omitted 
82 Barger v. City of Cartersville, Georgia, 348 F.3d 1289, 1297 (llth Cir. 2003) [citin£!: Burnes v. Pemco Aeroplex, 
Inc., 291 FJd at 1284]. 
8.1 Rose v, Beverly Health and Rehabilitation Services, Inc., 356 B.R. ]8,27 (Bankr, E.D, Calif 2006). 
84 Doherty'S Second Supplemental Memorandum, at pp, 3-5. 
85 Jowers v, Arthur, 245 Ga,App, 68, 71, 537 S.E.2d 200, 20] (2000), 
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tort claim, it stands to reason that the Georgia court in which the tort claim is asserted should 
honor the bankruptcy court's actions.,,86 
Markedly absent from any of the Georgia cases cited by Doherty is any recognition 
whatsoever of the Bankruptcy Code's allocation of a bankrupt's assets. Section 541 of the 
Bankruptcy Code provides that virtually all of a debtor's assets, including causes of action 
belonging to the debtor at the commencement of the banlauptcy case, vest in the banlcruptcy 
estate upon the filing of a banlauptcy petition. 87 The trustee, as the representative of the 
banlauptcy estate, is the real party in interest, and "is the only party with standing to prosecute 
causes of action belonging to the estate once the banlu'uptcy petition has been filed. ,,88 Once an 
asset becomes part of the banlu'uptcy estate, the debtor reclaims the asset only if .the trustee 
abandons it. 89 Property of the estate that is not listed on the schedules or otherwise administered 
by the time the case is closed remains property of the estate forever. 90 By ignoring this 
fundamental rule of banlauptcy, and approving a debtor's maintenance of a civil lawsuit that 
does not belong to the debtor, the Georgia courts undermine the integrity of the bankruptcy laws. 
86 Jowers v. Arthur, 245 Ga.App. at 70-1, 537 S.E.2d at 202. 
87 Kane v. National Union Fire insurance Company, 535 f.3d 380, 385 (5 th Cir. 2(08). 
88 rd. 
89 1d. [citing: Parker v. Wendy's international, inc., 365 F.3d 1268, 1272 (11 th Cir. 2(04)]. See also: Cannon-Stokes 
v. Potter, 453 F.3d at 448 ("the estate in bankruptcy, 'not the debtor, owns all pre-bankruptcy claims .... "). 
90 An-Tze Cheng v. K & S Diversified investments, inc., 308 B.R. 448,461 (9th Cir. 2(04); Us. ex rei. Gebert v. 
Transport Administrative Services, 260 F.3d 909, 913 (8 th Cir. 2001). 
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Furthermore, Georgia's stance rewards the debtor who hides a potential asset. If the 
opponent never finds out about the debtor's banlauptcy, the debtor suffers no consequence. If 
the opponent does discover the deceit, the debtor suffers no consequence, other than to re-open 
the banlauptcy and possibly share some of his recovery with his creditors. 
If Doherty, or any debtor, is allowed to simply "undo" his sworn statement to the 
bankruptcy court by re-opening his banlauptcy only after his opponent raises the judicial estoppel 
issue, then debtors are encouraged to hide assets and disclose them if later challenged. Such an 
outcome offers debtors no incentive for honesty and weakens the entire banlauptcy system. 
For these reasons, Doherty's re-opening of his banlauptcy to add this lawsuit as a 
potential asset does not provide a defense to judicial estoppel. 
E. Doherty's Lack of Bad Faith Does Not Equate to Mistake or Inadvertence. 
Doheliy asselis that he made a good faith mistake in not including his lawsuit in his 
banlauptcy asset schedules. 9 ! Doherty's intentions are not relevant, however. 92 Instead, judicial 
estoppel is based upon Doheliy's knowledge of the potential claim, coupled with his incentive, if 
any, to conceal it. 93 
91 Doherty Affidavit, at p. 2. 
92 Rose v. Beverly Health and Rehabilitation Services, Inc., 356 B.R. 18,27 (Bania. E.n Calif. 2006). 
93 White v. Wyndham Vacation Ownership, Inc., _ F.3 d at _, 2010 WL 3155161, at *3 [citing: Browning v. 
Lev)', 283 F.3d at 776]. 
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Doherty does not contend, nor can he, that he was unaware of his lawsuit against Dr. 
Dixon and the Clinic. 94 Instead, at oral argument, his counsel contended that Doherty was 
unaware that his potential, and later actual, lawsuit must be listed as an asset in his bankruptcy 
schedules. 
The Idaho Supreme Court, in grappling with the intent of the party against whom judicial 
estoppel is raised, wrote: 
... it should be made clear that the concept [of judicial estoppel] should only be 
applied when the party maintaining the inconsistent position either did have, or 
was chargeable with, full knowledge of the attendant facts prior to adopting the 
initial position. Stated another way, the concept of judicial estoppel takes into 
account not only what a pariy states under oath in open court, but also what that 
party Imew, or should have known, at the time the original position was adopted. 
Thus, the knowledge that the party possesses, or should have possessed, at,the 
time the statement is made is determinative as to whether that person is "playing 
fast and loose" with the court. 95 
In Heinze, a client sued his divorce attorney for legal malpractice. 96 The client argued 
that his attomey negligently recommended acceptance of the terms of the divorce settlement. 97 
Although the client expressed concem over the allocation of debts and assets in the settlement, 
the client ultimately acknowledged, under oath, that he accepted the terms of the settlement. 98 
The attorney later moved to set aside the settlement, but the magistrate judge denied the 
motion. 99 
94 See: Doherty Affidavit. 
95 Heinze v. Bauer, 145 Idaho at 235-6, 178 P.3d at 600-1 [citing: McKay v. Owens, 130 Idaho 148, 155,937 P.2d 
1222, 1229 (1997)] (emphasis supplied in Heinze v. Bauer decision). 
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The c1ientthen sued his attorney for negligent representation. 100 The attorney moved for 
summary judgment on the ground of judicial estoppe1. 1 01 The Idaho Supreme Court determined 
that the client was chargeable with full lmowledge of the attendant facts prior to adopting the 
settlement, even if the client was not actually aware, at the time he accepted the settlement, of 
en-ors therein. 102 The Court affirmed the district court's application of judicial estoppel to grant 
. d '.c: f I 103 summary JU gment 111 lavor 0 t 1e attorney. 
Although Idaho appellate courts have not dealt directly with the "ignorance of the law" 
defense that Doherty presents here, other federal courts have taken a dim view of such a 
position. 104 The bankruptcy court for the district of Hawaii put it this way: 
100 Id. 
101 W. 
A large pOliion of debtors who file for . .. bankruptcy surely are as 
"unsophisticated" and "unschooled" as [the debtor], yet have little difficulty fully 
disclosing their financial condition to the bankruptcy court. [The debtor's] 
assertion that he simply did not know better ... is insufficient to withstand 
application of the doctrine [of judicial estoppel]. 105 
102 Heinze v. Bauer, 145 Idaho at 236-7, 178 P.3d at 601-2. 
103 Heinze v. Bauer, 145 Idaho at 241, 178 P .3d at 606. 
104 See: Eastman v. Union Pacific Railroad Company, 493 F.3d 1151, 1]59 (10 th Cir. 2007); Biesek v. Sao Line 
Railroad Company, 440 F.3d 410, 411 (ih Cir. 2006); Galin v. l.R.s., 563 F.Supp.2d 332, 341 (D.Conn. 2008). 
105 Ah Quin v. County of Kallai Department of Transportation, _ B.R. _, 2010 WL 1372322 at p. *5 (D. 
Hawai'i 20] 0) [citing: Eastman v. Union Pacific Railroad Company, 493 F.3d ]151, ]159 (] ath Cir. 2007)] 
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Further, if Doherty infers that either his bankruptcy or his civil counsel failed him, the 
Idaho Supreme Court has held that "following the advice of counsel is not equivalent to 
inadvertence or mistake.,,106 The federal Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals bluntly described 
such a defense as legally unavailing. 107 Other courts take the identical positi on. 108 
Indeed, to allow Doherty to assume an "ignorance of the law" defense would gut the 
fundamental purpose of judicial estoppel, which is to protect the integrity of the judicial 
system. 109 In this case, judicial estoppel is available to protect the integrity of the bankruptcy 
process. 1 10 Doherty, once he instituted the bankruptcy process, disrupted the flow of commerce 
and obtained a stay and the benefits derived by listing all of his assets. ] II Doherty's failure to list 
his claim against Dr. Dixon and the Clinic as an asset on his bankruptcy schedules deceived the 
bankruptcy court and Doherty's creditors, who relied on the schedules to determine what action, 
if any, they would take in the matter. 112 Doherty did enjoy the benefit of both an automatic stay 
and a discharge of debt in his banhuptcy proceeding. 
Moreover, Doherty had a motive to conceal the potential claim from the bankruptcy court 
and ultimately his creditors. By omitting the claim from his asset schedules, he could enjoy the 
full fruits if he is successful in his litigation. 
106 A & J Construction Co., Inc. v. Wood, 141 Idaho at 687, 116 P.3d at 17. 
107 Cannon-Stokes v. Potter, 453 F.3d 446, 448-9 (ih Cir. 2006). 
108 See: White v. Wyndham Vacation Ownership, Inc., _ F.3d at _, 2010 WL 3155161 at p. *7; In re Coastal 
Plains, Inc., 179 F.3d 197,213 (5 th Cir. 1999); Tokheim v. Georgia-Pacific Gypsum L.L.C, 606 F.Supp.2d 988, 
998-9 (N.D. Iowa 2009); Galin v. I.R.S., 563 F.Supp.2d at 341; Barger v. City a/Cartersville, Georgia, 348 F.3d 
1289, 1295 (11 th Cir. 2003). 
109 Indian Springs LLC v. Indian Springs Land Investment, LLC, 147 Idaho 737, 748, 215 P.3d 457, 468 (2009). 
110 See: Hamilton v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Compal~)I, 270 F.3d at 785. 
III ld. 
112 ld. See also: In re Coastal Plains, Inc., 179 F.3d at 208. 
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For these reasons, Doherty is charged with knowledge of his potential claim and for 
failing to list it as an asset in his banlauptcy schedules. The fact that Doherty may have been 
ignorant of the banlcruptcy laws is no excuse. 
F. Lack of Prejudice to the Defendants does Not Cure the Defect. 
Doherty argues that Dr. Dixon and the Clinic suffered no prejudice by allowing Doherty 
to re-open his banhuptcy and to proceed with this lawsuit. 113 Whether or not the party-opponent 
in the non-banhuptcy action suffers prejudice is one of the factors articulated by the United 
States Supreme Court in New Hampshire v. Maine. Il4 The U.S. Supreme Court identified three 
considerations in determining whether to apply judicial estoppel: 
First, a party's later position must be 'clearly inconsistent' with its earlier 
pOSItIOn. Second, courts regularly inquire whether the party has succeeded in 
persuading a court to accept that party's earlier position, so that judicial 
acceptance of an inconsistent position in a later proceeding would create 'the 
perception that either the first or the second court was misled.' ... A third 
consideration is whether the party seeking to assert an inconsistent position would 
derive an unfair advantage or impose an unfair detriment on the opposing party if 
II'i not estopped. -
The Idaho Supreme Court, however, made clear that the factors articulated in New 
Hampshire v. Maine are factors a comi may consider, but are not required elements of judicial 
estoppel. 116 The Idaho Supreme Court also quoted New Hampshire v. Maine when it noted that 
II' 
J Dohelty's Supplemental Memorandum, at pp. 6-7. 
114 532 U.S. 742,750-1,121 S. C1. 1808,1815,149 L.Ed.2d 968, 977-8 (2001). 
115 NewHampshirev. Maine, 532 U.S. at 750-1,121 S. Ct. at 1815,149 L.Ed.2d at978. 
116 Heinze v. Bauer, 145 Idaho at 240, 178 P .3d at 605 [citimr: A & J Construction Company, Inc. v. Wood, 141 
Idaho at 687, 116 P.3d at 17J. 
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'" [t]he circumstances under which judicial estoppel may appropriately be invoked are probably 
not reducible to any general formulation of principle. ",J J 7 
Instead of the three factors highlighted in New Hampshire v. Maine, the Idaho Supreme 
Court consistently applies the rule announced in Loomis v. Church, 118 that: 
Judicial estoppel is applied when a litigant obtains a judgment, advantage, or 
consideration from one party, through means of sworn statements, and 
subsequently adopts inconsistent and contrary allegations or testimony to obtain a 
recover or a right against another party, arising out of the same transaction or 
subject matter. J J 9 
In this case, Doherty obtained a discharge of $12,000.00 in debt, based upon his sworn 
statement of assets, which did not include this lawsuit as a potential asset. He now adopts the 
inconsistent and contrary allegation that Dr. Dixon and the Clinic are liable to him for medical 
malpractice. In other words, Doherty previously claimed he had no outstanding potential assets, 
despite his knowledge (according to his deposition testimony), that but for Dr. Dixon's failure to 
send him to an eye specialist on the date of his injury, he would allegedly not have lost his eye. 
He now claims that Dr. Dixon's alleged failure is a potential asset. 
The non-disclosure of a potential asset, and the later pursuit of that same asset 111 a 
different forum, arise out of the same transaction or subject matter. Where Doherty declined to 
disclose this lawsuit as a potential asset to the bankruptcy court, he asserts that he is owed money 
from the same potential asset in this Court. 
117 Heinze]i, Bauer, 145 Idaho at 240, 178 P.3d at 605 [citing: New Hampshire ]i, Maine, 532 U,S, at 750, 121 S.Ct, 
at 1815,149 L.Ed.2d at 978]. 
118 76 Idaho 87, 93-4,277 P.2d 561, 565 (1954), 
119 Loomis]I, Church, 761daho at 93-4, 277 P,2d at 565, 
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It is true that neither Dr. Dixon nor the Clinic suffered any prejudice, beyond delay, by 
Doherty's failure to list this lawsuit as a potential asset and his failure to amend his asset 
schedules. It was the creditors who suffered, however. Doherty's unsecured creditors relied on 
Doherty's nondisclosure and accepted payment on a pro rata basis, meaning they were not paid in 
full. 120 
In the event that this lawsuit should proceed to a judgment against Dr. Dixon and the 
Clinic, however, the unsecured creditors could potentially recover their claims in full. Even in 
that instance, however, it is the integrity of the judicial process that suffers. If Doherty is allowed 
to proceed with this lawsuit, after his opponents discovered the deceit and Doherty amended his 
banhuptcy schedules, then debtors may be encouraged to willfully hide potential assets from the 
bankruptcy court with no threat of reprisal for such actions. Since the doctrine of judicial 
estoppel exists "to protect the integrity of the judicial process by prohibiting parties from 
deliberately changing positions according to the exigencies of the moment,,,121 allowing Doherty 
to go forward at this juncture would thwart that aim. 
For these reasons, prejudice to Dr. Dixon and the Clinic does not weigh heavily in the 
decision to apply judicial estoppel to Doherty. More important is the potential prejudice to 
Doherty's creditors and the ultimate prejudice to the judicial system if Doherty is allowed to 
amend his bankruptcy schedules after his omission was discovered and continue with this lawsuit 
as though he never took inconsistent positions before different tribunals. 
120 See: A & J Construction Company, Inc. v. Wood, 141 Idaho at 687, 116 P.3d at 17. 
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G. No PotentiaUor Inequity Arises if the Trustee is Substituted as the Party Plaintiff. 
Doherty argues that to dismiss his lawsuit would create inequity (to his unsecured 
creditors) in the name of equity. 122 But dismissal of Doherty as a party plaintiff to this lawsuit, 
particularly in light of Doherty's Motion to Join Trustee, will not cause harm to the unsecured 
creditors. 
Again, under the Bankruptcy Code, all of the debtor's assets and claims are the property 
of the bankruptcy estate, which is created when a bankruptcy petition is filed. 123 If a debtor fails 
to carry out his affirmative duty to schedule any asset or claim, or revise his asset schedules, the 
asset or claim continues to belong to the bankruptcy estate. 124 The trustee of the estate is the real 
party in interest with exclusive standing to pursue the asset or claim. 125 
If the Trustee is substituted for Doherty as the real party in interest, inequity to the 
creditors does not result. 
H. The Trustee Should be Substituted for Doherty as the Real Party in Interest. 
Doherty, by his Motion to Join Trustee, seeks the joinder of Kathleen A. McCallister, the 
Trustee of the Chapter 13 Bankruptcy Estate of Jerry Doherty (hereinafter "McCallister"), as a 
121 Barger v. City a/Cartersville, Georgia, 348 F.3d at 1293 [citing: New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. at 749-50, 
121 S. Ct. at 1814]. 
po 
~~ Dohelty's Supplemental Memorandum, at pp. 2-4. 
121 A & J Construction Company, Inc. v. Wood, 141 Idaho at 688, fn. I, 116 P .3d at J 8, fn. I. 
12" Id. [citing: Cusano v. Klein,264 F.3d 936, 945-6 (9 th Cir. 2001)]. 
125 A & J Construction Company, Inc. v. Wood, J 41 Idaho at 688, fn. 1, 1 16 P .3d at 18, fn. I [c iting: Wieburg v. GTE 
Southwest, Inc., 272 FJd 302,306 (5 th Cir. 2001)). 
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party plaintiff to this lawsuit. 126 Dr. Dixon and the Clinic do not object to Doherty's Motion to 
Join Trustee. 127 
In light of the bankruptcy code, and the applicability of judicial estoppel to Doherty; 
McCallister shall be substituted in place of Dohelty, rather thanjoined with Doherty, as the party 
plaintiff to this lawsuit. 
I. Doherty Should be Judicially Estopped from Pursuing his Claim. 
Doherty should not gain an advantage by his failure to list this lawsuit as a potential asset. 
Whether a calculated action, an oversight by bankruptcy or civil counsel, or Doherty's personal 
failure to inform his attorneys of his overlapping legal actions, Doherty is responsible for the 
omission. For reasons outlined above, Doherty shall be dismissed as a party plaintiff to this 
lawsuit. Dr. Dixon's and the Clinic's Opposition to Doherty's Motion in Limine, considered as a 
motion for summary judgment, shall be granted. Concurrently, McCallister shall be substituted 
as the party plaintiff to this lawsuit. 
VI. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
(1) The defendants' "motion for summary judgment" should not be stricken as 
untimely. 
126 Doherty'S Motion to Join Trustee, at p. 1. 
127 See: July 7, 2010 Minute Entry, at p. 1. 
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(2) The defendants did not waive their judicial estoppel claim by failing to include it 
as a defense in their answer. 
(3) Doherty had a duty to list a potential tort claim in his banlauptcy schedules. 
(4) Doherty had a duty to amend his banlauptcy schedules, prior to discharge, to 
include this lawsuit as a potential asset. 
(5) Doherty's request to reopen his banhuptcy did not cure his earlier failure to 
declare this lawsuit as a potential asset. 
(6) Doherty's declaration that he did not intend to mislead the banlauptcy court did 
not absolve his failure to declare a potential asset. 
(7) The lack of prejudice to the defendants does not absolve Doherty of his failure to 
declare a potential asset in banlauptcy. 
(8) The potential for inequity to Doherty's creditors does not trump the doctrine of 
judicial estoppel in this case. 
(9) The Trustee should be substituted for Doherty as the real party in interest in this 
case. 
(10) Doherty should be judicially estopped from pursmng his claim against the 
defendants. 
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VII. ORDER 
The defendants' Opposition to Doherty's Motion in Limine, considered as a motion for 
summary judgment, is granted. Furthermore, Doheliy's Motion to Join Trustee is granted in 
part. McCallister is substituted as the party plaintiff to this lawsuit. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
rt1 
DATED this i Le day of September 2010. 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on WlY); D, I served a true copy of the foregoing 
Order Granting Defendants' Motion fo~ummhry Judgment and Substituting the Bankruptcy 
Trustee. as the Party Plaintiff on the persons ·listed below by mailing, . first class, postage prepaid, 
or by hand delivery. 
Reed W. Larsen, Esq. 
Javier Gabiola,Esq. 
COOPER & LARSEN, 
CHARTERED 
151 NOlih 3rd Ave., 2nd Floor 
P.O. Box 4229 
Pocatello, ID 83205-4229 
Gary T. Dance, Esq. 
Julian E. Gabiola, Esq. 
MOFFATT, THOMAS, 
BARRETT, ROCK & FILEDS, 
CHARTERED 
412 West Center 
P.O. Box 817 
Pocatello, ID 83204 
~ U.S. Mail o Courthouse Box o Facsimile 
~ U.S. Mail 0 Courthouse Box o Facsimile 
SARA 1. STAUB, Clerk of the Court 
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Reed W. Larsen (3427) 
Javier L. Gabiola (5448) 
COOPER & LARSEN, CHARTERED 
15] North 3 f t! Avenue, 2nd Floor 
P. O. Box 4229 
Pocatello, 1D 83205-4229 
Telephone: (208) 235-1145 
Facsimile: (208) 235-1182 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 




GORDON DIXON, M.D., and 












NOTICE OF APPEAL 
TO: THE ABOVE NAMED RESPONDENT, GORDON DIXON, M.D., AND 
BLACKFOOT MEDICAL CLINIC, INC., AND THEIR ATTORNEY OF RECORD, 
GARY T. DANCE OF MOFFATT, THOMAS, BARRETT ROCK & FIELDS, 
CHARTERED, AND THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE ENTITLED COURT. 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
I. The above-named Plaintiff, Jerry Doherty, appeals against the above named 
Respondent to the Idaho Supreme Court from the Order Granting Defendants' motion ror SUIllIlWI) 
Judgment and Substituting the Bankruptcy Trustee as the Party Plailluffentered III the above-entitled 
action on the 16th day of September, 2010, the Honorable DalTen B. Simpson presldlJ1g. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 1 
2. Appellant has the right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme COUli, and the order described 
in paragraph 1 above is an appealable order under and pursuant to Rules 11(a)(2) or 12(a) of the 
l.A.R. 
3. The issues which Appellant intends to raise on appeal include the follovving: 
a. Whether tbe trial court erred in refusing to strike defendants' Motion for 
Summary Judgment for being untimely. 
b. Whether the trial court erred in determining that the defendants waived the 
defense of judicial estoppel by failing to claim it in the Answer. 
c. Whether the trial cOLirt erred in its application of the doctrine oCJudicial 
estoppel as between the plaintiff, Jerry Doherty, and the defendant, Gordon Dixon, M.D., and 
Blackfoot Medical Clinic, Inc., because of the bankruptcy filing ofMr. Doherty. 
d. Did the trial court error in determining that Mr. Doherty was judicially 
estopped from pursuing his claim against the defendants Gordon Dixon, M.D., and Blackfoot 
Medical Clinic, Inc. 
4. No order has been entered sealing all or any pOliion of the record. 
5. The Appellant requests a reporter's transcript as defined in Rule 25. The f\ppeli<llll 
requests that the preparation of the transcript be in hard copy. 
6. The Appellant requests the following documents to be included in the clerk's record 
in addition those automatically included under Rule 28, l.A.R.: all of the summary judgment 
motions, affidavits, and briefs dealing with the summary judgment memorandum decision of 
September 16,20 I 0. 
7. There are no exhibits that would be applicable as trial has not yet taken place. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 2 
8. Reed W. Larsen, the undersigned attorney of the appellant, hereby certi fies that: 
a. The Notice or Appeal has heen made upon the reporter or lhe pr()CCL'dlll~:-' 
Sandra Beebe, Bingham County Courthouse, 50 I North Maple, No. ]0 I, Blackfoot, Idaho H3221-
1700. 
b. That the clerk of the district court or administrative agency has been paid the 
estimated fee for preparati on of the reporter's transcript. 
c. That the estimated fees for preparation of the clerk's or agency's record has 
been paid. 
d. That the appellant filing fee has been paid. 
e. That service has been made on all parties require to be served pursuant to 
Rule 20. 
DA TED this..2:::~ day of October, 20 10. 
COOPER & LARSEN, CHARTERED 
~~ 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 3 
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IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF'THE"STATE oi-IDAHO 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BINGHAM 
KA THLEEN A. McCALLISTER, in her ) 
capacity as the Bankruptcy Trustee and ) 
substituted in place of Jeny Doherty, ) 
) CASE NO. CV-2006-214S 
Plaintiff, ) 
) ORDER CLARIFYING SUMMARY 
vs. ) JUDGMENT ORDER 
) 
GORDON DIXON, M.D., BLACKFOOT ) 
MEDICAL CLINIC, INC., and BLACKFOOT ) 
MEDICAL CENTER, LLC, ) 
) 
Defendants. ) 
THIS COURT, on September 16, 2010, issued its Order Granting De.fendants' Motion for 
Summary Judgment and Substituting the Banla-uptcy Trustee as the Party Plaintiff (hereinafter the 
"Summary Judgment Order ") in the above-numbered and styled cause. At the status conference 
held this date, the parties informed the COUli that they understood the Summary Judgment Order to 
apply judicial estoppel not only to former Plaintiff Jerry Doherty (hereinafter "Doherty"), but also 
to Kathleen McCallister, in her capacity as the bankruptcy trustee and substituted in place of Jerry 
Doherty (hereinafter "McCallister"). This Order shall clarify the Court's ruling in the Summary 
Judgment Order. 
ORDER CLARIFYING SUMMARY JUDGMENT ORDER 1 
According to bankruptcy law, the claims Doherty makes against the defendants in this 
lawsuit, having arisen pre-petition (that is, prior to his filing the Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition), 
belonged to McCallister, and only McCallister has standing to pursue them. 1 Furthermore, this 
Court held that Dohetiy was judicially estopped from pursuing those claims because he failed to 
include them in or add them to his bankruptcy asset schedules. 2 
The Summmy Judgment Order reads: 
Based upon the record, the relevant authorities, and the arguments of the parties, 
this cause of action belongs to the banlauptcy estate and the trustee is the real 
party in interest. The trustee may proceed with Doherty's claims. Doherty, on the 
other hand, should be judicially estopped from proceeding with this matter. 3 
This conclusion, set forth in the preliminary Statement of the Case section of the Summary 
Judgment Order, was not repeated at the end of the opinion. Thus, the parties misinterpreted the 
Court's intent to bar Doheliy from recovering on a claim he failed to list in his banlauptcy 
schedules but to allow the banlauptcy trustee to pursue those claims on behalf of the banlauptcy 
estate. 
McCallister, in her capacity as the banlauptcy trustee, should not be judicially estopped 
from pursuing Doherty's claims against the defendants. Where the evidence does not reflect that 
the trustee abandoned the asset or took a contrary position before the banlauptcy court, the 
I See. e.g.: Moses v. Howard University Hospital, 606 F.3d 789, 796 (D.C. Cir. 2010) [citing: Parker v. Wendy's 
International, Inc., 365 F.3d 1268, 1272 (11th Cir. 2004)]; Turner v. Cook, 362 F.3d 1219, 1225-6 (9 th Cir. 2004); 
Detrick v. Pana/pina, lnc., 108 F.3d 529, 535 (4 th Cir. 1997). 
2 Order Granting Defendants' motion for Summary Judgment and Substituting the Bankruptcy Trustee as the Party 
Plaintiff, Doherty v. Dixon, Bingham County case no. CV-2006-2145 (filed September 16,20 10), at p. 29. 
) Summary J1ldgment Order, at p. 3. 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on ~ 1/ J.- OJ / I V, I served a true copy of the foregoing 
Order ClarifYing Summary Judgment Ordl; on tIre persons listed below by mailing, first class, 
postage prepaid, or by hand delivery. 
Reed W. Larsen, Esq. 
Javier Gabiola, Esq. 
COOPER & LARSEN, 
CHARTERED 
151 North 3rd Ave., 2nd Floor 
P.O. Box 4229 
Pocatello, ID 83205-4229 
Gary T. Dance, Esq. 
Julian E. Gabiola, Esq. 
MOFFATT, THOMAS, 
BARRETT, ROCK & FILEDS, 
CHARTERED 
412 West Center 
P.O. Box 817 
Pocatello, ID 83204 
rm u.s. Mail 0 Courthouse Box o Facsimile 
¢ U.S. Mail 0 Courthouse Box o Facsimile 
SARA J. STAUB, Clerk of the Court 
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IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT (i)F'THE=SfATEO~ IDAHO 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BINGHAM 
KATHLEEN A. McCALLISTER, in her ) 
capacity as the Bankruptcy Trustee and ) 
substituted in place of Jerry Doherty, ) 
) CASE NO. CV-2006-2145 
Plaintiff, ) 
) JUDMENT AS TO JERRY DOHERTY 
vs. ) 
) 
GORDON DIXON, M.D., BLACKFOOT ) 
MEDICAL CLINIC, INC., and BLACKFOOT ) 
MEDICAL CENTER, LLC, ) 
) 
Defendants. ) 
THIS COURT, having issued its Order Granting Defendants' Motion for Summary 
Judgment and Substituting the Banlo'uptcy Trustee as the Party Plaintiff and its Order ClarifYing 
Summary Judgment Order in the above-numbered and styled cause, finds that a judgment 
dismissing Jeny Doherty as the party plaintiff should issue. 
Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that Jeny Doherty is hereby dismissed as the party plaintiff 
from this lawsuit. Jeny Doherty shall take nothing by his claims against the Defendants. 
JUDGMENT AS TO JERRY DOHERTY 1 
Plaintiff Kathleen A. McCallister, inher capacity as the Bankruptcy Trustee, may proceed 
hereafter as the plaintiff, as she sees fit. 
·W 
DATED this d~ I day of November 2010. 
Darr~n B. Simpson 
District Judge 
RULE 54(B) CERTIFICATE 
With respect to the issues determined by the above Judgment as to Jerry Doherty, it is 
hereby CERTIFIED, in accordance with Rule 54(b), Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, that the 
Court has determined that there is no just reason for delay of the entry of a final judgment and 
that the Court has and does hereby direct that the above Judgment as to Jerry Doherty shall be a 
final judgment upon which execution may issue and an appeal may be taken as provided by the 
Idaho Appellate Rules. 
i2(? 
DATED this Q3 day of November 2010. 
\ 
JUDGMENT AS TO JERRY DOHERTY 
an~n B. Simpso 
Distl~ct Judge \ 
v 
2 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
1 HEREBY CERTIFY that on lJ(2q I je) , I served a true copy of the foregoing 
Judgment as to Jerry Doherty on the persns list;(! below by mailing, first class, postage prepaid, 
or by hand delivery. 
Reed W. Larsen, Esq. 
Javier Gabiola, Esq. 
COOPER & LARSEN, 
CHARTERED 
151 North 3rd Ave., 2nd Floor 
P.O. Box 4229 
Pocatello,ID 83205-4229 
Gary T. Dance, Esq. 
Julian E. Gabiola, Esq. 
MOFFATT, THOMAS, 
BARRETT, ROCK & FILEDS, 
CHARTERED 
412 West Center 
P.O. Box 817 
Pocatello, ID 83204 
,JUDGl'vIENT AS TO JERRY DOHERTY 
I&l u.s. Mail 
ItJ U.S. Mail 
o Courthouse Box o Facsimile 
o Courthouse Box o Facsimile 
SARA J. STAUB, Clerk of the Court 
d 





Reed W. Larsen (3427) 
Javier L. Gabiola (5448) 
COOPER & LARSEN, CHARTERED 
151 North 3rd Avenue, 2nd Floor 
P. O. Box 4229 
Pocatello, ID 83205-4229 
Telephone: (208) 235-1145 




IN THE DISTRlCT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRlCT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BINGHAM 
KATHLEEN A. MCCALLISTER in her 
capacity as the bankruptcy trustee, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
v. 
GORDON DIXON, M.D., and 



















BLACKFOOT MEDICAL CENTER, LLC, ) 
) 
Bingham County Case No.CV-2006-2145 
Supreme Court Docket No. 38196-2010 
AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL 
TO: THE ABOVE NAMED RESPONDENT, GORDON DIXON, M.D., AND 
BLACKFOOT MEDICAL CLINIC, INC., AND THEIR ATTORNEY OF RECORD, 
GARY T. DANCE OF MOFFATT, THOMAS, BARRETT ROCK & FIELDS, 
CHARTERED, AND THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE ENTITLED COURT. 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
1. The above-named Plaintiff/Appellant, Kathleen A. McCallister, in her capacity as the 
bankruptcy trustee, appeals against the above named Defendants/Respondents to the Idaho Supreme 
AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL - 1 
COUli from the Order Granting Defendants'/Respondents' motion for Summary Judgment 
andPlaintiff sl Appellant's Motion Substituting the Bankruptcy Trustee as the Party Plaintiff entered 
in the above-entitled action on the 16th day of September, 2010, the Honorable Dan'en B. Simpson 
presiding. 
2. Appellant has the right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the order described 
in paragraph 1 above is an appealable order under and pursuant to Rules 11(a)(2) or I2(a) of the 
LA.R. 
3. The issues which Appellant intends to raise on appeal include the following: 
a. Whether the trial court erred in refusing to strike defendants' Motion for 
Summary Judgment for being untimely. 
b. Whether the trial court erred in determining that the defendants waived the 
defense of judicial estoppel by failing to claim it in the Answer. 
c. Whether the trial court erred in its application of the doctrine of judicial 
estoppel as between the plaintiff, Jerry Doherty, and the defendant, Gordon Dixon, M.D., and 
Blackfoot Medical Clinic, Inc., because of the bankruptcy filing ofM1'. Doherty. 
d. Did the trial court error in detennining that M1'. Doherty was judicially 
estopped from pursuing his claim against the defendants Gordon Dixon, M.D., and Blackfoot 
Medical Clinic, Inc. 
4. No order has been entered sealing all or any pOliion ofthe record. 
5. The Appellant requests a repOlier's transcript in both a hard copy and electronic 
fonnat ofthe hearing on the Motion for Summary Judgment and Motion for Joinder ofBanIauptcy 
Tmstee held on July 7th , 2010. 
6. The Appellant requests the following documents to be included in the clerk's record 
in addition those automatically included under Rule 28, I.A.R.: all of the summary judgment t7 i) 3 
AMF,NDF.D NOTICE OF APPEAL- 2 Ci\.-d\ 
DEC-22-2010 11 : 02 
,,__ motions, affidavits, and exhibits attached thereto, and briefs dealing wjth the Motion to Dismiss Re: 
"'.' . 
,-. 
Judicial Estoppel, Judicial Estoppel Defense, Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Rc: 
Judicial Estoppel Defense, Opposition to Defendm1ts ' Motion for Summary judgment Re: Judicial 
Estoppel and summary judgment memorandum decision and order issued by the District Court on 
September 16, 2010. 
7. There are no exhibits that would be applicable as trial has not ye11.ak~n place. 
8. Reed W. Larsen, the undersib'JJed attorney of the appellant, hereby certifies that: 
a. That a copy of the Notice of Appeal has been served upon the reporter of the 
proceedings, Sandra Beehe, Bingham County Cow1:house, 501 NOlth Maple, No. 301, Blackfoot, 
Idaho 83221-1700. 
b. That th.e clerk of the district court has been paid the estimated fee for 
preparation of the reporter's transcript. 
c. That the estimated fees for preparation of the clerk's record has been paid. 
d. That the appellant filing fee bas been paid. 
e. That service has been made on all parties require to be served pursuant to Rule 
20. 
DATED this J1.day of December, 2010. 
COOPER & LARSEN, CHARTERED 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this f'1- day of December, 2010, I served a true and correct 
copy of the above and foregoing document to the following person(s) as follows: 
Gary 1. Dance 
Julian E. Gabiola 
Moffatt, Thomas, Barrett Rock & Fields, Chtd. 
P.O. Box 817 
Pocatello,ID 83204-0817 
Sandra Beebe 
Bingham County Courthouse 
501 North Maple, #310 
Blackfoot, Idaho 83221 








x U.S. Mail/Postage Prepaid 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ ] Facsimile 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
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GORDON DIXON, M.D., BLACKFOOT, 
MEDICAL CLINIC, INC. 
DefendantlRespondent, 















Docket No. 38196 
Case No. CV-2006-214S 
CERTIFICATION 
OF EXHIBITS 
I, SARA STAUB, Clerk of the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District of the 
State ofIdaho, in and for the County of Bingham, do hereby certify, list and describe the 





IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of said 
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GORDON DIXON, M.D., BLACKFOOT, 
MEDICAL CLINIC, INC. 
DefendantlRespondent, 
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I, SARAH STAUB, Clerk of the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District of the 
State of Idaho, in and for the County of Bingham, do hereby certify that the above and 
foregoing record in the above-entitled case was compiled and bound under my direction, 
and is a true, full and correct record of the pleadings, documents and papers designated to be 
included in the clerk's record by the Idaho Appellate Rule 28, the notice of appeal, any 
notice of cross-appeal, and any designation of additional documents to be included in the 
clerk's record. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of said 
court at Blackfoot, Idaho, this 11 th day of February 2011. 
SARA. ~ST . B, C. lerk.ofthe Court 
~~. /~ l~tda7L { 
Depue 
**************************************************************** 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF STATE OF IDAHO 
**************************************************************** 
KA THLEEN McCALLISTER, Chapter 13 
Bankruptcy Trustee, 
) 
) Docket No. 38196 
) Case No. CV-2006-214S 
Plaintiff/Appellant, ) 
-vs- ) 
) CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
GORDON DIXON, M.D., BLACKFOOT, 
MEDICAL CLINIC, INC. 
Defendant/Respondent, 










I, SARA STAUB, Clerk of the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District of the State of 
Idaho, in and for the County of Bingham, do hereby certify I personally served or mailed, by United 
States mail, one copy of the clerk's record and the reporter's transcript in the above-entitled case to 
each of the attorneys of record, to wit: 
Counsel for Appellant: 
Counsel for Respondent: 
Reed W. Larsen, ESQ., PO Box 4229, 
Pocatello,ID 83205-4229 
Gary T. Dance, Esq. PO Box 817, 
Pocatello, ID 83204 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of said court at 
Blackfoot, Idaho, this 11 th day of February 2011. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
SARA STAUB, CLERK 
Clerk of the Distfict Court 




TO: Clerk of the Court 
Idaho Supreme Court 
451 West State Street 
Boise, Idaho 83720 
DOCKET NO. 38196-2010 
( 




( GORDON DIXON, M.D., et al. 
NOTICE OF TRANSCRIPT LODGED 
Notice is hereby given that on January 18,2011, I lodged a transcript of 47 pages 
in length for the above-referenced appeal with the District Court Clerk of the County of 
Bingham in the Seventh Judicial District. 
Hearings included: Motion for Summary Judgment, 7-7-10 
Sandra 1. Beebe, C.S.R. 
January 18, 2011 
